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discussed at two meetings of communists,
but rather superficially. And what is
especially surprising is that the progress
in fulfilling the directives of the Party in
the main direction of agricultural policy
was removed from control by the Party
Committee. Obviously premature!

Now, after the meeting, the
members of the party committee are

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veins? Now, at a meeting of the Party
Committee, its members collectively think
about this. Efficiency and efficiency, a
creative approach to business are the
most important qualities of a modern
organizer. What means will help to develop
them among the employees of the
administrative apparatus? The
comrades are unanimous: it is important
not to leave a single case without a
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Greig O. G
79 Stalin could strike first / Oleg Greig. - M.: Eksmo: Algorithm, 2010. - 368 p. -
(Historical sensations).

G5VM 978-5-699-41154-2

The author, a man who held a responsible position in the organs of Soviet power, in his book for the first time reveals the unknown pages of the Second World War. Did Stalin's plan for a preventive strike against Nazi Germany "Thunderstorm" exist? What were the goals and tasks of the Black Sea Fleet in accordance with it, and why during the war years the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet had a chance to fight mostly on land, and not at sea? These questions are considered by the author from different positions.

The reader will also discover the revelations of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, whom the author personally had the opportunity to meet on several occasions.

UDC 94(47)
LBC 63.3(2)62

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978-5-699-41154-2 © 000 Eksmo Publishing House, 2010

Chapter 1
"CONSIDER WAR INEVITABLE..."

After the end of the war 1941-1945. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR I.V. Stalin issued an order dated July 22, 1945 in honor of the Day of the Navy, where there are the following words: "During the defense and offensive of the Red Army, our fleet reliably covered the flanks of the Red Army, resting at sea, inflicted serious blows on the merchant fleet and shipping of the enemy and ensured the uninterrupted operation of their communications. The combat activity of Soviet sailors was distinguished by selfless steadfastness and courage, high combat activity and high skill. Sailors of submarines, surface ships, naval pilots, gunners and infantry adopted and developed everything from the age-old traditions of the Russian fleet ... On the Baltic, Black and Barenie seas, on the Volga, Danube and Dnieper, Soviet sailors for four years of war wrote new pages in the book of Russian

maritime fame. The fleet has fulfilled its duty to the Soviet Motherland to Konya. And these words emphasize the high appraisal of the actions of all the sailors of the Soviet Navy.

The order says that the fleet reliably covered the flanks of our army, inflicted serious blows on the enemy and, in general, was distinguished by high skill.

But is it?!

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Let's consider this on the example of not the entire Soviet Navy, but in terms of the forces of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF). By the way, it is curious that with such a high assessment of the actions of the entire Navy in the last war, only two of the four commanders of the fleets were awarded the Gold Stars of the Heroes of the Soviet Union, namely, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Filipp Sergeevich Oktyabrsky (present Ivanov) and the commander Admiral Ivan Stepanovich Yumashev of the Pacific Fleet (whose fleet showed good results in the battles against Japan in the Far East campaign in the autumn of 1945 under the command of Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky, holder of two Orders of Victory, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky). Other commanders of the fleets, and in particular the Northern one, Admiral Arseniy Grigorievich Golovko, who, with the help of the entrusted fleet, really provided protection for communications for the delivery of weapons, ammunition, military equipment and strategic raw materials by convoys of allies, did not receive such an award! Like the commander of the Baltic Fleet, Admiral Vladimir Fedorovich Tributs.

It should be added that the only member of the Military Council during World War II who was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union also served in the Black Sea Fleet is Vice Admiral Nikolai Mikhailovich Kulakov. It is also worth remembering the army commander who received the star of the Hero, Major General Ivan Efimovich Petrov (later General of the Army), who commanded the Separate Primorsky Army during the defense of Sevastopol in 1941-1942. And also twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Lavl Ivanovich Batov (later General of the Army), who commanded the 9th Special Rifle Corps during the days of the defense of Sevastopol.

Describing and analyzing the events of those protracted tragic months of 1941-1942 in the Crimea and Sevastopol, one should pay close attention not only to the command and the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet, but also to the army commanders who led the actions of the Soviet troops on the Crimean peninsula.

And, therefore, we will touch on the activities of the three commanders of the troops who held the defense on the Kerch Peninsula. Among the heroes of the book will be the commander of the Crimean Front, Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy, Vice Admiral Gordey Ivanovich Levchenko; representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, army commissar of the 1st rank Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis; Commander-in-Chief of the troops of the Southern Direction (direction as a whole, not the front!) Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny; his deputy for the maritime unit, First Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy, Chief of the Main Naval Staff, Admiral Ivan Stepanovich Isakov (later Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union).

Throughout the author's study of the actions of the Black Sea Fleet in the initial period of the war, there will undoubtedly be a conversation about the heroism of the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet and units of the Red Army operating in this region. But along with this, the unwillingness of Soviet sailors and soldiers, commanders and political workers of both branches of the Armed Forces to fight for interests alien to them will also be analyzed. Which, undoubtedly, to some (let's say frankly: to a large extent) predetermined the nature and direction of the actions of the forces of the fleet. First of all, it should be pointed out that the main command of the Navy, headed by the talented naval commander Admiral Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov (later Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union), clearly realized that the main activity in defeating the enemy would have to be carried out by the army forces, while the fleet would have to play a secondary, supporting role.

In order to understand many of the nuances of the topic of interest to us, it would be necessary to show the relationship between the People's Commissar of the Navy and the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet at that difficult time for these people. That's right - deliberately not emphasizing the usual "difficult time for the country", but leaving "difficult time for these people." Which is connected with many psychological and social factors, under the influence of which the two main characters, who had the most direct relation to the battles for the Black Sea stronghold, turned out to be. At the same time, the people's commissar had to manage not only

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one Black Sea Fleet, but three completely different fleets located in opposite geographic latitudes.

Military historians of the post-war period believe that the most effective form of support for the ground forces was the landing of naval operational and tactical landings, of which a total of 123 were carried out during the war years. More than a quarter of a million people participated in all landings, which averages about 25 arrows kov divisions of the then Red Army. The landing of these formations was provided by more than 3000 warships and auxiliary

telny ships, almost 10,000 aircraft. Maritime transportation played a significant role in the conditions of war. This was important in the north, after the enemy had cut off the Oktyabrskaya railway, its Murmansk direction, with a skillful maneuver. It was also important in the Baltic, during the defense of Hanko, the Moonsund Islands and Leningrad, and in the Black Sea, during the defense of Odessa, Sevastopol and the Caucasian coast. Then the Navy transported about 120 million tons of cargo and about 10 million people.

Naval aviation and artillery made a significant contribution to ensuring the activities of the sea flanks. Pilots during the war made about 75,000 sorties, destroyed 1,500 tanks and many other military equipment and weapons in all fleets. Naval artillery can be confidently attributed to the fire shield of naval bases due to its range and the destructive power of projectiles.

Military historians believe that it was the war that promoted such admirals as talented commanders, such as N. G. Kuznetsov, I. S. Isakov, A. G. Golovko, L. A. Vlady Mirsky, F. S. Oktyabrsky, V. F. Tributs, I. S. Yumashev; this is from the category of leadership of the Navy and commanders of the fleets.

By June 22, 1941, the Soviet Navy included more than 500 surface ships and combat boats, 218 submarines, more than 2.5 thousand aircraft and over 2000 guns.

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coastal and anti-aircraft artillery. All these forces were deployed in four theaters of military operations (THA) isolated from each other. At the same time, the basing and ship repair system is not developed, the possibilities for inter-theatre maneuvering are limited.

Whereas since 1927 the USSR was undergoing the restoration and completion of the construction of ships laid down before 1917, by 1937 submarines and small-tonnage warships were mainly being built. Beginning in 1938, the construction of the sea and ocean fleet began. What fit into the state program of preparation for an offensive war against a potential enemy. But the actions of the political forces of Germany and its attack on the USSR thwarted the implementation of plans to build a large fleet.

By the beginning of the German aggression, 219 warships were under construction, of which: 3 were battleships, 3 were heavy cruisers, 9 were cruisers, 47 were leaders and destroyers, and 91 were submarines.

Organizationally, the Soviet fleet consisted of the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, Pacific fleets and the Amur, Caspian and Pinsk military flotillas. The USSR Navy was subordinated directly to the People's Commissariat

to the Navy Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, and operationally - to the People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko.

After the invasion of the German Wehrmacht, the Main Military Council of the Navy was formed under the chairmanship of Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov. Thanks to the talent of this naval chief, a system of operational readiness developed by him and immediately brilliantly worked out was introduced in the fleets, which made it possible in a very short time to transfer the forces of the fleet from civilian training to full combat readiness; moreover, to do everything in accordance with the strict requirements of the charters and the People's Commissar of the Navy himself, not only to deliver a preventive strategic strike on the entire theater of operations of the USSR Navy, but also to meet the enemy's attack, which is undoubtedly a unique step of Nikolai Gerasimovich; for not a single Soviet military leader thought of preparing the entrusted to him

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special military districts, armies, corps and divisions for defense. After all, in accordance with the strategic plan "Thunderstorm", the Red Army was supposed to deliver a frontal strike from the Baltic to the Black Sea in Europe, not to defend, but to attack. Thanks to Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, the Navy had clear guidelines on the use of naval forces in the prospect of any war, be it offensive or defensive. "For me, one thing is indisputable: J.V. Stalin not only did not rule out the possibility of a war with Nazi Germany, on the contrary, he considered such a war inevitable ... J.V. scheduled by him ... deadlines. These words are in the book of N. G. Kuznetsov "On the Eve".

By the beginning of the war, such views were concretized and enshrined in the guiding operational-tactical documents "Combat Charter of the Naval Forces of the Red Army" of 1937 and "Temporary Instructions for the Conduct of Marine Operations" of 1940. It is thanks to these documents, and especially the last one, that N. G. Kuznetsov prepared the fleets for war in a few hours!

Obviously, we should stop at an explanation of the documents that regulate this or that readiness of the fleets for action. Nikolai Gerasimovich considered it extremely important that the commanders of the fleets and the corresponding commanders of formations and ships clearly understand what should be understood by "readiness No. 3", "readiness L # @ 2", "readiness No. 1".

"Readiness @3" - the usual readiness of ships and units that are in service, i.e. in the first line. Whereas the first line is the ships that are ready to participate in sea battles, and not those that are in the dock, at the pier or in repair at the factory. In the case of "readiness No. 3", the crews of the ships are engaged in daily combat training, live an ordinary life, but maintain fuel supplies, keep

the availability and readiness of the weapons and mechanisms of the ship.

"Readiness #2" - much higher than the previous one. For the ships replenish all the necessary supplies, again and again put the material part in order, establish special duty according to the ship's schedule, dismissals for

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the cost of all personnel is reduced to an extreme minimum, and this applies to both sailors and commanders. The personnel remains in place. Ships can stay in this state for a long time, although this will require a certain amount of moral and physical strength from the personnel.

And, finally, the highest "readiness No. 1", which is announced when it is absolutely clear that the situation is extremely dangerous and a turn to peacetime is practically impossible. All weapons and mechanisms of a warship must be able to immediately take action, and all personnel must be at combat posts and follow the orders of the ship's commander in accordance with the charter: accurately, unquestioningly and within a strict time limit. Having received a prearranged signal, each warship and each part of the fleet forces act according to the instructions they have, which provide for the opening of special government packets, which indicate the time and exit to the place of hostilities.

N. G. Kuznetsov spent a lot of time on each of the fleets, carrying out inspections and exercises. These checks revealed a lot of shortcomings in the preparation of the forces and assets of the four fleets for offensive battles. The Navy did not prepare for defensive measures. It took the people's commissar a year for the fleets to learn how to quickly and accurately switch to high readiness, to "readiness No. 1". Huge work had to be done at headquarters, on ships and in units. The struggle went on not only for hours, minutes, but also for seconds - from the moment the signal was given to the receipt of the command report on the readiness of the fleet.

Chapter 2

WHO OWNS THE SEA AND THE WORLD

... Somehow returning from one of Stalin's meetings, Kuznetsov caught himself thinking: wouldn't it be better to abandon the Black Sea Fleet exercises planned jointly with the troops of the Odessa Special Military District?

Nikolai Gerasimovich, who knew so much, still knew far from everything; however, he understood that the past May 1941 and the coming June were an extremely difficult time for the country's leadership in terms of international relations with a number of European states, with the United States, and especially with its ally, Germany. The seditious thought repeatedly crept into the mind of Nikolai Gerasimovich that this alliance would sooner or later lead to no good. Torturing and torturing himself with doubts, the admiral, being on business with the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Marshal of the Soviet Union Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, asked:

- Tell me, Boris Mikhailovich, what is the participation of the fleets in the plans of the General Staff in case of planned strategic operations of our Red Army in the possible near future?

Shaposhnikov, listening to him, tactfully covered some of the documents lying on his desk with clean sheets of paper, and in a low voice, with a hoarse voice in his voice, answered:

- Don't rush, my dear. You will receive all necessary orders in due time. And now I will not delay you any longer, I have a lot of work to do.

Having not received a satisfactory answer, the admiral, returning to his office, again admitted the idea that the country's Navy would play far from the role that he, as the head of the fleet, had imagined when studying the history of the Russian fleet since the time of Peter the Great. Nikolai Gerasimovich felt this keen sense of unfair innocence especially sharply not when he assumed the post of People's Commissar of the Navy, but in those extremely tense May and June days of 1941.

He was not tormented by a feeling of fear or despondency, even ignorance of the possible development of further events did not take the admiral by surprise, because he tried to calculate them himself, of course, as far as possible. His concern at this stage boiled down to the main thing: is enough done to ensure that all four fleets of the Navy are as ready as possible to instantly respond to what Marshal Shaposhnikov said vaguely and pointedly "... all in due time" ?

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However, the admiral had no doubt that soon the forces of the fleets would have to go to the ocean. This is provided that battleships, heavy cruisers, cruisers, leaders, destroyers and submarines are completed, pass sea and state tests and put into combat operation of the first line. All this will take at least another 6 months to 1.5 years. But even those forces of the fleet that are available as of June 1941 are only partially capable of participating in the grandiose plans of Stalin and his first military leaders. And the fact that plans exist is clear without words.

Kuznetsov remembered a conversation with Stalin connected with the death of the submarine "D-1" - "Decembrist". She was the firstborn of the Soviet submarine shipbuilding and the lead ship of a series of six units bearing revolutionary names from Narodovolets to Yakobinets. It was with the submarine "D-1" that a large-scale peacetime program of submarine shipbuilding was launched, when 250 submarines of various projects were built in less than 10 years. Therefore, the death of the lead ship of this program was perceived very painfully. Stalin ordered to search for the boat and called Golovko himself, duplicating his own order. Then Kuznetsov, in the presence of the chief of the Main Staff, Admiral Haller (already removed from his post, but not yet handed over to Admiral Isakov), reported that, most likely, there had been some kind of fatal mistake or miscalculation made by the commander of the boat, Lieutenant Commander Eltishchev. As a result, he lost control and was unable to keep the boat at the maximum depth, and it was crushed by the pressure of the water.

- Why didn't you do it? - Stalin spoke with a sharp Georgian accent, which spoke of an impending denunciation.

But, apparently, having gathered his will into a fist, he, piercing the admirals with a cruel look, calmly ordered a thorough investigation to begin; and refrained from "strict organizational conclusions." Kuznetsov and Galler were "put in sight", Admiral Golovko received a "severe reprimand". Taking advantage of this, the admirals dared and launched a counterattack,

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stating to the Secretary General that there was an acute shortage of personnel in the fleet. Galler tried to say that the entire mobilization reserve was being taken by the Red Army, while the fleet... Kuznetsov immediately pulled him by the sleeve. But Stalin, who clearly heard the words of the dismissed head of the Main Military School, with his characteristic genius, resolved the issue, as if not noticing the attack: conscripts should increase their service life in the navy to 5 years! And in the case when the time comes for the dismissal of two ages at once, increase it to 7 years.

At the same time, the question of an acute shortage of command personnel was raised. Naval schools could not keep up with the rapid shipbuilding program. There was an acute shortage of commanders of submarines being built in mass series. The leader ordered a secret mobilization of captains and officers of the merchant fleet, passing them through retraining courses. Commanders of disbanded cavalry units were also sent to special courses for submariners. But despite this, the number of naval schools has not increased since 1937.

At the same time, Stalin spoke about the military shipbuilding program and strict control over the schedule for its implementation.

By the end of 1946, it was planned to build 16 battleships, 16 battle cruisers, 2 aircraft carriers, 28 light cruisers, 20 leaders, 144 destroyers, 96 patrol boats, 204 minesweepers, 408 submarines. The admirals were struck by such a program: how to provide this gigantic armada with personnel?! Admiral Galler, in his characteristically intelligent manner, tried to explain to the leader why the shipbuilding program was stalling. This, in his opinion, is explained by the lack of planned deliveries of equipment and weapons for ships by factories in various industries. Haller was a supporter of the grandiose Stalinist program of creating a super-powerful fleet, with the help of which the leader of all times and peoples sought to achieve final victory over the imperialists. And the Stalinist decision to temporarily stop the laying of new ships was painfully received by Haller. Stalin understood that the terms for the implementation of the program did not correspond in any way to the terms of Operation Thunderstorm. Therefore, I considered it necessary

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to curtail the program for a short time, and Haller to be removed from his post and replaced by Admiral Isakov, who was closer in spirit to him, who by 1917 managed to rise only to the rank of midshipman, while Haller was already a captain of the 1st rank, so he had experience knowledge of a different life and a different fleet, and besides, German blood in their veins.

In mid-October, Stalin told Kuznetsov:

- It seems to me that Haller should be replaced by Isakov as Chief of the Main Naval Staff.

The leader's words "it seems to me ..." never had any other meaning than directive or order.

"Galler is a good performer, but not a sufficiently left-handed person, and Isakov is prepared operationally, perhaps better," the leader explained.

It was hard to come up with more nonsense that Admiral Isakov was "better operationally prepared" than Haller. Kuznetsov sighed, but did not dare to protest. However, he asked:

"What are we going to do about Admiral Haller?"

"We'll think about it," the leader replied laconically.

Stalin's last phrase, "We will think about it," frightened the people's commissar, he had already studied the leader and teacher quite well, and made a last attempt to save the disgraced admiral.

"Comrade Stalin," Kuznetsov said in a choked voice, "Admiral Haller is now indispensable in the leadership of the People's Commissariat of the Navy, which you have entrusted to me.

There are no irreplaceable people! - the Secretary General snapped with his favorite phrase with a strong Georgian accent, which followed

consider that the admiral has gone too far ...

- In the navy...

But Stalin abruptly interrupted and ordered to go to his place.

Yes, Nikolai Gerasimovich knew a lot, but not everything. Especially in terms of the fact that the Black Sea Fleet was supposed to ensure complete dominance in the Black Sea, close the Bosphorus and prevent any formations of hostile fleets from moving to the theater of operations (TVĐ) of the Black Sea. With the help of the 9th Special Rifle Corps, it was envisaged to destroy the fleets of Romania and Bulgaria, and if necessary

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Yes, then Turkey. Interacting with the troops of the Odessa and Transcaucasian military districts, ensure their coastal flanks, transportation and landing operations.

In the deep autumn, from November 26 to 28, 1940, command and staff exercises of the troops of the Odessa Military District, led by Colonel General Ya. T. Cherevichenko, were already being held. Where the tasks were conditionally solved (which in fact will be set in May-June 1941). The largest and most powerful army with the serial number "9" was to be secretly introduced into its composition. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky, was called to the exercises. The task of the district, interacting with the ships of the Black Sea Fleet and the Danube Flotilla, was to quickly seize the ports from Constanta to Varna with complex strikes from land and sea, followed by access to the Bulgarian-Turkish border.

Having familiarized himself with the results of the past military and naval games, the leader drew attention to the fact that even in theory, the interaction between different types of troops leaves much to be desired ... but in practice, there is most likely no interaction, but only mediocre attempts. In this, the leader was right, despite the fact that he did not have a sufficient military-strategic outlook. All three types of the Armed Forces, swollen to gigantic proportions on Stalinist leaps and bounds, turned into formidable and at the same time some kind of amusingly amorphous structures that did not want to have anything to do with each other.

Whereas the gigantic pyramid of strict subordination and the strictest personal responsibility, built by Stalin and closing in his Kremlin office, assumed a clear interaction of all branches of the Armed Forces.

The closest military adviser to the General Secretary, BM Shaposhnikov, did his best to solve these problems. After his release from the post of Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army K.A. Meretz Cove, in euphoria from the gigantic number of troops and military equipment

Red Army, completely forgot about the "insignificant" military

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sea fleets. And if he remembered them, then only when the delivery of troops and military equipment was required. Even the artillery support from the ships was classified as ineffective from the experience of the war with Finland. [In his opinion, the fleet has some autonomous plans of its own, which, by the way, no one in the fleet itself knows, since they fully exist only in the mind of Comrade Stalin.

In a way, it was so: the leader cherished his cherished plans. "K710o owns the sea - he owns the world," wrote Admiral Mahan; in this the American naval researcher was absolutely right.

... So, Nikolai Gerasimovich believed that the exercises in the Black Sea Fleet, together with the troops of the Odessa Special Military District (OdOVO)} should be canceled; he instructed the chief of the Main Naval Staff, Admiral I.S. Isakov, to call the General Staff and find out their opinion on this issue. But Ivan Stepanovich replied that he had not been told anything specific, which would give grounds for changing the plan regarding the exercises. In this regard, the People's Commissar and Admiral Isakov decided to instruct the fleet to keep weapons and ships in full readiness. Lead exercises in Sevasto

Isakov left.

The two admirals agreed that if the situation becomes emergency, then Isakov will instruct the commander of the Black Sea Fleet to use the weapons and ships of the fleet already on the spot. After Ivan Stepanovich's departure, Kuznetsov received a phone call from the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, the General Commissar of State Security, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, and asked in a harsh tone:

- Why are you, Comrade Kuznetsov, so irresponsible about our party cadres? Why didn't you send a group of workers from the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda to help Comrade Isakov? Do you think that without Party control you will do whatever you please?

Knowing what was happening in his environment and suppressing any emotional desire to speak out, Nikolai Gerasimovich calmly and firmly answered:

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— Comrade Beria, I have decided to send to the Black Sea Fleet a group of workers from the Main Directorate for Literary Propaganda headed by Brigadier Commissar Azarov. I think this candidacy will satisfy you.

"Very well," the voice in the receiver answered peacefully, "I think Comrade Stalin will be pleased with your decision."

After that, everything was quiet, and then there was a long buzzer. Nikolai Gerasimovich put the receiver on the hook.

[Chapter 3
"FUNAAMENT" OF THE ARMY AND NAVY

The basis, the foundation of the Red Army and the Navy were the political bodies of the CGT). Therefore, the army and navy of the USSR in June 1941 cannot be compared with the Russian army, which existed on the eve of the First World War and was a completely different military formation. She fought for the Fatherland under an Orthodox cross; and the army of 1941, crowned with a pentagram called a red star, was a kind of atheistic army from its very inception. The creators of the Red Army were Leiba Davidovich Bronstein (known as Lev Davidovich Trotsky) and Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov-Lenin. The Red Army, created in 1918, was originally a collection of criminal authorities, executioners, degenerates, psychopaths, drunkards, debauchers and internationalists from China, Yugoslavia, Hungary and other countries of the world, who were alien to the interests of the Russian people and who, being rejected by their countries, they came to arrange their well-being on the blood of Russian people and other subjects of the Russian Empire. In order to keep such an "army" in check, it is necessary to have a huge layer of informers in its midst.

The state of Trotsky and Lenin created this stratum of degenerates, depraved people and greedy people. All of them were informants, if not the commissars, then the operational authorized special departments of the NKVA-GUGB, who are also in

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were mostly Jews. And this fact is no longer disputed by modern historians... Such an army - structurally, morally, psychologically - can only resemble a criminal gang; She must live according to the laws of Hugo

catchers.

The squealing was the backbone of the Soviet ideology in the country that the Bolsheviks had occupied since 1917, destroying Orthodoxy and massively killing the people and the village. Without squealing, communism is impossible in any country, in any form. For communism itself, retelling the essence of Lenin's words, is created on blood, on dictatorship - with the help of monstrous exploitation of the people, which must be constantly kept in fear. And fear is maintained by the incessant work of informers, informing on everyone and everything. It is the informers who are the conspiratorial, secret army of the socialist state. There are informers everywhere: in the Armed Forces, in production, in science, culture, education.

vaniya, i.e. in all sectors and activities of the Soviet country. Informers are needed not only in the conduct of an offensive, but also in a defensive war, which was the war in connection with the aggression of the German Wehrmacht on June 22, 1941.

But after the outbreak of hostilities, huge masses of Soviet informers found themselves on the other side of the front, in captivity. Where ... they continued their activities and voluntarily offered their vile services to the Gestapo. But the German secret police did not trust them very much. At the same time, this so long and carefully created potential of Soviet snitching turned first of all against the commissars and Chekists. After all, whom did they have to hand over to the enemy, if not their own?! It is known that Stalin's son, senior lieutenant of the Red Army Yakov Dzhughashvili, was also captured by informers who were his subordinates before the war and in the first months of the war.

Political workers of the Red Army and Navy were structurally nomenklatura employees of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and functioned as a department of the Central Committee of the Party in the Red Army and the Red Army Fleet. And their leader is the head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda, a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, an army commission

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sar 1st rank Zaporozhets - acted as secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). L.P. Beria headed the punitive organs of the country, but by that time, with the consent of Stalin, the punitive organs were over the fleet, over the army and over a number of structural subdivisions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Lavrenty Pavlovich himself, in connection with the main task of "revealing the enemies of the people," became, perhaps, the closest adviser on these problems to the leader of the party and state, Comrade Stalin. And his political workers, along with employees of the internal affairs bodies in the army and navy, became a reliable support in identifying those very "enemies".

Kuznetsov knew that Ilya Ilyich Azarov had received instructions from the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. So, the instruction was to carry out work with political workers, teaching them that in the event of a war, each political worker must use personal weapons if the fleet commander, having received an order to enter hostilities, for some reason refuses to comply. Of course, for Nikolai Gerasimovich this order in relation to the "rebellious" commanders was not a special secret ... True, years later, Admiral Azarov publicly said that he had received a different kind of instruction: to tell political workers that "in the event of a German attack, readiness weapons ... "; meanwhile, Azarov's position was indeed difficult at that time. The fact is that it was necessary to bring weapons to readiness ... after the TASS announcement of June 14, 1941, announced in the press and on the radio, which categorically rejected rumors about the possibility of war, declaring any rumors provocative.

On the day of the announcement by the Soviet government, Nikolai [e Rasimovich was with Stalin. Having reported on the intelligence data on the fleets, the people's commissar briefly spoke about the exercises at the Black Sea Fleet, and that deliveries from the German side in terms of the fleet, namely in the construction of the Lutzow cruiser, continue. (But in his book "On the Eve", for the sake of certain forces in the country, he, to put it mildly, lied, writing that the Germans then actually stopped deliveries for the Lutzow cruiser). And although the admiral wanted to report that the German

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what transports are leaving our ports and whether the movement of Soviet merchant ships in German waters should not be restricted, he said nothing, waiting for the leader's reaction. Stalin did not ask any questions about the readiness of the fleets, which is why the people's commissar considered his further presence unnecessary and, with the permission of the owner, left the office.

Returning in the car, Nikolai Gerasimovich again caught himself thinking that although this was not said, Stalin did not exclude the possibility of war with Germany. Moreover, he considers this war probable and inevitable. And Stalin considers the 1939 treaty only as a postponement.

"Just four days after Litvinov's dismissal, on May 7, 1939, at the solemn graduation ceremony for students of military academies, Stalin made a short but expressive speech, in particular saying: "The worker-peasant prize must become the most aggressive of all ever existing offensive armies"

... But how many days was given to him, the people's commissar, for this delay?

[Chapter 4
GAME OF SUPER-OLIGARCHES AND POLITICS

In order to clarify the position of the People's Commissar of the Navy in the May June days of 1941, one should go back several years, say, a year in 1927. So, Stalin firmly took his place at the top of the Bolshevik pyramid of power and began to strengthen his dictatorship, becoming increasingly preoccupied with the global problems of the communist movement and expanding his influence in the world. It was in that year that Stalin concluded that World War II was inevitable. He was urged to do this by his overseas friends, who brought his predecessor Lenin to power through money and the organization of the First World War. Stalin had already calculated the whole alignment, he, unlike the duped Soviet people, knew perfectly well that the Bolshevik power did not come from nowhere in this great country, did not sail into the hands of a ry

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a hairy, burly little man who jumped on an armored tank ... Here, overseas financial tycoons were involved, who spent not only huge flows of money on a bloody coup (the jackpot was much fatter!), but also many, many years of struggle "on the sly". As the facts testify, from the middle of the 18th century, after the center of the world "revolutionary" organization, using bribery and terror, began to achieve total hegemony, the development of History, in fact, became artificial. From now on, all wars had obvious, well-known, and therefore false goals, and along with this - true ones, those that are carefully hidden from the world community, but the resulting result, or the famous Hegelian synthesis, is most often the desired, planned by all that same world backstage show. Here is a formula well known to all Soviet people from their school desks: thesis plus antithesis equals synthesis; when both the thesis and antithesis are created and financially supported with one hand, in the end they get what they intended: synthesis! Thus, the First World War had as its hidden goal the weakening of monarchical regimes, the so-called proletarian revolutions, the implantation of the criminal ideology of Marxism and, of course, the establishment of the financial and political hegemony of the United States.

But Stalin is not a bastard; he, having entered the game of super-giants, super-politicians who make up the secret world behind the scenes of the super-chosen ones - the Order (USA) and the Group (Great Britain), is going to win, and for this it is necessary to rebuild the entire party and the entire vast country not even under his own rules, and for your game...

1927 - the beginning of the industrialization of the USSR.

At the beginning of the first five-year plan, the Stalinist army had about 100 obsolete tanks, and at the end of it - more than 4,000 new ones! But priority was given not so much to the quantity of weapons as to the creation of an industrial base that would produce high-quality weapons at a rapid pace.

This was already the second five years. Then coke oven batteries, open-hearth furnaces, power plants,

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oxygen plants, rolling mills and bloomeries were built, the number of mines and mines was increased. But the production of means of war was not yet Stalin's main task, although two five-year plans saw a significant leap in equipping the aviation and the army with new types of weapons.

The planned third five-year plan was to produce weapons, military equipment and ammunition in huge quantities and of high quality. And it should end in 1942; but whoever believes that this is so, he ... is mistaken. Because Stalin's five-year plan could be fulfilled

with control figures and for 3 years! But since it is written for everyone that it will end in 1942, then this designated and voiced period also implies its own specific goal.

Meanwhile, Stalin envisages and plans, with the help of one of his most gifted scientists, the military theoretician BM Shaposhnikov, a strategic offensive operation codenamed Thunderstorm.

Shaposhnikov's unique brain seemed to temporarily become the second part of Stalin's brain. Boris Mikhailovich expounded in scientific military language what Stalin had planned. We must not forget the fact that Shaposhnikov was a participant in the development of the mobilization plan of the Russian Army on the eve of the First World War; he knew all the shortcomings of that plan and took them into account, keeping in mind the new circumstances that arose in the decades after the October Revolution. And, according to the "Groza" plan, the day of the invasion of Soviet armies into Europe was to be July 6, 1941.

And the five-year plan, in accordance with the planned goals, continues to work in a military direction and systematically fulfills its tasks of providing the invading armies of the First and Second strategic echelons with weapons, ammunition and everything else necessary for waging an aggressive war. At the same time, in accordance with the same plan for the industrialization of the country, for the past two years the Soviet people, performing feats of labor, have also been working for the Third Strategic Echelon.

In parallel with industrialization in the USSR, collectivization also took place, i.e., the establishment of a communist stronghold.

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mischievous in the countryside. The price of these two planned events, including the conquest of Europe, cost the peoples of the USSR almost 15 million human lives! But for the leader of the USSR, these were not victims, but rather, production costs.

And how exactly here, in this chapter, not to cite, one by one, several brief but important quotations from the works of a serious researcher Igor Bunich; this is for those (and not for the author!), who, having read Soviet historical literature in their time, likes to convict authors of incompetence and falsification. So, open the book "Operation Thunderstorm". Bloody games of dictators" (M., 2003). "It was necessary to create highly qualified engineering, technical and working personnel for the aviation industry. And to create all this from the wild and primitive peasant masses. ... And this is not even the main thing, but the fact that all this was created in less than five years! ... But this is only aviation. And the tanks? Tens of thousands of tanks required more than one hundred thousand specialists in a wide variety of fields ... Next - the fleet! The most complex branch of the Armed Forces, requiring powerful technical knowledge from the personnel. More than two hundred submarines - more than all the maritime powers combined - were built with

1933 to 1940, and each boat had two trained crews "(p. 19; hereinafter highlighted by me. - Avui.). "In August and November 1938, the first two super battleships of the Soviet Union type were laid down in Leningrad and Nikolaev. Experts complained about the lack of funds for the construction of these armored monsters. But Stalin said gently: "We'll collect a penny, but we'll build as much as we need," as not when Ivan Shaw in the Moscow Kremlin: "We'll collect a penny, but we'll build." ... While the English and German fleets will destroy each other, the French and German armies will do the same along the fortified lines of Maginot and Siegfried in useless attacks and counterattacks, losing, as in the last war, 10,000 people a day. And then, for starters, we will take the Balkans and the straits. Let's just take it with our bare hands, appointing Comrade Dimitrov President of the Socialist Balkan Federation. We'll take the Baltics and Finland. These are our lands lost under the Brest Treaty. How else will the war in Poland go? There we will decide on

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installation. The main thing is that the corporal does not get scared! (p. 52) And a little more: "The cadres of the civil war were not suitable for the new army ... Why was an unthinkable huge army created with such haste, hundreds of times exceeding all the limits of necessary state defense, even if Stalin himself, in his numerous speeches noted the growing pacifism in Europe, torn apart by contradictions, shaken by crises and practically unarmed? Recall the figures: the army of France - 300 thousand, including colonial formations; Reichswehr - 150 thousand and not only a single tank, but even an armored car; USA - 140 thousand and a company (experimental) of armored vehicles; England - 90 thousand, scattered throughout the empire; USSR - 2.5 million and already 4. tank corps. ... At the tank sites near Kazan, together with the secretly arrived officers of the Reichswehr, the tactics of tank wedges are being worked out. Thirsty for revenge, the Germans are a natural ally in the future campaign. The Comintern, relying on the workers' detachments and the long overbought ROVS, will quickly destroy their rears, making organized resistance impossible... A huge army of many millions, "sparkling with the brilliance of steel," is frankly preparing for a "furious campaign" (p. 20).

But Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, who was busy with his naval affairs, could not know about this, not only know everything, but also guess. Either as the chief naval adviser, he is engaged in the war in Spain, then he manages affairs as commander of the Pacific Fleet, then he acts as the first deputy people's commissar of the Navy, and in fact he manages the fleet, and, finally, he is appointed to the post of people's commissar fleet.

Much was done by Kuznetsov in order to comply with the instructions set by Marshal Shaposhnikov to the People's Commissar of the Fleet for the preparation of forces and means for a future war. At the same time, it was necessary to strengthen not only the fleets, but

and flotillas - the Danube, Dnieper, Pinsk, which were supposed to operate in the future along the entire perimeter of the offensive of the Red Army. So the superintense voltage of Nikolai Gerasimovich was only enough to manage

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fleet, and not to rethink all the components of what is happening.

“Stalin hesitates. A huge army is deployed along the western borders. Almost the entire economy of a huge country works for the war. The secret figures of the reports lying on Stalin's desk are encouraging and inspiring. If just two years ago the military industry produced annually 1,911 guns, 860 aircraft, and 740 tanks, by the end of the past year, in 1938, the economy, which had been almost completely transferred to a war footing, began to produce 12,687 guns, 5,469 aircraft, and 2,270 tanks. A new law on “All common military duty” is already ready, which should increase the army, which is already unthinkable for peacetime, almost three times. ... The program of military shipbuilding, monstrous for a continental country, causes sincere amazement of all maritime powers. More than three hundred ships of various classes are on stocks or being completed afloat. Submarines are flowing along, the number of which has already exceeded the number of submarines in service in the United States, England, Japan and Germany combined! Battleships, battlecruisers, light cruisers and destroyers have been laid down and are being built at a feverish pace. ... Stalin is pleased. Created an almost triple military advantage over any combination of possible adversaries. Perhaps you can start. Begin carefully, gradually, without burrowing...” (pp. 61-62).

In this almost triple advantage of the Soviet Armed Forces, there were truly super-unique formations, which will be discussed below and which were involved in the Crimean campaign of the 40s of the 20th century - during the Second World War.

Chapter 5

THIS IS THE ODIUM OF WAR!

In our narrative, it is impossible to ignore an object that was not written about either in the era of the USSR or in subsequent years. By the way, that object is one of the stronger

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our corps of the Red Army! And there were only two of them, such super-powerful ones: the 34th rifle corps, command

which in the spring of 1941 was appointed Lieutenant General r. Khmel'nitsky, yes 9th Special Rifle Corps. And in total in the Red Army at that time there were 29 mechanized corps of 3 divisions each, 62 rifle corps of 3 divisions (sometimes - 4), 4 cavalry corps of 2 divisions, 5 airborne corps, 5 aviation corps in the composition Air Force 3 divisions and 2 air defense corps. The powerful 34th Rifle Corps had 5 divisions.

But we are interested in the 9th Special Rifle Corps, which was transferred from the Transcaucasian Military District to the Crimea at the beginning of June 1941; commanded by Lieutenant General Nantes / 1. I. Batov.

The 9th Special Corps was the highest operational-tactical formation, unique in its composition, armament and direction of combat training. During the exercises of June 18-19, 1941, which so worried Kuznetsov, the Black Sea Fleet deployed its forces together with one of the divisions of the 9th Special Rifle Corps, which was operationally subordinate to the commander of the Odessa Special Military District. The division of the corps was put on the warships of the Black Sea Fleet and then carried out a landing on the coast of the "enemy". The uniqueness of the operation was manifested not in the fact that troops landed from ships, but that a full-blooded division landed, which had never been done before in the Red Army.

Stalin paid special attention to these exercises, and they were held under the personal control of senior officials of the General Staff of the Red Army, while the People's Commissariat of the Navy participated in the First Deputy People's Commissar - Chief of the Main Military School Admiral I.S. Isakov. And on behalf of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs from the Central Committee of the Party, the actions of the fleet and parts of the corps division were coordinated by the divisional commissar I. I. Azarov.

Under the condition of the outbreak of war, according to the plan of Marshal Shaposhnikov, this corps should not fight on Soviet territory.

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The unique 9th Special Rifle Corps, trained in the Caucasus mountains and having selected soldiers and commanders, proven political workers, in accordance with the Thunderstorm plan, should be landed from the warships of the Black Sea Fleet on the coast of Romania and Bulgaria; the purpose of the operation is to cut off the transportation of oil to Europe. By capturing oil terminals and deposits, it will be possible to control the supply of oil from the Black Sea to the Soviet Union. The squadron of the Black Sea Fleet was supposed to be involved in such a serious operation, and the landing was to be ensured by all the auxiliary forces of the fleet.

But wherever this largest higher formation of the Red Army was subsequently landed, the main direction of its military operations was envisaged - the port of Ploiesti in Romania. All the time in anticipation of these heroic feasts

events, the forces of the political department of the corps, as well as employees of the state security agencies in the unit, carried out intensive work to raise the morale of the personnel, distributed patriotic leaflets, held fiery conversations, in general, tough instructions were carried out to prove that the offensive spirit was so high, and the enemy is so weak that it will be crushed in a matter of minutes... besides, all these comrades were convinced, the enemy is ill-prepared for war and has not trusted his commanders and high military command for a long time... This work was carried out on such an intensive basis, so successfully that, suddenly finding themselves in a situation caused by the attack of the Wehrmacht - not in the role of advancing, but in the role of fighting back - parts of the corps immediately turned out to be morally broken; not knowing how to fight on the defensive, the soldiers most often fled in horror and fell under the deadly fire of their own fellow citizens - under the fire of the NKVD units located in their rear.

Then, in the June days of 1941, the 3rd Airborne Corps (VDK) under the command of Major General V.A. Glazunov, which included deployed directorates, headquarters, service units, three airborne brigades - 5th, 6th, 8th, artillery battalion, a separate tank battalion from

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50 amphibious tanks; the total number of soldiers and officers of the 3rd Airborne Forces is 14,834 people. At the same time, at the same time, the 3rd Airborne Forces took part in exercises with the deployment of combat control of the corps headquarters and brigade headquarters. With the beginning of the exercises of the Black Sea Fleet and the troops of the Odessa Special Military District, the commander of the OdOVO troops, Colonel-General Ya. T. Cherevichenko, arrived in Crimea, who received the troops of the 9th Special Rifle Corps. The fact that Yakov Timofeevich was present in the Crimea on June 9-12 and inspected the troops of the 9th Corps was also confirmed by Marshal of the Soviet Union Matvey Vasilievich Zakharov (see the journal Voprosy istorii, No. 5, 1970).

In the postwar years, Soviet historians, as well as military leaders, including N. G. Kuznetsov, and Ya. T. Cherevichenko, others, who were under the strict pressure of communist ideology, did not indicate that 9th Special Army under the command of Lieutenant General I. S. Konev (future twice Hero of the Soviet Union, holder of the Order of Victory, Marshal of the Soviet Union). Neither I. Konev, nor his deputy at that time, Lieutenant General M. Reiter (later General of the Army) remember this anywhere either! And it turns out that General Ya. Cherevichenko ... did not even know about the redeployment of the army from the east to the territory of the district entrusted to him. If you read the memoirs of twice Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army P.I. Batov, we will see that Pavel Ivanovich omits the most important thing in his memoirs about the war: when he was

At the same time, he was also deputy commander of the troops of the Caucasian Military District. However, Batov does not explain what "special corps" means, what kind of elite soldiers serve in it, and why the units and formations of the corps work out the elements of the operational landing of troops and the loading of military equipment and weapons on the warships of the Black Sea Fleet! And one more thing - they are working out the conditions for further landing on a foreign coast with the aim of capturing or destroying (arson) oil

towers and wells.

Pavel Ivanovich, who wrote his memoirs, must have forgotten why in the corps he commands,

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There is an unprecedented even by Stalinist standards, formed in the second half of the 1930s, the propaganda of the "war of liberation on the territory of the aggressor".

And why is this special propaganda carried out by specially arrived specialists from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the Main Directorate of State Security and the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army and Navy?

And why on June 13, 1941, did the personnel of units and formations of the 9th Special Rifle Corps, up to and including ordinary Red Army soldiers, receive Russian-Romanian phrasebooks?

Cautious statements about this can be found in the memoirs of some military leaders, but only not by Pavel Ivanovich, who commanded this same corps. On the other hand, the "outstanding commander" P.I. Batov, who during the war years was awarded seven Orders of Lenin, the military orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov, two Gold Stars, did not forget to write in his memoirs that the 11th Army of the Wehrmacht under the command of Colonel General Erich von Manstein, straddling the Perekop Isthmus, "significantly outnumbered the forces of the Crimean Front in terms of the number of troops by 3-4 times and almost 4 times in the number of tanks, almost 5 times in aviation and 3 times in artillery." Yes, it was necessary to lie like that... whereas, in fact, Batov's corps, in all of the above parameters, surpassed the 75,000-strong grouping of the 11th Wehrmacht Army by at least 5-6 times!

Yes, incredible "miracles" of illiteracy and cowardice were shown by the highest and senior command staff not only of the 9th Corps, but also of the three Soviet formations (armies) that later settled on the Kerch Peninsula.

Lies covered the cowardice of the highest command staff of the Crimean Front and the Black Sea Fleet, the ideology of the Soviet country was fueled by lies; as always (forever?!), the unwillingness of Soviet soldiers to fight for the alien interests of "Bolshevism - socialism - communism" was hidden.

Comrade Stalin spoke about the same with a member of the Order,

Freemason and all-powerful American, authorized by US President F. Roosevelt - Averell Harriman; then Stalin said: "We know that the people do not want to fight

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for world revolution; he will not fight for Soviet power either... maybe he will fight for Russia" (see B. Nikolaevsky, "Secret Pages." Also: Anthony Sutton, "Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution").

The Soviet commanders did not write about what and how was happening in the USSR on the eve of German aggression, and did not link together the teachings of the 9th Special Rifle Corps, the 3rd Airborne Corps and the 14th Rifle Corps, which conducted the exercises to land their divisions from the ships of the Danube Flotilla, while the 3rd Airborne Forces landed from aircraft and gliders. The exercises of these higher formations were carried out in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet and were connected in place, time, goals and tasks.

But this is nothing but, in accordance with the secret plan "Thunderstorm", the exercises of a gigantic scale of various branches of the Armed Forces of the SSV have a specific goal: an offensive. This is the odium of war (the threshold), as Marshal Shaposhnikov said, covering with a tricky word for the offensive essence of the main thing.

Further, the catastrophe of the Crimean Front and the participation in it of three formations of the Red Army of this front, the 9th Special Rifle Corps, the Separate Primorsky Army and the Black Sea Fleet will be covered in more detail.

On the eve of the invasion of the German Wehrmacht, three superstrike armies were formed in the country at a compressed and hard pace; and it was a unique phenomenon in the very nature and essence of the Soviet invasion armies.

But even among these superpowerful three armies, one stood out - with the same magic number as the corps: the 9th Army; she especially showed herself in the Finnish campaign, after which she seemed to ... dissolve, melt in the vast expanses of the vast USSR, And, it would seem unexpectedly, after a short time, she appeared under the guise of a TASS message dated June 13, 1941 (signed on the evening of 13- th, but transmitted by radio early in the morning on the 14th); but the army is still understaffed, and by June 13-14 it was still an unfinished structure of the most powerful unification of the world.

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It consists of 6 corps, and by July 5, 1941 (on the eve of no invasion), it is planned to introduce 3 more corps; for now, these 6 corps include 2 mechanized and one cavalry divisions, 8 rifle divisions. By June 21, 1941, the 9th Army already had 27 divisions, including 2 aviation, 2 mechanized, 2 cavalry, 4 tank, 17 rifle divisions. In general, the formation of two more super-strike armies is proceeding at the same rapid pace, but the 9th Army is also expected to include the 27th mechanized corps under the command of Major General Ivan Efimovich Petrov, who, by the way, became one of the main characters of the events of the Black Sea Fleet 1941-1942.

General Petrov, who had previously been the head of a military school, formed a corps in the Turkestan military district (TurkVO), then transferred this corps to the west. After being included in the 9th Army, it will already have 30 divisions. Well, before July 1, 1941, it is planned to form another 15 divisions, including 6 tank divisions; everything will be - unprecedented power! - 45 divisions, as planned by the strategic plan "Thunderstorm", should

to be realized on July 6, 1941.

And if we assume that the full complement of the 9th Army will be completed by July 1, 1941, then it will already have 3350 tanks - there have never been such a number of tanks in any army in the world! According to other sources, more than 4,000 tanks. The number of these tanks in only one single Soviet army practically corresponds to the number of all tanks of the German Wehrmacht. Colonel General Pavel Belov is in command of the superstrike army, and at that time he was the only person in command of the largest army in the world.

such military rank.

In the entire army of the USSR at that time there were eight colonel generals; in aviation - not a single one, in the NKVA - not a single one, in the tank ones - not a single one, but at the head of the iridiati of one (!) Soviet army (associations) are major generals and lieutenant generals. Twenty-one armies are already deployed in the First Strategic Echelon, and ten armies NOT shown on the official maps of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces are located in the rear of these two

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twenty one army. Only three of them have the military rank corresponding to Colonel-General in the Navy - admiral - N. G. Kuznetsov, I. S. Isakov and L. M. Galler.

In the first half of June 1941, on Stalin's orders and in accordance with the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, the most powerful three armies entered the final stage of formation.

Moreover, the 9th Army is being created near the borders with Romania. Its first formations appeared here as early as June 1940. Exactly a year later, under the cover of the TASS report of June 13, it appears in its mighty integrity where the so-called "liberation of the Western peoples" was completed a year ago. And if the offensive is ahead, then the goal of the army will be Romania, as the main source of oil for Germany. In the event of a strike against Rumania, Germany will be left without oil, which means that all military equipment will stop: aircraft, tanks, machines, ships, transport and all industry; for oil is the blood of war. And a blow to Romania with the power of the super shock 9th Army is a direct hit in the heart of the Third Reich.

In order to strike the heart of Germany, the most promising military leaders were assembled in the 9th Army. The headquarters of the 9th Army and the headquarters of the Odessa Special Military District are merging into a single operational-strategic mechanism, which can just as easily be separated. On the day of the TASS message, this separation was carried out. As for the merger, it was carried out so that the Abwehr (headed by Admiral Friedrich Wilhelm Canaris) and the UT department of the RSHA "Ausland SD" (headed by SS Oberführer Heinz Maria Karl Jost) discovered ... sudden disappearance

9th Army; while she did not disappear, but hid under the cover of merging with the headquarters of the OdOVO.

After the first commander, Colonel General Belov, was shot by the NKVD as an "enemy of the people," he was replaced by the relatively young and daring Major General Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky (later a member of the Central Committee of the KISS, Minister of Defense of the USSR, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Commander of the Order "Victory", Marshal Sovetsko

2 Stalin could strike first No.) -

th Union). Four years after taking over as commander of the 9th Army, Malinovsky would amaze the world with a stunning dash across the Gobi desert and the Khingan mountains to a gigantic operational depth in Manchuria, commanding the troops of the Transbaikal Front.

In 1941, General Malinovsky and his staff, the commanders of the 9th Army formations faced the most difficult task: they had to travel 180 km, though on quite good roads, and strike at the Romanian army. Of course, in 1945, in order to strike at the powerful Kwantung Army, I had to go through the mountains and desert as much as 810 km. The difficulty of the first transition was that Malinovsky only theoretically imagined what awaited him, because not a single general in the world had at his disposal as much equipment, weapons and ammunition as he had. He had three times more tanks in the 9th Army than in any of the tank armies of the USSR in 1945! But the Wehrmacht thwarted this task ...

With such a detailed coverage of the preparations for the aggressive war of the USSR against Germany in the south of the country, I propose to consider what was the role of the ground forces in this sector in accordance with the Thunderstorm plan and what role was assigned to the Black Sea Fleet in this. Even in this situation, it is clearly seen that the role of the southernmost fleet was very simple, rather auxiliary. No naval battles were planned, and it is not surprising that the thorough and charming Marshal Shaposhnikov, who treated Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov so kindly, delicately evaded a more detailed and, of course, forbidden explanation about THAT, 970, How and when it will be carried out.

Chapter 6

THIS DATE IN THE HISTORY OF THE USSR

It is important to recall that on May 5, 1941, a reception was held in the Kremlin for graduates of the military academies of the Red Army and Navy, at which Stalin made a "secret" speech,

declaring that "the war with Germany will begin no earlier than 1942", i.e. at the end of the five years.

If we judge this phrase from a distance from our time, without taking into account various nuances (partly already listed above), then Stalin, having made such a statement, "made a political miscalculation" and made a mistake in the timing of the start of the war.

But is it?

Let us imagine the Kremlin, St. George's Hall and seated academicians, as graduates of military academies were then called. Not hundreds, but thousands of pairs of coveted eyes, renouncing the whole world, accompany the slightest movement of the leader, not hundreds, but thousands of ears heed his words, and ... the leader, with his statement, relieves stress from graduates, sets a task for them: not today. In addition, Stalin knows that no matter how hard counterintelligence tries, there may be enemies among these graduates, and any term he pronounces will become public knowledge. And in order to prevent this, it is necessary to make an insidious statement precisely to the elite of the Armed Forces, who throughout their studies in the academies were trained only for offensive operations against the enemy; attack! — the teaching staff did not provide for a different understanding of the further mission for their students.

In the Kremlin, Stalin is listened to not only by graduates and scientists, but also by the supreme political leadership of the party and government, the highest command staff of the Red Army and the RKKF, among which is Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov.

All commanders of formations and commanders of associations of all armed formations of the USSR were informed about the General Secretary's speech, but among the listeners there were also those who, on Stalin's orders, should leak some moments of the leader's speech. At the same time, he had no doubt that there would be those who would carry out this leak on their own. It is possible that it will be possible to identify all the "unplanned" possible informants of the enemy and through them to misinform the opposing side, misleading in terms of the implementation of the "Groza" plan.

Stalin's speech was not published in the press; but its content is known to thousands of people who have listened to it. This is not a couple

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dox, but a carefully planned action, and Nikolai Gerasimovich leaves a record for posterity that at the same time a directive of the General Staff was developed: "... a very important directive aiming the commanders of the districts and fleets at Germany, as the most likely enemy in a future war" (from his book "On the Eve"). The directive of May 5 was given, but it did not specify the date for the start of the war, it only indicated that one should wait for the prearranged signal and be ready at any moment to start hostilities. This phrase, in addition to all

Our information, most of all worried the German military command, which resulted in the introduction of the Barbarossa plan, an action that fell for a period of two weeks before the execution of the Thunderstorm plan.

On the basis of a secret directive of May 5, 1941, already on June 15, orders were issued to the command of formations and associations of the Red Army; the circle of the consecrated ones expanded to several hundred commanders. And the day before, on June 14, 1941, TASS reports that the USSR is not going to attack Germany and is transferring part of the army to the west of the country in connection with the exercises. Whereas the generals are ordered to be ready to seize foreign territory at any moment.

But the command of the Wehrmacht, as well as the political leadership of Germany, doubted such a statement of the Soviet government, as well as the fact that the USSR would attack Germany only in 1942.

June 13, 1941 is one of the turning points in the history of the USSR. For on that day, a titanic work began throughout the country to transfer such a huge number of troops that the People's Commissariat of Railways could hardly cope with this task. Almost all people's commissariats and departments of the Soviet country were involved. In this situation, the most severe tension reigned in the military headquarters of the capital, associated with an unprecedented secret redeployment of troops, which were supposed to form the Second Strategic Echelon of the Red Army. Its numerical strength was more than 100 tank, motorized and rifle divisions, not counting dozens of separate regiments and hundreds of separate battalions.

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Recall that the composition of the First Strategic Echelon consisted of thirty-one armies, which included more than 300 divisions and the most powerful grouping of the army, concentrated on the Romanian border, which had the goal of cutting off the oil fields of Ploiesti from Germany. (Let us recall a phrase from a conversation between Churchill and Roosevelt at a conference in Casablanca about Major General Charles de Gaulle. "What is he against Stalin," Churchill asked rhetorically, "who has three hundred divisions behind his back?" This phrase was said in the middle of the war, and in the first hours of the war between the USSR and Germany, the same Churchill said to Roosevelt: "Do not hesitate, Uncle Joe (i.e. Stalin) will beat Hitler, because he has at least three hundred divisions on the border alone.")

On June 13, 1941, some steps of Stalinist diplomacy were also carried out.

So, in London, a meeting took place between the Soviet ambassador Yves na Mikhailovich Maisky (now Steinman) and the British Foreign Minister (Forrin Office) Anthony Eden, at which Maisky played a performance with a stomp-

kicking and demanding that the British ambassador to Moscow, Cripps, be recalled. Later, when Maisky was asked the reason for such tactlessness of his behavior, he replied that ... the meeting was held in a friendly atmosphere for the benefit of the peoples of the two countries. |

At the same time, Soviet diplomats were negotiating with Germany about Poland. Meetings were also held at the level of the Soviet ambassador and the leadership of the US State Department.

Chapter 7

WHEN THE GENERALS' ACTIONS REQUIRE CONTROL...

Literally a few hours after the TASS report on the morning of June 14, 1941, Nikolai Gerasimovich, having gone to work, immediately plunged into reading operational documents and reports that came from the fleets. Unfortunately they

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did not please; Admiral Isakov, head of the Main Staff, reported on the preliminary results of the exercises from Sevastopol; Separate information about this has not yet been received from the commander, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky.

Nikolai Gerasimovich looked at the HF apparatus, about to call Sevastopol, when the door opened a crack and a member of the Military Council, head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the RKKF, army commissar 2nd rank Ivan Vasilyevich Rogov entered. After saying hello, Ivan Vasilyevich announced his meeting with a member of the Military Council of the RKKF, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee and the City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Andrei Alexandrovich Zhdanov, with whom they discussed the topic of further strengthening the party line on ships and in parts of the fleet.

Kuznetsov, knowing the deputy for political affairs well and not showing his attitude in any way, pushing the working documents aside, prepared to listen. He, taking advantage of this, immediately began to narrate, as if in front of him was not the People's Commissar of the Navy of the country and a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, but a graduate of the school, who had just put on a tunic with a lieutenant's stripes:

"Here's the balance for you... Comrade Stalin, emphasizing the special significance of our Party, means that at the top of its leading strata there are about 4,000 top leaders. I would call it the generals of our party. Then there are 40,000 middle leaders, which can be figuratively compared with the commanders of the Red Army and Navy. Even lower, there are about 200,000 lower party leaders.

active composition. This, one might say, is our Party officers...

Nikolai Gerasimovich read about this in the newspaper Pravda as early as March 29, 1937, and in a directive resolution of the Party Central Committee in April 1941; more than once Rogov spoke on a similar topic; The people's commissar did not betray his displeasure with a single muscle on his face and continued to listen to the interpretation of the newspaper article and directives through the mouth of the head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda.

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- As you remember, in order not to rot, the party carried out purges in its ranks. After that, a new stage began, and this stage went from the end of the 38th year, from the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6b). We must bear in mind that the structures of the party: district committees, city committees, regional committees, regional committees, the Central Committee of the Union republics are the power structures of the state. And they operate in a centralized manner... Well, in our navy structures, the communist cells should act with triple strength... through the military departments, our party exercises control over the entire process of preparation for war, controls the mobilization reserves, the transfer of industry, agriculture, communications and transport on military rails. The Party directs the most complex and extremely difficult process of preparing our entire people for war. You, Nikolai Gerasimovich, could not fail to notice that lately all party workers, from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) to the lower party levels, have put on gray-green protective tunics and belts, and put on commander's boots, huh? The Central Committee of the Party strengthened the naval and military ranks with its cadres. What is the relationship! At the beginning of 1941, the recruitment of generals and admirals as candidates and members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was organized. Thus, the line between the Party and the Armed Forces was practically erased...

Nikolai Gerasimovich, listening to his interlocutor, who probably came not only to talk, but also, on duty, to look after him, did not react in any way, except for a slight affirmative shake of his head. So far, Rogov has not said anything new; Of course, Kuznetsov knew that in addition to 4,000 communists who were assigned to political work in the Red Army and Navy, in August 1939 the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a number of important decisions, after which they were implemented in the same year in the army and navy among the leading political workers there were already 190,000 communists. And by May of the current, 1941, the army of communists is already more than 600,000!

So, 4,000 communists were sent to party work at the level of companies and ships of the 4th and 3rd ranks, as well as to the combat units of ships of the 2nd and 1st ranks. But in 1939 it was introduced

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a proposal to eliminate the positions of political workers at the company level, after which these positions began to be reduced.

What came of it?

After this reorganization, the number of soldiers and sailors increased by more than 6 times, and the number of political workers decreased by 5 times, because at the level of the battalion, the commander of the ship of the 3rd rank, only one political worker remained. This, it would seem, is the essence of economy, because combat units can be formed from the released people. But ... this is if we count in a quantitative ratio relative to ordinary soldiers. And a political worker, as Rogov has repeatedly stated, "is worth ten or even more Red Army and Red Navy men." Based on such an assessment, the approaches to the formation of political workers in the Red Army were revised.

"Do you remember," Ivan Vasilievich still continued to say, "on March 13, 1940, a decree was issued 'On military retraining and recertification of workers of party committees and on the procedure for their mobilization in the Red Army'? I also took an active part in its development. In accordance with this resolution and the instructions of Comrade Stalin, 'responsible employees of the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks are on the personal register of both military people's commissariats and are mobilized for work in the army and navy by the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the proposal of the military people's commissariats and the administration personnel of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6b) '... as you can see, I even remember the text verbatim.

Ivan Vasilievich procrastinated for a long time the common truths, distracting the People's Commissar of the Navy, but Nikolai Gerasimovich gradually switched to other thoughts, although his face expressed complete attention to the words of "a worthy representative of the Central Committee of the Party in the Navy" ...

And literally in 2-3 days a new resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks will be issued on the next organizational recruitment (org recruitment) of communists for party-political work in the army and navy. And Kuznetsov understood what this was about - Stalin and the top leadership of the party and the country still doubt the complete reliability of the ranks of the army and navy ... But this is not dangerous; concerns are that those military

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the chiefs of the army and navy who did not end up in the camps, it is not excluded that they can allow seditious thoughts (not even express, but allow!), and therefore their "normal, correct" state in relation to the top leadership of the party should be ensured by party representatives at all levels of military authority.

The People's Commissar remembered that this was exactly the case in August 1939 on the border with Poland. Yes, exactly the same ... 19 days after the decision to call up nomenclature workers

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the Red Army struck a blow, "annexing" Bessarabia, Moldavia, the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, as well as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania ... and if we compare, then ... and now, after the released resolutions ... in conditions when there is a systematic concentration of Soviet troops along the entire perimeter of the western border with Germany and Romania ...

In the meantime, Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov, after a short meeting in Stalin's office, summed up:

- Comrade Stalin, I ask you to let me go, and at one in the morning I will report my opinion on the task you have set.

The leader looked askance: .

- Well, Boris Mikhailovich, tell me, are we doing the right thing, that we are considering the question of restoring the institution of commissars in the Red Army?

Yes, Comrade Stalin, one cannot but agree with you. The restoration of the institution of commissars, especially in the early days of Operation Thunderstorm, will require considerable control over the actions of our generals, in which there is already a certain deficit at the present time. Therefore, I believe that literally from June 20 to June 25, a number of military leaders who, in my opinion, have not committed anything reprehensible towards our party and people, should be returned to duty, and they should be released from places of detention. And in order to be calm, it is necessary to assign experienced political workers to them, who have undergone military and political hardening under the direct supervision of a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria.
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The formation of such military leaders, a list of which I am ready to present to you immediately and for whom I vouch, should be carried out in stages. And in order to give these people the opportunity to restore their health, they, along with their family members, must be sent to sanatoriums in the Moscow region, the Caucasus and the Crimea ... I'm sure they will feel that you have placed high confidence in them. After the experience, each of these commanders will have a great feeling of gratitude to you personally, Comrade Stalin, for having personally sorted out the case of each of them ... and they will show such high devotion to you that no other person can dream of.

The marshal opened the folder so that, in case of a positive decision on the part of the leader, he would immediately submit a list with a schedule for the release of convicted military leaders. He took risks, but for him the game was worth the candle; he realized that the only way to get the military leaders out of the camps was by agreeing to the presence of super-vigilant trained overseers-commissars near them.

"Well, Boris Mikhailovich, you, as always, take care of our business in time. Leave a list.

As soon as the marshal left the office, the leader pressed a button and said to the secretary A. N. Poskrebyshchev who entered:

- Call Lavrenty for me.

"He is here, Comrade Stalin.

When the people's commissar of internal affairs entered, Stalin angrily threw:

"Listen, are you all sitting here? I have Vlasik for this, and you seem to be replacing him. Can you change places?

- What are you, Comrade Stalin, I just felt that you should call me. And I entered when the marshal was leaving your reception room.

- OK then. Remember we talked about commissars? Get these people ready to start our operation. And don't forget that the commissars already in office must be extra vigilant.

- Comrade Stalin, I am worried about some political workers in the fleets ...

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But the leader interrupted:

"Are you trying to say that Kuznetsov beat you?" You're wrong. We have reliable support there: Chief of Staff Isakov, Commissar Rogov. They will always let us know about ... the wrong behavior of Comrade Kuznetsov ...

CHAPTER

8 COMPLETE THE PICTURE

Before telling the story about the secret mission of the Black Sea Fleet during the Second World War, however, as well as about the tragedy that broke out on the Crimean Peninsula, we still need to put many, many dots over the "1". Otherwise, it will only be a rewriting of known facts, as is done by most authors working on military topics. So, we will more than once make a short digression into Soviet history and turn the closest look at the biographies - real, with closed or little-known facts, and not just encyclopedic ones - of people who were related to the events discussed in this book. In this way, we will be able to present to the interested, thinking reader - how realistic this is - the most complete picture of what happened and, perhaps,

to indicate the position of the author, which is fundamentally different from all currently presented.

On the eve of summer and in the first summer month of 1941, two armies confronted a thousand-mile-long broken border line: the huge Red Army and the German army, strong in professionalism, but much smaller in number and strength, waiting for the agreed signals: "Thunderstorm" and "Dortmund".

The alignment of the opposing forces looked like this.

On the right flank of this huge grouping, he deployed his six armies of the North-Western Front under the command of Colonel General Fyodor Kuznetsov: 23rd, 27th, 11th AND 8th, 42nd and 55th Air Defense Corps (according to the density of fire

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shaping the defense of Berlin and London by almost 10 times!) - Chief of Staff of the Front, Lieutenant-General P. S. Klenov.

At the turn of the Western Dvina, in tension from the desire to rush into battle, the 22nd Army of the Second Echelon was concentrated; in the area of the city of Dvinsk, the 5th airborne corps under the command of Major General I.S. Bezugly, which was armed with 53 amphibious tanks, was waiting in the wings.

The four mechanized corps, not counting the tank regiments assigned to rifle divisions, had 2,948 tanks: the 3rd mechanized corps had 672 tanks; at the 12th - 730; the 6th - 1131; the 11th had 414. Including 682 new KV (heavy) and T-34 (medium) tanks. However, it must be pointed out that this information is drawn from Soviet sources; which means they are clearly underestimated. To the west, 5,573 artillery and mortars were pointed, ready to open fire on receipt of the signal.

The actions of the ground forces were supposed to provide a surprise preemptive strike of 1560 combat aircraft, not counting the formations of naval aviation.

The front on the right flank was operationally subordinated to a powerful formation of the Naval Forces, consisting of two battleships, two cruisers, 15 destroyers, dozens of submarines, artillery and torpedo cruisers.

The number of personnel of the front was more than 2.1 million people (excluding the Navy and not counting the troops of the NKVD).

The Northwestern Front of the Red Army was opposed by the Army Group "North" under the command of Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb, who deployed two of his armies on the 230-kilometer stretch from Memel to Goldap - the 18th (commander Colonel General Georg von Küchler)) and the 16th (commander Colonel General Ernst Busch), as well as the 4th Panzer Group (commander General Erich Höppner).

The tank group had 900 tanks, of which a third of the outdated types were the R2-Sh and R2-[U] petrol types.

From the air, the North group was supported by the 1st Air Fleet under the command of Colonel General of Aviation Alf Red Koller, who had 530 combat aircraft. 770 guns and mortars aimed to the east, waiting for the order to immediately open fire.

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The Western Front, under the command of the Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army Dmitry Grigoryevich Pavlov (Chief of Staff of the Front, Major General Klimovskikh), deployed its armies - the 3rd, 10th and 4th in the central sector, on the "Bialystok Balcony", as well as 13th, 11th, 16th, 19th. Here, at the field airfields of the Bialystok ledge, 1,789 combat aircraft are concentrated; another 1,000 are at permanent airfields.

The seven mechanized corps (4th, 8th, 13th, 14th, 17th, 19th and 20th) included 3151 tanks, including 585 new KV and T-34 tanks, more than in any army in the world, including the Wehrmacht. The 21st Army is concentrated in the area of the Belarusian city of Gomel, and the 20th Army of the Second Echelon under the command of Lieutenant General F. N. Remizov is concentrated in the Smolensk area; southwest of Minsk was the 4th Airborne Corps under the command of Major General A.S. Zhadov, which also numbered 53 unique amphibious tanks.

Waiting for the signal, more than 13,000 guns and mortars are aimed to the west.

The combat and rear units of the front included 2.9 million people.

They were opposed by Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal Fyodor von Bock; the army was deployed on the 500-kilometer sector from Goldap to Vlodva. The Field Marshal General has two armies under his command: the 9th (under the command of Colonel General Strauss) and the 4th (under the command of Colonel General Günther von Kluge) and the 3rd Panzer Group (under the command of General Gott) and the 2nd I am a tank group (under the command of General Heinz Guderian); in both groups there were about 1,500 tanks, of which 300 were R2-SH and R7-G \ U, the rest were obsolete - Czech and French tanks.

The Army Group was supported by the 2nd Air Fleet under the command of Colonel-General of Aviation Albert Kesselring, which had about 1200 combat aircraft.

On the famous "Lvov Balcony" (the term arose in a conversation between General Secretary Stalin and the then commander of the 1st rank B. M. Shaposhnikov), they were close, preparing for

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throw, four Soviet invasion armies (5th, 6th, 12th and 26th) of the Southwestern Front under the command of Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel-General Mikhail Kirponos.

The six mechanized corps: 2nd, 15th, 16th, 19th, 22nd and 24th included 2941 tanks, of which 307 were KV and T-34 tanks. To the south of the Ukrainian capital, the city of Kiev, the 19th Army of the Second Echelon is concentrated, further along the front: the 26th, 6th, 5th Armies and the 2nd Air Army under the command of twice Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant General of Aviation Denisov (will take part in the operations of the Crimean Front as a division commander).

South of Kyiv, near the town of Uman, the 1st Airborne Corps was stationed, awaiting orders, with 53 amphibious tanks under the command of Major General M.A. Usenko. The 2nd Airborne Corps under the command of Major General F. M. Kharitonov was also deployed in the Second Echelon, also with 53 amphibious tanks.

The actions of the ground forces were to be supported by more than 5,000 aircraft, as well as 13,634 gun and mortar barrels.

On the left flank of the front, the Separate 9th Special Army was deployed under the command of Colonel General P. Belov (Chief of Staff Major General M. V. Zakharov, later Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR —First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Professor, Marshal of the Soviet Union, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, member of the Central Committee of the CPSU), which, according to official data, has 1119 tanks (in fact - more than 4000 modern tanks - more than in the entire German Wehrmacht, which had 3410 tanks!) , 950 combat aircraft and 5554 guns. As of June 22, 1941, as part of this army, the still unfinished framework of the association (should be in full combat readiness on July 5, 1941), 6 corps, including 2 mechanized and one cavalry, are 17 divisions, including 2 aviation, 4 tank, 2 motorized, 2 cavalry, 7 rifle. It included highly professional generals of the Red Army, who later became Marshals of the Soviet Union:

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R. Ya. Malinovsky, M. V. Zakharov, N. I. Krylov (Chief of Staff of the Primorsky Army in Sevastopol in 1941-42), three times Hero of the Soviet Union A. I. Pokryshkin and the future Air Marshal I who shot him down in 1941 P. Pstygo, as well as the future generals of the army I. E. Petrov (commander of the Separate Primorsky Army in 1941-1942 in Sevastopol), I. G. Pavlovsky, P. N. Lashchenko. The army was inspected by Lieutenant-General K. K. Ro, who had recently been released from prison.

Kossovsky - a brilliant commander of the Second World War, later Marshal of the Soviet Union, holder of the Order of Victory and twice Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the rear of the gigantic Separate 9th Special Army, the 18th Airborne Army of the Second Echelon (under the command of Major General V. Ya. Kolpakchi, later General of the Army) was deployed, which included two mechanized corps and two mountain corps. The staffing of the 9th, 12th and 18th armies was carried out in the Caucasus, where a mountain training school was created from the best Soviet climbers. From there armies were sent to the western frontier; this was due to the fact that at the time of the offensive of the Soviet troops on July 6, 1941, to overcome the mountain range of the eastern Carpathians. The Carpathians are inconvenient for aggression from west to east; the enemy descends from the mountains to the plains, and from east to west they are convenient for an offensive. The Eastern Carpathians are a blunt ledge towards the enemy, where powerful groupings of Soviet troops were concentrated. The two Soviet armies stationed in the eastern Carpathians to invade Europe found themselves in a catastrophic situation from June 22, 1941 - the strike of the 1st German Panzer Group on Rovno made it impossible to support these two armies in the Carpathians, and they were partially defeated, and for the most part surrendered. A similar situation developed in the south, when the tanks of General Ewald von Kleist entered the rear of the Separate 9th Special Army.

On June 22, 1941, all Soviet armies were on the border with contact with the German Wehrmacht and the Romanian border of Tse, as well as on the Finnish border, on the Kola Peninsula, where the 23rd Army was located, and the 14th Army approached the rear,

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fit the standard of invading armies or shock armies. But formally, these armies did not bear such names. Along the entire line of the beginning of the Soviet-German front from north to south there were armies: 23rd, 14th, 11th, 3rd, 10th, 4th, 5th, 6th, 26th, 12th Special, 18th Special Airborne and Separate 9th Special Army. The last three are structurally absolutely similar.

In the Second Echelon in Ukraine, in the Shepetovka region, the famous 16th Army was unloading, which consisted of prisoners - "black" soldiers under the command of Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin (he would be in German concentration camps for 4 years, and then more than 10 years to serve his sentence in Soviet concentration camps; upon his release, he was reinstated in military rank, orders and medals were returned, and the rights of a retired Soviet military leader were restored). This army included a combination of tankers with more than 1,000 tanks. In the Second Echelon, the 19th Army (under the command of Lieutenant General I.S. Konev, later Marshal of the Soviet Union, holder of the Order of Victory and twice Hero of the Soviet Union), the 20th Army and the 21st Army were secretly advanced to the state border. (See: Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. Fund 208. Inventory

2511. Case 20. S. 128). |

The 20th Army was successively commanded by lieutenant general tenants: F. N. Remizov (June - July 1941), P. A. Kurochkin (July - August 1941), M. F. Lukin (July - September 1941 G.), F. A. Ermakov (from October to November 1941), M. A. Reiter (March - September 1942). In all Soviet military publications, the period from October 1941 to March 1942 was indicated without an army commander! While in reality during this period General Andrei Anoreevich Vlasov commanded the 20th Army, his troops especially distinguished themselves on the Lama River. Those battles under the command of General Vlasov fully deserve to become an example of martial art - higher than the battles in Cannes, Carthage and near Stalingrad. If not for the battles of this army, not for the talent and skill of its commander, it would hardly have been possible to keep Moscow. General Vlasov was then awarded the Orders of Lenin and the Red Banner. And two days before, when he switched to side

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Well, the Wehrmacht, at Headquarters, it was decided to award him the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and the title of Colonel General with a further appointment to the post of First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, which had previously been occupied by Army General Smorodinov for a long time; I say this information with all the responsibility of a knowledgeable person who has gone through the crucible of the most difficult and difficult trials both by serving in a closed department, and by participating in secret military operations outside the SSNE, and by getting acquainted with the materials of the most secret archives! — are still well hidden!

In total, in the First and Second strategic echelons, by June 22, 1941, the following were advanced to the western border from north to south: 14th, 7th, 8th, 27th, 24th, 20th, 22nd, 19th, 16th, 28th, 21st, 13th, 11th, 10th, 4th, 5th, 26th, 12th, 18th, 9th I, 6th Army, as well as the Air Force of the fronts. (See, for example, the album of maps to [Volume "History of the Second World War 1939-1945", map No. 4 "Military operations on the Soviet-German front in the initial period of the war. June 22-mid-July 1941.)

It is known that the 2nd and 3rd air armies were disbanded by order of Stalin in November 1940 (including the 1st VA), and on their basis 5 air corps and 3 separate air divisions were created, not counting aviation Navy and NKVD. Before disbanding, the air armies, based on the DB-Zf aircraft, were commanded by: 1st VA - Lieutenant General of Aviation V.F. Arzhanukhin, 2nd VA - Lieutenant General of Aviation S.P. Denisov, 3rd VA - Lieutenant General of Aviation I. I. Proskurov, who after the disbandment became the head of the GRU of the General Staff of the Red Army.

As a result of the German preventive action, the second strategic echelon had to be used not for its intended purpose, but for organizing defense.

Most of the armies moved out light, providing a fundamental base for the arrival and covert deployment of armaments and ammunition by 5 July 1941. The main formations of the echelon were the 16th Army, which included more than 1,000 tanks, and the 57th Tank Division from Aelnaya under the command of the regiments

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nick V. A. Mishulin, who was under the operational command of the commander-16, General M. F. Lukin. This division had 200 tanks, and when fully equipped, the army was supposed to have 1340 tanks. Even more powerful was the 19th Army of General Konev, also redeployed from the North Caucasus. It consisted of four buildings, including 1 mechanized - the 26th. Soon, the 25th mechanized corps was placed at the disposal of General Konev. And the 34th Corps, which was part of the 19th Army, was headed by the personal assistant of Marshal Voroshilov, Lieutenant General r. P. Khmel'nitsky, which included 4 rifle and 1 mountain rifle divisions; as well as six separate heavy artillery regiments.

If in the First Echelon the strongest army is the 9th Special Bay, then in the Second - the 19th. Both armies are directed against Romania, i.e. Romanian oil fields. On this occasion, the intelligence officer, historian and writer Viktor Suvorov noted: "The paid friends of the Soviet Union launched the legend that the Second Strategic Echelon was intended for" counterattacks ". If so, then the most powerful "counterattack" was being prepared against the Romanian oil fields.

The actions of the grouping of Soviet troops were supported by ships and aviation of the Black Sea Fleet, consisting of 1 battleship, 6 cruisers, 3 leaders, 15 destroyers, dozens of submarines, torpedo and artillery boats and ships of the Danube military flotilla. An independent unit of the southern group of forces was the unique 9th Special Rifle Corps under the command of Lieutenant General L.I. The divisions of this corps were thoroughly trained as mountain formations in the Caucasus.

In total, this grouping aimed at the Romanian oil fields had over 5,000 tanks and more than 3,500 combat aircraft.

The personnel of the group of troops exceeded 3 million people, not counting the personnel of the fleet and the troops of the NKVD.

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This grouping was opposed by a 780-kilometer deployed

meter section of the Army Group "South" Field Marshal Shala Karl von Rundstedt, which included three German armies: the 6th (under the command of Colonel General Walter Reichenau), the 11th (under the command of the Ritter Oh gene von Schobert) and 17th (under the command of Colonel General Heinrich von Stülpnagel) and 1st Panzer Group (under the command of Colonel General Ewald von Kleist), as well as the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies and one Hungarian division.

Army Group South had 949 tanks, of which 250 were Rya-Sh and R7-[U]; the rest are obsolete Czech and French tanks. From the air, the South group was supported by the 4th Air Fleet (commanded by Colonel-General of Aviation Ler), which had 772 combat aircraft, and the Romanian Air Force, which numbered only 500 obsolete types of aircraft, about 300 combat aircraft, which are actually in did not take part in combat missions.

In contrast to the Soviet operational-strategic formation of three strategic echelons, the operational formation of the German army groups was carried out in one echelon, with the allocation of one to three divisions to the reserve. There were no airborne units at all, except for small, purely sabotage groups.

On the coastal flanks, there was no support from the Naval Forces due to the lack of such forces. It was possible to transfer two links of torpedo boats to the Baltic. On the Black Sea, except for two Romanian destroyers, who stood at the base throughout the war, and one Romanian submarine "Delfinul", there was nothing at all.

The grouping of all German troops, together with the Romanian and Finnish units, consisted of about 4.5 million people, 3410 tanks and 4275 combat aircraft, counting the aircraft of Romania and Finland.

Against them, on only three fronts of the Western theater of operations (not counting the two armies of the Northern Front under the command of Lieutenant General Markiyon Markovich Popov), an army of 8 million was deployed, built in two strategic echelons. But there was still a Third Strategic Front under

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general command of the former head of the border troops of the Belorussian district, Lieutenant General I. A. Bogdanov (member of the Military Council and head of the Political Directorate of the Chekist Front, Deputy Commissar of State Security of the USSR, Commissar of State Security 3rd rank (Lieutenant General) S. N. Kruglov) with three separate armies of the NKVD - the 29th (commander of the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Lieutenant General of the NKVD I. I. Maslennikov), the 30th (commander of Major General of the NKVD V. A. Khomenko) and the 31st (commander Major General K. I. Rakutin), ready to begin the "Sovietization" of the occupied territories at full speed.

The formation of the Third Strategic Echelon began long before the Wehrmacht invaded the territory of the USSR. These three armies were formed in the rear of the First Strategic Echelon, i.e. in the West. Three more Chekist armies were formed in Central Asia and two in the Caucasus, which would subsequently be actually controlled by a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis, but only during the autumn of 1941-summer 1942, i.e. until the death of the Crimean Front, the loss of the Crimea and the flight of the high command of the Black Sea Fleet and army formations.

In the border districts, the Wehrmacht was opposed by 11,000 tanks and another 8,000 in the Second Echelon armies. We should take into account that the troops of the Third Strategic Echelon had at least one tank corps and at least one artillery corps.

From the air, the troops of the Red Army covered 11,000 aircraft and 2,300 long-range bombers that were part of the DBA RVGK (Long-Range Bomber Aviation of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command), which was commanded in 1941 and early 1942 by Colonel P. A. Gorbatsevich. There were another 8,000 combat vehicles with crews in the reserve.

At that time, the Soviet DBA included 5 aviation corps, 2 divisions each; 3 separate aviation divisions that were not part of these corps; 1 separate aviation regiment No. 212, which was not part of either the division or the corps. It was he who was headed by Lieutenant Colonel A. E. Golovanov. Alexander Evgenievich (and hence his

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regiment) was directly subordinate to Comrade Stalin. The history of this military unit is curious, but that will be a completely different topic. Now, within the framework of the theme of the story, the personality of Golovanov and some nuances that are not known at all to researchers, historians, or readers are important to us!

Back in February 1941, Comrade Stalin's personal pilot and one of the leaders of the party intelligence of Comrade Stalin's Secretariat - the most closed structure, the existence and tasks of which only very, very few of the intelligence super-elite can know about and information about which is still a great secret of the twentieth century! - Alexander Evgenyevich Golovanov was mobilized into the ranks of the Red Army. He was awarded the military rank of lieutenant colonel, and he was appointed commander of the 212th long-range bomber regiment for special purposes - Spetsnaz.

In the post of commander of an air regiment, he was less than six months and already in August 1941 he was appointed commander of the 81st long-range bomber air division Spetsnaz, which was directly subordinate to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

The 81st air division, with the participation of A.E. Golovanov, in 1941 bombed military industrial

objects of Berlin, Danzig, Ploiesti, Koenigsberg.

In February 1942, bypassing the post of commander of the air corps, Golovanov was immediately appointed commander of long-range bomber aviation, which was soon transformed into long-range aviation (ADD). Its commander was successively awarded the ranks of Major General of Aviation, Lieutenant General of Aviation, Colonel General of Aviation and, finally, Air Marshal. In August 1944, he, then 40 years old, was awarded the rank of Air Chief Marshal. In the same 1944, the type of his activity was repurposed - on the orders of Stalin, Golovanov began to transfer Pe-8 aircraft for work in the Antarctic (yes, how many curious secrets still lurk in the depths of History ...).

After the physical removal of Stalin (I didn't make a reservation!) A. E. Golovanov's career was abruptly interrupted, he was released from all posts and sent to the reserve. It should be noted that in the USSR Marshals of the Soviet Union, marshals

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troopers and generals of the army, and of the Navy - Admirals of the Fleet of the Soviet Union and Admirals of the Fleet did not go into reserve. They were part of the so-called "Paradise Group," or Department of Defense Inspector General Group, receiving the full salary of the latter position, with all other perks and privileges due. Alexander Evgenievich was excluded from these lists and became the Chief Marshal of the reserve. He was given a pension in accordance with the length of service in aviation, in party bodies and in military service.

It would seem that this man had nothing to do with the history of the Black Sea Fleet and the events in the Crimean Front. But it is not so; in fact, he was most directly related to the events that broke out in the autumn of 1941 and early 1942. at the Crimean TVD. And about this, perhaps, I will say later. I will only add that, on the orders of my boss, I met Alexander Evgenievich Golovanov in the early 1970s and had several long and frank conversations. After all, we were, as they say, from the 00th test, or rather, from the same office ...

Three airborne corps were deployed in the zone of the armies of the First Echelon, and two airborne corps of the Second Echelon.

For combat operations on the coastal flanks of the fronts, support was provided for units and naval formations of the Navy. The aviation of the fleet (not counting the Pacific) had more aircraft than all the formations of the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front. In total, there were 6,700 aircraft in the aviation of the USSR Navy in three fleets.

Judging by this scenario, it becomes unclear to the reader: why, then, did the bloody war last for a whole

four years, and did not end in a few months with the complete defeat of the enemy?!

Yes, because the Red Army, which does not want to fight for the alien interests of the anti-Russian rulers, did not resist the recent friends who invaded the country's territory - the German soldiers of the Wehrmacht. About the "true" friendship of the Soviet and German peoples, about some secret joint

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private projects of both economic and military nature, but on the eve of the war, we will talk later.

How amazed was the German General Guderian when he learned that on the eve of the war, the Russians themselves (all to advance their invading army!) Cleared passages and notches on many

parts of the state border for the passage of Soviet troops, tanks and artillery, but ...

During the first days of the war, 11,000 Soviet aircraft concentrated near the borders with Germany were destroyed!

During the first weeks of the war, almost 95% of Soviet tanks were lost out of a total of 23,000 combat units in the First and Second strategic echelons!

Most of the IS and KV tanks were captured on the platforms of the echelons heading to the western border; here it should be taken into account that in order to unload these heavy and most powerful tanks of that time, a stationary platform along the railway track (which was available only at the junction stations) and, of course, fuel were needed.

But in the panic of the first days and weeks of the war, all equipment was left to its fate.

Chapter 9

THE FAILURE HEIR OF AN EXHAUSTED EUROPE

"He wants to inherit a war-weary Europe," Adolf Hitler remarked remarkably accurately of his Moscow friend Joseph Stalin.

But what role does the General Secretary assign to the German Wehrmacht? - The role of the kulak, storming Europe.

And at some point, the mutual plans of these leaders went awry. Already on June 23, 1941, Comrade Stalin realized that the secretly planned invasion of Europe following the armies of the Wehrmacht, in particular, into England, which had long become

across the throat of both Hitler and Stalin, is postponed, since the Wehrmacht, preventing a Soviet backstab, has already invaded the USSR

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And then it was decided to start the operation "Thunderstorm"!

"Storm! Storm! Storm!" - teletypes and transmitters of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff were anxiously tearing up, heating up the lines of communication between the front, corps and divisional headquarters.

I remember that in the mid-70s I met with retired colonel Vakhrushev, who at that time served as a lieutenant colonel in one of the communications departments of the Red Army. On the night of June 21-22, 1941, he was on duty for communications of the General Staff. Vakhrushev admitted that "we did not have any fear of German aggression. Yes, we all did not attach much importance to this, because we knew that with the available forces our troops of the three Special Districts would crush and destroy the invading Germans and, as he characteristically put it, the Red Army would be on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean in two Suvorov marches.

Upon hearing the code word, thick red packets with the inscription "Open on Rose Signal" were taken with a flutter of historical significance from many safes.

Such a package, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky did not, but this is not a reproach to the people's commissar and the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, not a reproach to Stalin.

It's just that the "Groza" plan assigned the Black Sea Fleet a completely different role, a different task, where the commander had to first only allocate warships and other surface assets for the transfer of divisions and military equipment of the 9th Special Rifle Corps to the Ploiesti area, i.e. on the foothold of the Romanian oil fields. And this could not but give rise to insanity in the mind of Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, which was clearly manifested throughout his command of the Black Sea Fleet, right up to his dismissal in 1943.

For the time being, the packages contained operational orders with the names of Polish, Romanian, German cities, towns and objects, which were ordered to be taken in the first 72 hours after the start of Operation Thunderstorm. And now, seized from the opened envelopes, all these maps and settlements, to which fat red arrows led, greedily

about

watched by hundreds of commanding eyes. The arrows were aimed at Warsaw, Berlin, Koenigs, who were unaware of the danger.

Berg, Vienna, Bucharest, Copenhagen, Budapest, Ploiesti.

"Storm! Storm! Storm!"

Exactly following the order, the commander of the tank division, Colonel Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky (later the youngest General of the Army in the Red Army, twice Hero of the Soviet Union), who was on the North-Western Front, threw his tanks into the attack on Tilsit, and, having captured it, to start developing the offensive further, to Königsberg, as indicated in the order extracted from the package. Colonel Chernyakhovsky's tanks managed to advance 25 kilometers; but in view of the need to defend, and not to attack, Chernyakhovsky was forced to turn back. This was quite clearly and figuratively conveyed in the early 60s. in his little book of memoirs, the former commissar of Chernyakhovsky's division, regimental commissar Achille Lvovich Bankvitser, a man of the rarest decency; we met with him in Moscow. Unfortunately, his book was not republished; however, it is clear why! He described how one of our KVs, when the ammunition ran out, got surrounded in a tank battle, but with caterpillars (tracks) destroyed dozens of German tanks, leaning on them with all its multi-ton power. After the battle, it was found that under the power and weight of the KV tank, up to two regiments of tanks were killed against the nickname! And this fact, as further checks revealed, really took place!

Following a laconic order from the red package, the tank division of the 14th mechanized corps, under the command of the deputy division commander, Lieutenant Colonel Sergei Mednikov, who was on the Western Front, crossed the Bug and launched an attack on Demblin. With fighting, the division moved forward 30 kilometers when fuel and ammunition ran out. Lieutenant Colonel S. Mednikov himself died.

On the Southern Front, several divisions secretly deployed between Anestr and Prut (24 divisions were deployed - only part of the forces of the 9th Special Army!) managed to invade the territory of Romania, supported by hurricane fire from

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niters of the Danube flotilla, created after the division of the Dnieper flotilla into two. The Pinsk flotilla, created after the division, according to the Thunderstorm plan, should begin the movement of its ships along a dug channel in Belarus with the aim of penetrating into large European rivers.

But these few examples are exceptions, confirming the inglorious end of a unique military operation of invasion and conquest, launched at the wrong time.

Everything went wrong.

Under the circumstances, Comrade Stalin continues

"educate" their commanders, turning human material into recklessly devoted, working to wear out the material tires.

Fighting is going on. Moscow is confident that General of the Army K. A. Meretskov has become the commander-in-chief of the North-Western direction as part of two fronts: the North-West and the North. Whereas Kirill Afanasyevich (Hero of the Soviet Union, recent chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, later Marshal of the Soviet Union, holder of the Order of Victory) was arrested on the fast train Red Arrow and transferred to the Sukhanov prison. The general already has experience of "communication" with bone-breakers from the NKVD, he experienced the horror of interrogations and torture in 1937 and realized that there are moments when you voluntarily want to exchange your life for a bullet in

back of the head.

The commander of the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet, 28-year-old Major General of Aviation Nikolai Alekseevich Ostryakov, and his colleague, Major General of Aviation Korobkov, will fall into a similar situation. Both generals will die under torture. Whereas Soviet historians will point out that both ... died during air raids by the Luftwaffe, "fascist aviation"; the first - in Sevastopol, the second - in Evpatoria (this will be discussed in more detail later). And this is also from a series of facts hidden from the general public.

It seems that there is no need to retell in detail how the ritual of turning a person into dust, into an unworthy creature takes place; rite, developed and successfully applied

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in the bowels of Chekist organizations for many decades... Having cut off the belt and belt, cutting off the buttons on the general's trousers, cutting off the buttonholes with five stars of the general of the army, screwing the order, without saying or asking anything, the executioners first tormented the psychologically humiliated and crushed man with rubber clubs, and then, in a fit of Chekist high of permissiveness, they urinated on the head of an army general lying on the floor in his own blood. Which in unconsciousness could only lie in this slurry until the morning.

From the moment he was appointed commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Philip Sergeevich Oktyabrsky was afraid of precisely this: arrest. He knew firsthand about the practice of bullying generals and admirals carried out in the NKVD. Fleet commanders who arrived in Moscow for meetings at the People's Commissariat of the Navy, as well as other admirals and generals of the fleet, were shown in the cinema the interrogations of Soviet military leaders recorded on tape. Many people lived with a feeling of such pathological fear not for years, but for decades; overwhelmed with fatal fear, Philip Sergeevich also lived - he slept, ate, drank, loved women, famously, raz- gulno, every day, every night, as if for the last time .. Only once the sword of Damocles really almost falls on his head. But, apparently, about the impending arrest of Ok-

Stalin recognized Tyabriskiy and threw a meaningful, but saving phrase:

- He is not to blame for the fact that he did not have to defend the Caucasus, and saved warships. And for losing Chervona Ukraine, send it to the East with a reduction, and then we'll see ..

It is clear that even for a simple little man from the Soviet system, even for a general of the Red Army who has known violence, it is easy to turn into a subhuman, into a being anti-divine in its inner essence and essence, into a creature that is unworthy of whining, but only the devil in the flesh or his offspring can do such a perverted humiliation to a Thinking Man...

Having experienced the monstrous torments of the flesh, Meretskov immediately began to testify. At a confrontation with Stern (Ge

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swarm of the Soviet Union, colonel general, commander of the air defense of the Red Army), he testified that, together with Stern, he was involved in a criminal group that worked for German and British intelligence at the same time. He pointed out that the group periodically transferred secret documents about the plans and weapons of the Red Army abroad. And while Stern was screaming hysterically in panicky horror: "Kirill Afanasyevich, well, it didn't exist, it didn't exist, it didn't exist!" - Meretskov named accomplices. He named Zhukov the first, and after Pavlov, Kir of diarrhea, Klenov, and others. They say that he did not name only the new commander of the North-Western Front, Colonel General Fyodor Kuznetsov, who will survive, although the front will be crushed to smithereens. But his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Klenov, will be arrested and will die during interrogation from a heart attack.

As for others named by Meretskov, General Pavlov, together with his entire staff, will be shot. It is believed that for the defeat and collapse of the Western Front. General Colonel Kirponos will be shot by a special officer in Kyiv. According to the official version, he committed suicide ... with two shots from a revolver in the back of the head! Zhukov was not touched, but all his employees, from the driver Bochin to the chief of staff, General Telegin, were arrested. By the way, Konstantin Fedorovich Telegin left the NKVD, during the war years he was a political worker, and when Zhukov was appointed commander of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, Lieutenant General K.F. Telegin was and remained in the position there.

After the formation of the Crimean Front, the divisional commissar I.I. Azarov, after one of the meetings of the military council of the Black Sea Fleet, addressing directly the commander of the fleet, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, in the presence of a member of the Military Council, Divisional Commissar N.M. Kulakov and Major General P.A. Morgunov

wa said:

- Philip Sergeyevich, keep in mind that the difficult situation led to the fact that a number of commanders did not cope with their duties. For the loss and collapse of the fronts, Pavlov and Kirponos were shot. I would especially like to emphasize that Kirpo

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nose, according to the popular opinion in the country's leadership, COMMITTED LIFE with two shots to the head. Remember it!

Pale, Oktyabrsky only managed to squeeze out, looking at Kulakov and Morgunov:

I always remember this...

Chapter 10
DISASTER: SCALE AND VICTIMS

The catastrophe of the first days and months of the war increased in scale.

The Red Army did not behave as it should! The huge Western Front fell apart, disintegrated, dissolved, disappeared in a matter of days and weeks. By September 1941:

2 million people surrendered, throwing down their weapons, leaving behind the newest tanks and planes as unnecessary.

1.5 million people went into captivity with weapons in their hands; they often went to surrender to the sounds of regimental and divisional bands in whole units and formations, sincerely considering German soldiers and officers to be liberators from the Soviet Jewish yoke (as German propaganda spread).

500 thousand people were captured during the fighting.

1], a million people openly deserted, hoping for a quick fall of Soviet power (of which 657,354 people were caught, 10,200 were shot, the rest disappeared without a trace). Almost without resistance, the Wehrmacht troops occupied Soviet cities, the population met the Germans with bread and salt, and the liberators were showered with flowers. From pedestals in squares, streets, and parks, monuments to the "leader of the AJ of all peoples" Joseph Stalin and the grandson of Israel Moisevich Blank - Lenin were thrown down.

800 thousand people were killed and wounded.

About a million more people scattered through the forests, huto Ram and villages.

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The remaining less than a million (980 thousand), seeing the inactivity of the commanders, in a panic, wave after wave, rolled back to the east, into the depths of the Soviet country.

Then the designation "missing" appeared. Battalions, squadrons, entire regiments, divisions, corps disappeared without a trace ... They disappeared - only to please historians who decreed an unshakably false "truth": the forces of the enemy were many times superior to the forces of the native Red Army, not prepared for war!

20 senior officers (generals), about 100 senior officers from the NKVD, the military prosecutor's office, as well as commissars from political agencies who had special ranks went missing: state security commissars, brigade and army nurists of various ranks, as well as brigade, divisional commissioners. Another 182,432 officers of various ranks have gone missing. And 106 generals, including several army commanders, were captured. Corps Commissar Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Burmistenko committed suicide; Corps Commissar N. N. Vashugin did the same after the failure of the tank battle in the summer of 1941 near Dubno, Lutsk, Rovno, planned by the "military genius" of General of the Army G. K. Zhukov. In the battle of six Soviet mechanized corps with the 1st tank group of the Wehrmacht, which took place on June 23-27, 1941, the 1st tank group of the Wehrmacht was armed with 799 tanks (mainly R7-2 and R7-3, heavy tanks, amphibious there were no tanks with diesel engines, with anti-shell armor, with long-barreled guns of 75-mm and higher caliber, with wide caterpillars, there were no tanks at all). Whereas from the Soviet side the following took part in the battle: the 4th mechanized corps, where there were 892 tanks, of which 414 were the latest T-34s and KVs; the 8th mechanized corps, which had 858 tanks, including 171 T-34s and KVs; the 15th mechanized corps, which had 733 tanks, including 131 T-34s and KVs; 22-1 mechanized corps, which had 647 tanks, including 31 T-34 and KV. In total, the troops of the Kiev and Odessa military districts had 8069 tanks, which is 30 times more than was required for defense.

Then, in the battle, the Red Army lost 6,290,000 units of small arms (VIZh, 1991, No. 4). Such a weapon would be quite enough to rearm the Wehrmacht!

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And the loss of more than 20,500 tanks, which would be enough to equip five such armies as the Wehrmacht !! Moreover, this number of tanks would be enough to arm not only the Wehrmacht of Germany, but also all other armies: the USA, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Japan, etc. Moreover, tanks of such a quality that were not in any army in the world!

At the same time, more than 10,300 aircraft were lost, -

this quantity can repeatedly re-equip the Luftwaffe and again with high-quality aircraft: Il-2, Pe-2, TB-7 (Pe-8), Yak-3, Yer-2, DB-3f. The losses of Soviet artillery during the six months of the war amounted to 101,100 guns and mortars. This amount of artillery was enough to complete all the armed forces of the Planet, taken together! - and not once, but many times. And again - the best models of cannons, howitzers, mortars in the world.

More than a million tons of Soviet ammunition was thrown on the western border. According to VIZH No. 2 for 1992 (p. 23), in 1941 the entire superbly prepared Red Army was defeated and captured in the first months of the war, its losses amounted to 5.3 million soldiers and officers killed captured and missing. This is not counting the wounded, shell-shocked and crippled. Due to the hasty stampede of Soviet troops, mostly to the west, in 1941, another whole army of 5,360,000 conscripts remained on the territory occupied by the Wehrmacht, who did not have time to be called up to the Second Strategic Echelon of the Red Army.

What happened angered Stalin.

What was happening stunned and inspired the German command.

The Wehrmacht suddenly found itself armed with a multi-million RUSSIAN NATIONAL ARMY, ready to fight the regime of demons that occupied the former Russian Empire since 1917 and changed the course of the entire world history.

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The Germans already had more than 4 million prisoners of war of the Red Army, including Stalin's son, Yakov Dzhu. Gashvili.

It is believed that at least another 2 million people could enter the ranks of this national army. And be this force that has acquired a real, and most importantly, desired goal! - officially recognized by the German side, it would include the remnants of the Red Army retreating in panic. In cooperation with the Wehrmacht, this army would have quickly dealt with the Soviet regime, which led the Russians and people of other nationalities living on the territory of 1/6 of the land to complete lawlessness and slavery.

But what happened happened.

All those who went over to the side of the Wehrmacht with weapons in their hands were ordered to disarm, declaring prisoners of war. Thus, Adolf Hitler rendered a great service to his friend Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. And then part of the armament

women went into the forests, forming the backbone of future partisan formations and the so-called republics. Already after the victory of the Soviet troops over Germany, in 1945, all these partisan detachments were poisoned in the camps of Siberia and the North Caucasus; Vlasovites and repatriated prisoners were poisoned there in the same stage.

Some of the Soviet soldiers who surrendered, and later, disappointed that their forces would not be used for their intended purpose, that they were again left to the mercy of fate, that they were NOT needed, and those who escaped from captivity made their way back to Red army. And they were shot as traitors.

Looking ahead, I will give an example: more than 120,000 Soviet soldiers and sailors, taken prisoner in the first days of July 1942, like their predecessors, defeated on the Kerch Peninsula from the composition of the three Soviet armies and taken prisoner, for the most part were irredelible not to return to the Red Army, although they had such an opportunity. After all, when they were sent on foot across Tavria, these huge columns of many thousands were accompanied only by small guard detachments of Romanian soldiers with rifles. For 600

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Erich von Manstein will not provide a single (!) German soldier for more enhanced protection of prisoners of war due to the limited composition of his 11th army.

So, already in the first months of the war, the 8,000,000-strong Red Army ceased to exist.

Taking revenge on all the citizens of the Soviet country, Comrade Stalin proclaimed in August 1941: "We have no military personnel,

we are traitors to the motherland.

Then the General Secretary issues Order No. 220, according to which the families in the rear become hostages of the soldiers at the front and their behavior at the front. Here the General Secretary did not make any discovery at all: it was from this that Trotsky's "valiant" Red Army began its existence; when a person was forcibly taken to the Red Army and he knew that if he refused, then the whole family would be shot before his eyes. And they shot hundreds, thousands, millions of Russian families with women and household members, even babies!

From Order No. 220, it followed that if a serviceman was taken prisoner, his family would be repressed (often other relatives were subject to this fate, while repression in this case should be understood not as a term in a camp, but by execution).

After that, Comrade Stalin announces total mobilization - this is how the divisions of the "people's militia" are formed.

nia, consisting of elderly and sick people, completely untrained to fight. But those of the 32 million manpower of the country, trained before the war, "Voroshilov shooters", who were not called up before that, are gradually pouring into the ranks; and those of the 1 million paratroopers, also trained before the war, who still remained in the territories not occupied by the Germans; and those of the excellent students who passed the TRP standards ("Ready for work and defense!"), Who, according to the accelerated program of agitprop, are stuffed with hatred for "mean dogs", "damned fascist occupiers" and who have not yet passed the test of strength in a collision with enemy at the western borders with the beginning of the war ...

By the beginning of 1942, another 420 rifle and 120 cavalry divisions, 250 tank brigades, hundreds of ar

3 Stalin could strike first 6 about

Tillerman and aviation regiments. And this force: the newly created 8-million army, thrown as a ritual sacrifice to the bloody gods, almost all will die. An army will perish, the soldiers of which were born already under Soviet rule, and therefore did not know what Russia was like before 1917 and its occupation by red demons. And this nuance is very important!

Among these formations, three armies of the Crimean Front were created, stationed on the Kerch half of the island. There is no more stupid, if not more criminal decision than to drive three armies onto the peninsula, where there is no operational space! (Of course, we are still looking at the whole picture superficially, further we will talk about the situation in Crimea in more detail, but the knowledge gained will help us better navigate in particular.)

So, in 1942, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin again has a strong army of 8 million soldiers and officers.

And now let us turn to an important Soviet source - the reports of the Soviet Information Bureau. I will cite the text that on November 25, 1941, the many millions of Soviet people of the USSR listened to on the evening air, mesmerized by the sternly penetrating voice of the announcer Yuri Borisovich Levitan.

Ridiculous fabrications of Hitler's fake netchikov about the losses of Soviet troops.

On October 3, in a radio speech, and on October 2, in an order for the German army, Hitler boastfully announced that a decisive offensive had begun against the Soviet troops. Hitler promised the Germans in the rear and the troops that this offensive would inflict a mortal blow on the Soviet troops and the war would end before the onset of winter. But, as the Russian proverb says, "a terrible dream, but God bless," the offensive promised by Hitler began ... and failed miserably. Winter has come, advice

The Russian armies were not only not destroyed, but in the fire of war they became even stronger, and the Hitlerite robber army, lousy, undressed and hungry, snaps its teeth from cold and hunger. Hitler once again appeared before the German people as a notorious demagogue

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and deceiver. In connection with such an embarrassing failure, Hitler is now once again forced to writhe like a snake in front of the population of Germany and again lie and boast, boast and lie.

The command of the German army, summing up the results of five months from the day of the war in the East, to reassure the population of Germany, threw out a new trick by publishing false and ridiculous data on Soviet losses. Here is the ridiculous data. During the period from June 22 to November 20, German troops allegedly took 3,725,600 prisoners and defeated 389 Bolshevik divisions. The Soviet troops allegedly lost 8,000,000 soldiers, more than 22,000 tanks, 27,000 guns, 15,454 aircraft, and a large number of military and merchant ships.

But the losses of the Bolsheviks, it turns out, do not end there. It turns out that German troops have allegedly seized a territory with a population of 75 million, and in this territory they have seized military factories, the total productivity of which amounts to % of the entire military industry of the Soviets.

If Hitler and his command had at least some sense of humor, they would have thought ten times before publishing these ridiculous data. Indeed, if the Soviet troops have such astronomical losses in manpower and equipment, then, one asks, why is the Hitlerite army not now standing behind the Ural Mountains, but trampling near Moscow? Are the vaunted Hitlerite gangs fighting windmills?

Of course, the Germans did not occupy any territory with a population of 75 million. The Soviet population, knowing the wolfish habits of Hitler's robbers, rapists and murderers, for the most part evacuated in a timely manner to the eastern regions of the Soviet Union. Part of the population, which did not have time to leave the areas temporarily occupied by the Germans, has an indomitable hatred for the invaders, which finds its most striking expression in the remarkable actions of the partisans.

And the Germans did not capture military factories either. All plants and factories from the areas occupied by the Germans have been evacuated to the eastern regions of the Soviet Union, and many of them are already in

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The new place gives the Red Army tanks, planes, cannons, and ammunition. A small number of enterprises that

It was not possible to evacuate some of them, the Germans really captured ... but they captured them in the form of ruins, blown up and destroyed by Soviet troops.

As can be seen from the foregoing, Hitler's henchmen fabricated data on Soviet losses according to the principle: "Do not like it, do not listen, but do not interfere with lying."

But another question arises. Why do Hitlerite rules stubbornly hush up their own losses in men and equipment? Someone, if not the Germans, should know about their losses, but meanwhile they are silent, as they took water in their mouths. There can be only one answer to this question - the Germans have lost such a huge number of people and equipment that Hitler and his gang are mortally afraid to tell the German people the truth about the losses of the German army. But you can't hide the truth. The German people also suspect this truth. Yes, and how not to guess when almost every German family has a killed or wounded family member.

To characterize the losses of the Germans and our troops during the 5 months of the war, we present the following irrefutable data:

`Losses of the Germans:

About 6,000,000 people were killed, wounded and captured

Tanks - more than 15,000

Aircraft - 13,000

Guns - up to 19,000

Our losses:

2,122,000, of which 490,000 were killed, up to 1,122,000 were wounded, and 520,000 were missing.

Tanks - 7900

Aircraft - 6400

Guns - 12 900

From the testimonies of the prisoners it is also clear that the coming winter, which was not included in the calculation of the German command, caused a wave of mass diseases of German soldiers from pro

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colds, frostbite, lung diseases, flu, etc. The prolongation of the war, the poor supply of the army, the onset of cold weather are increasingly undermining the physical and moral condition of the fascist bandit army.

These are the real and truthful data on the losses of the Nazi and Soviet troops during the 5 months of the war.

But the enemy, regardless of any losses, continues to rush forward. He strains his last strength in order to capture Moscow. However, as they say, this depends not only on the braggart Hitler. The multi-million Soviet people and their Red Army will end the war only with the complete defeat of the enemy. This defeat of the enemy must begin near Moscow.

Sovinformburo"

(Communications of the Soviet Information Bureau, M., 1944, vol. 1, pp. 374-375).

Indeed, the Soviet agitprop prophesied according to the principle: "If you don't like it, don't listen, but don't interfere with lying."

Taking as an axiom such a feature of the Germans as pedantry and accuracy, the data that "for the period from June 22 to November 20, German troops ... took 3,725,600 prisoners, defeated 389 Bolshevik divisions. The Soviet troops lost ... 8,000,000 soldiers, more than 22,000 tanks, 27,000 guns, 15,454 aircraft, a large number of military and merchant ships "- should be considered RAL!

It was not without reason that I referred to the report of the Soviet Information Bureau, headed during the Second World War by a member of the Orgburo, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (from 03/22/1939 to 05/10/1945) Alexander Sergeevich Shcherbakov (1901-1945).

All events, even the most global ones, take place in direct dependence on many individuals.

This is my advice to a smart reader: look at the biography of each person involved, only then much will become clear, something that cannot be seen, understood and comprehended with a superficial reading about certain deeds and events.

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ties. As I said, we will carefully look into the biographies of individuals who are directly related to our story.

The official biography of this man says that he is the son of a worker from the city of Ruza, Moscow Region, and that his father was beaten by gendarmes for participating in the demonstration and soon died of beatings. Shcherbakov's wife, Vera Konstantinovna Pestroukhova (1902-1948), was also born into a working-class family in the Donbass, joined the party at the age of 17; worked in the party apparatus and took part in the fight against banditry (understand: with Russian people who did not recognize

criminally imposed Soviet regime) in the area of Lisi chanska in Ukraine; graduated from the Communist University named after Ya. M. Sverdlov and the Engineering and Technical Academy. In the 1930s, the Shcherbakovs settled in a dacha in the village of Ogarevo near Moscow in ... the premises of a church closed by the Soviet authorities. This "house" was equipped by N. S. Khrushchev, who was working in Moscow at that time. The Bulganins refused to move there for fear of defiling the church, but the Shcherbakovs moved in. On this occasion, the local population, if something bad happened, said: everything is because sinners, theomachists live in the church. Shcherbakov's sister Kapa married the hereditary revolutionary Balukonis. And sister Zinaida was at one time married to A. A. Zhdanov, secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

Another curious person who was responsible for ensuring that the listeners of the USSR received only the "correct" reports and news from the battlefields was the Soviet and party leader Borodin. In fact, this Misha Borodin was called Mikhail Markovich Gruzenberg (1884-1951), and from 1934 to 1949 he was the editor-in-chief of the Sovinformburo. This is according to the Soviet Historical Encyclopedia, vol. 2, section 623; while the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, vol. 3, p. 578, indicates that he held this very responsible position from 1941 to 1949.

This party member has the same "heroic biography" as most of them: they fought against tsarism, studied abroad in terrorist groups and detachments, listened to

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lectures on how to kill properly and effectively in order to retain power. They wandered around countries and continents and were ready at any moment to rush to where, from their propaganda, their unrest, riots and intimidating acts of terrorism, the state power would crack, which would eventually allow them to gain a foothold in that country forever, as masters of ... In 1906, Mikhail lived in England, from 1907 to 1922 he gained experience in the USA. Overseas, with the money of his employers, he organized a special school for comrades in the struggle. This agent of the Comintern and freemason was one of the founders of the US Communist Party. Mikhail Markovich worked both as the 1st Consul General of the RSFSR in Mexico (1919) and as an adviser to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in China. Returning to the USSR in 1927, he immediately received high posts, was deputy people's commissar of labor, deputy director of TASS, editor-in-chief of Mozsom'Memz (combining, as indicated in the TSB, this work with the work of the editor-in-chief of the Sovinform Bureau; simply irreplaceable specialist in the field of fooling degenerates!)

Colleagues of Mikhail Borodin worked as propagandists in newspapers, filmed photographic and film documents about the "heinous crimes of the fascists", about "crimes directed against humanity", in order to present these materials as weighty arguments at the trial of the victors over the vanquished.

The only tragic thing is that there was no one to capture the crimes against 60 million Russians and other former subjects of the Russian Empire, brutally destroyed after the "Great October ...", prepared and carried out with the money of those who financed this "Russian" (correctly, - anti-Russian) revolution, and Trotsky with his Red Army, and Adolf Hitler with his Third Reich.

And now, when the real picture of what was happening in the Soviet country is almost clear, we can begin the story directly about the events that ultimately led to the tragedy of the Black Sea Fleet and the troops of the Crimean Front during the Second World War.

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Chapter 11

PROPOSED BY KUZNETSOV, AGREED WITH
STALIN...

Much later, when Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov had to write the book "On the Course to Victory," he would celebrate Saturday, June 21, 1941, "full of alarm signals from the fleets," which passed almost the same way as the previous ones. "Before the weekend, we usually stopped work earlier, but that evening my heart was restless, and I called home:

Don't wait for me, I'll be late.

Vera Nikolaevna, my wife, was not surprised: I was often late at work. She only asked if I would stay the night in my office. I hastened to answer:

- I'll tell you later.

I didn't want to talk about it on the phone.

It was a hot and stuffy evening in Moscow. Dark clouds were gathering in the sky, despite the open windows, not the slightest movement of air was felt.

Calm reigned in the capital's institutions. On ordinary days, after 6 pm, lunch time came: the leaders went home - for about three hours, then to sit at work until late at night. But on Saturday, many people left the city. The business pain subsided.

That evening it was somehow especially quiet, the phone did not ring at all, as if it had been turned off. Even such "restless" people's commissars as V. A. Malyshev and I. I. Nosenko, with whom I was especially closely connected, did not remind themselves of the question that has become familiar in recent times: "How are you?"

I was sitting in my office, where the usual city noise could be heard from the street - the hum of cars, sometimes loud and carefree young laughter.

He idly flipped through the papers. Thoughts could not focus on them. Quite shortly before that, I came across a review of the foreign press and TASS reports. All sorts of newspapers wrote about the imminent war between Russians and Germans. They couldn't all agree!

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I remembered how wars started in the past, especially the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. We were often reminded of it at the school and at the Naval Academy, perhaps because its first act took place at sea. It began with an unexpected torpedo strike, which Japanese destroyers inflicted on the Russian squadron, stationed on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur ... ".

A difficult state, a sense of a vicious circle, but his true thoughts, which he cannot even share with his colleagues or with his readers, are hidden ...

The People's Commissar's thoughts were interrupted by V. A. Alafuzov, deputy chief of the Main Staff, who came in with an evening report: the situation in the Baltic is restless, in the Black Sea it is calmer, in the north nothing special has happened ...

The heads of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff, whom Nikolai Gerasimovich called, were not there. He had a short talk with Commander of the Baltic Fleet V.F. Tributs, Commander of the Northern Fleet A.G. Golovko, and then with Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet I.D. Eliseev. Everyone was in place, the command posts were deployed, the fleets had been in operational readiness No. 2 for two days already. At the same time, part of the Red Navy men and commanders were released ashore, a concert was taking place in the Sevastopol House of the Fleet, but many were working at the headquarters. The officer on duty at the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet noticed that the German transports, usually at sea during these hours, suddenly disappeared, hiding in Bulgarian and Romanian ports.

At about 8 pm, the USSR Naval Attaché arrived in Berlin, Captain 1st Rank M.A. Vorontsov, who had come from the German capital. Mikhail Alexandrovich spoke about the events in the Reich, noting that the attack would be from one hour to the next. "This is war," Vorontsov sighed. After his departure, Admiral Lev Mikhailovich Galler, who dealt with the problems of shipbuilding, entered. What he began to talk about was not important for Nikolai Gerasimovich at that moment. But this man was sympathetic to the drug addict ...

Around 10 pm Galler left. It got dark outside the window. A gust of wind raised dust in the street, fluttered the curtains on the open windows, a thunderstorm broke out, and rain poured down, dispersing the merry youth.

At that moment, Vladimir Antonovich Alafuzov again entered the office with an extraordinary report, reporting information from the fleets. At about 11 pm, the HF telephone rang, and Marshal Timoshenko suggested that Kuznetsov immediately come to him. The People's Commissar of the Navy went to the People's Commissar of Defense together with Vice Admiral Alafuzov, taking cards with him.

That night the war with Germany began...

It seems that now is the time to draw the attention of readers to the command and command staff of the Navy during the war of 1941-1945.

But before listing all the key people, I will outline some important nuances that are also little known to a wide range of researchers. Higher and senior officers personally initiated and appointed by People's Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov to nomenklatura positions will be highlighted in bold type. All the rest were initiated by the Chief of the Main Naval Staff Admiral Isakov and sanctioned by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, and Kuznetsov was only forced to state the fact of their appointment and sign the relevant orders.

Vice-Admiral Alexander Vasilievich Nemiti (1879-1967), Rear Admiral of the Imperial Russian Navy and the first commander of the Soviet naval forces of the Black Sea, German by origin, from an aristocratic family of barons, descending from Charles the Great. In 1900 he graduated from the Marine Corps, then artillery officer classes in Sevastopol. In 1912, he completed his studies at the Nikolaev Naval Academy and, having become a professor, taught there. By an unspoken decision of Russian officers of German origin, he was left to cooperate with the Bolshevik regime in order to find employment in the navy and counteract the destruction

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the Russian fleet and its traditions laid down by Peter the Great.

Vice Admiral Nemitz met with Kuznetsov six months after the appointment of Nikolai Gerasimovich as People's Commissar of the Navy. They had a difficult conversation. Devoting the people's commissar in detail to the system of selection and placement of personnel, first by the Leninist Council of People's Commissars, and later by the Stalinist leadership, Alexander Vasilyevich drew attention to the fact that Russians by origin in positions that should be filled by senior officers (at that time - command

Dirsky), the number is extremely small. Whereas these posts are cadres of the Soviet government, most of them bearing Russian surnames, but most often hiding their true national origin.

In order not to aggravate relations with the Stalinist leadership and at the same time to achieve at least some success in the importance of his people, Nemitz recommended that he be very careful in appointing top commanders who are useful to Nikolai Gerasimovich as highly qualified specialists to the apparatus of the people's commissariat. But at the same time, to appoint persons of non-Russian nationality to some positions in parallel. "You will then see which of the people you appoint have problems," Nemitz chuckled sadly.

"Aren't you afraid to tell me about it?" asked the interlocutor, who listened attentively to him. Kuznetsov hardly expected to see in this seemingly stiff, pedantic Russian admiral a patriot of Russia; over the years of service, he almost lost faith that there were people left in the country who truly cheered for the Russian cause and were able to do something ...

"I am already old enough to deceive anyone. I only talk to people I feel like I need to. And I have few such people: one old friend, yes ... he shared with you about painful and long-suffering things. I bow for this. And God bless you.

... When appointing one or another leader, who was personally initiated by Nikolai Gerasimovich, he usually

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before that, he consulted with a member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a member of the Main Military Council, Andrei Aleksandrovich Zhdanov, knowing that he would certainly pass on their conversation to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs and, most importantly, to Stalin personally. If it concerned the appointment of nomenklatura officials of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which included the commanders of the fleets, then usually the General Secretary of the Central Committee himself initiated these positions; True, when asking the People's Commissar who he would like to see in one place or another ... And if you understand that Stalin has already decided everything in advance, whom to appoint, then it remains only to get to the point. Fortunately for Nikolai Gerasimovich, he always hit the mark in such cases, because he knew the rules of the game.

The command and commanding staff of the Navy during the war of 1941-1945. :

Chief Military Council of the Navy:

Chairman: Kuznetsov Nikolai Gerasimovich, Admiral - People's Commissar of the Navy of the USSR, member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

Council Members:

Zhdanov Andrey Alexandrovich - member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), divisional commissar,

Isakov Ivan Stepanovich, Admiral - First Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy and Chief of the Main Naval Staff,

Rogov Ivan Vasilyevich, Army Commissar 2nd rank - Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy and Head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Navy, member of the Central Audit Commission,

Galler Lev Mikhailovich, Admiral - Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy,

Levchenko Gordey Ivanovich, Vice Admiral - Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy,

Zhavoronkov Semyon Fedorovich, Lieutenant General of Aviation - Head of the Air Force Directorate of the Navy.

Command of the People's Commissariat of the Navy:

People's Commissar of the Navy: Kuznetsov Nikolai Gerasimovich, Admiral of the Fleet - 06/22/1941 - 09/03/1945.

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Deputy People's Commissars of the Navy:

Isakov I.S., Admiral of the Fleet - 06/22/1941 - 09/03/1945

Rogov I.V., Colonel General of the Coastal Service - 06/22/1941 - 09/03/1945

Galler Lev Mikhailovich, Admiral - 06/22/1941 - 09/03/1945;

Levchenko Gordey Ivanovich, admiral - 06/22-10/12/1941 and 04/09/1944-09/03/1945 (the people's commissar had to agree, although he objected in detail to the appointment of Gordey Ivanovich as commander of the Crimean Front; this appointment was initiated by Admiral Isakov in agreement with L. P. Beria , and General Secretary Stalin approved this initiative);

Ignatiev Sergey Parfenovich, corps commissar - 06/22/1941 - 01/20/1942 (creature of L.P. Beria);

Malyshev Nikolai Vasilievich, lieutenant general of the coastal service - 01/20/1942 - 04/19/1945 (creature of L.P. Beria);

Abankin Pavel Sergeevich, Vice Admiral - 19.04. - 03.09.1945;

Vorobyov Sergey Ilyich, Colonel General of the Coastal Service - 06/22/1941 - 09/03/1945.

Heads of the Main Naval Itab:

Isakov I.S., Admiral - 06/22/1941 - 07/03/1942;

Alafuzov Vladimir Antonovich, admiral - 07/03/1942 - 03/16/1943 and 07/22/1944 - 04/13/1945 (creature of L.P. Beria);

Stepanov Georgy Andreevich, Vice Admiral - 03/16/1943 - 07/21/1944 (creature of L.P. Beria);

Kuchеров Stepan Grigorievich, Admiral - 27.04 - 03.09.1945.

Heads of operational management:

Alafuzov V. A., Rear Admiral - 06/22/1941 - 03/17/1943;

Bogdenko Valentin Lukich, Rear Admiral - 03/17/1943 - 08/05/1944;

Zozulya Fedor Vladimirovich, Rear Admiral - 05.08. - 09/12/1944;

Kuchеров S. G., Vice Admiral - 09/12/1944 - 04/27/1945;

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Kharlamov Nikolai Mikhailovich, Vice Admiral - 27.04 - 03.09.1945.

Head of the organizational and mobilization department

niya:

Babin Panteleimon Ivanovich, Major General of the Coastal Service - 06/22/1941 - 09/03/1945.

Heads of the Intelligence Directorate:

Zuykov Nikolay Ivanovich, rear admiral - 06.22. - 09/11/1941.

Vorontsov Mikhail Alexandrovich, Rear Admiral - 09/11/1941 - 04/10/1945 (according to unspecified information - a descendant of the prince and count Vorontsov);

Filippovsky Alexander Alexandrovich, captain of the 1st rank - 10.04. - 05/09/1945 and 08/09/09/03/1945;

Rumyantsev Alexander Mikhailovich, captain of the 1st rank - 09.05-09.08. 1945 (according to unspecified information - a descendant of the Count and Field Marshal of the Russian Army P. Rumyantsov).

Head of the Department of Military Communications:

Kechetzhi Nikolai Konstantinovich, Major General of the Coastal Service - 06/22/1941 - 09/03/1945.

Heads of the Department of External Communications:

Sendik Iosif Moiseevich, captain of the 1st rank - 10/06/1941 - 12/13/1944;

Sergeev Nikolai Dmitrievich, captain of the 1st rank - 12/13/1944 - 08/30/1945.

Heads of the historical department:

Kruglov Vladimir Ilyich, Major General of the Coastal Service - 06/22-08/16/1941 and 09/05/1944-09/03/1945 (creature of L.P. Beria; executor of the will of Soviet historians who created capital works on the topic: the history of the Russian state and the formation of the Soviet powers - in which tsarism was accused of cruel exploitation of peoples, as well as at the same time of destroying the Russian fleet, as a result of which it lost the Crimean War and the war with Japan ... In the current difficult situation in July-September 1941, many figures " new historical science" became uneasy in Leningrad and Moscow, and they, knowing how the Gestapo' deals with the

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yards, left both former Russian capitals for further "creative activity" in the capital of Soviet Uzbekistan, Tashkent. The head of the historical department, V. I. Kruglov, also submitted a report from his position. It was at that time that the People's Commissar of the Navy decided to appoint Captain 2nd Rank Iva Nikolayevich Bykov to the post of head of the historical service, but this officer was not destined to become the leading historian of the fleet .. After the events on the fronts and in the capital settle down, the "outstanding" Soviet figures of science, including Vladimir Ilyich Kruglov, will again return to their "historical" posts.);

Bykov Ivan Nikolaevich, captain of the 2nd rank - 16.08 - 30.10.1941;

Bologov Nikolai Aleksandrovich, Rear Admiral - 10/30/1941 - 07/20/1943;

Dolinin Mikhail Mikhailovich, Rear Admiral - 07/20/1943 - 09/05/1944.

Heads of combat training departments:

Kharlamov N. M., Vice Admiral - 22.06. - 07/20/1941 and 11/20/1944-04/27/1945;

Kuznetsov Konstantin Matveyevich, captain of the 1st rank - 07/25-09/03/1941;

Stavitsky Sergey Petrovich, Vice Admiral - 03-25.09.1941 and 03.17.1942-20.11.1944; |

Korenev Konstantin Yulianovich, Rear Admiral - 09/25/1941 - 03/17/1942;

Gren Ivan Ivanovich, Vice Admiral - 04/27-09/03/1945.

Head of Communications Department:

Gavrilov Viktor Mikhailovich, engineer - vice admiral - 06/22/1941 - 09/03/1945 (this candidacy was personally approved by the people's commissar from Stalin, and the Secretary General had no questions);

Head of Shipbuilding Department:

Isachenkov Nikolai Vasilyevich, engineer-vice admiral - 06/22/1941 - 09/03/1945.

Artillery Commanders:

Akulin Mikhail Ivanovich, Rear Admiral - 06/22/1941 - 03.1942;

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Egorov Vladimir Aleksandrovich, Rear Admiral - 03.1942-03.09.1945.

Head of mine and torpedo department:

Shibaev Nikolai Ivanovich - Rear Admiral - 06/22/1941 -09/03/1945.

Heads of technical department:

Orlov Alexander Grigorievich, engineer-vice admiral - 06/22/1941 - 04/28/1945;

Savin Alexander Nikolaevich, engineer-rear admiral - 22.04-03.09.1945.

Heads of the chemical department (creatures of L. NI. Beria):

Smirnov Sergey Pavlovich, captain of the 1st rank - 06/22/1941 -09/1942;

Romanov Boris Ivanovich, Rear Admiral - 09.1942 - 09.03.1945.

Head of the Radar Department:

Arkhipov Sergey Nikolaevich, engineer-rear admiral - 07/16/1943 - 09/03/1945 (this candidacy was put forward by people

coma, perhaps better than others in the Soviet leadership, who understood the need for radar support for the country's Navy. Nikolai Gerasimovich insisted on this even when he took office as People's Commissar of the Navy, and then later, on May 27, 1941, on the day of the death of the German battleship Bismarck. It is known that the design of this ship was very successful, had a reliable armor scheme, super-powerful weapons for that time, and the layout of the hull gave the battleship phenomenal survivability, which ensured its successful destruction of the pride of the British fleet of the battleship Hood. But a few hours later, the Bismarck was discovered thanks to the radar equipment in service with the Royal Navy, which, having calculated the location of the German raider, sent an aircraft carrier with aircraft against it and attacked it. The sailors of the Kriegsmarine, in order not to lose the honor of the German sailors, opened the kingstones of the ship, and he went to the bottom without surrendering to the enemy. Arkhipov S. N. was one of the most highly professional specialists and laid the foundations for electronic warfare - electronic warfare of the Navy).

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Heads of the Scientific and Technical Committee:

Zhukov Anatoly Alekseevich, engineer-rear admiral - 06/22/1941-01/24/1943;

Yakimov Alexander Avdeevich, engineer-rear admiral - 04.1943-05.07.1944;

Alekseev Nikolai Vasilyevich, engineer-rear admiral ^ - 05.1944-05.09.1945.

Head of Hydrographic Department:

Lapushkin Yakov Yakovlevich, Rear Admiral - 06/22/1941 - 09/03/1945

Chiefs of the emergency rescue department:

Krylov Fotiy Ivanovich, rear admiral - 06/22/1941 - 08.1941;

Kuznetsov Apollon Alexandrovich, Rear Admiral - 08.1941-02.1942;

Frolov Alexander Andreevich, engineer-vice admiral - 02.1942-09.03.1945.

Head of Engineering Department:

Sudbin Pavel Ivanovich, lieutenant general of the engineering troops - 06/22/1941 - 09/03/1945.

Diving directors:

Frolov Alexander Sergeevich, rear admiral - 26.01. —

11/11/1943;

Vinogradov Nikolai Ignatievich, Rear Admiral - 12/02/1943 - 02/23/1944;

Stetsenko Andrey Mitrofanovich, Rear Admiral - 06/24/1944. - 03/09/1945;

Shergin Alexander Petrovich, captain of the 1st rank - 09.03. - 09/03/1945.

Head of the Medical and Sanitary Department:

Andreev Fedor Fedorovich, Major General of the Medical Service - 06/22/1941 - 09/03/1945.

Head of Coastal Defense Department:

Mushnov Innokenty Stepanovich, lieutenant general of the coastal service - 06/22/1941 - 09/03/1945.

Head of the Air Force Department of the People's Commissariat of the Navy:

Zhavoronkov Semyon Fedorovich, Air Marshal - 06/22/1941 - 09/03/1945.

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Chapter 12

CLOSED WATERS DO NOT
DECIDE THE OUTCOME OF BATTLE

On a hot summer night in 1941, the Second World War reached the Russian Crimea... And the circumstances - for the umpteenth time! - tested the Black Sea Fleet for strength ...

"The first to take the blow was Sevastopol. Even if others entered the battle only an hour or two later, they already knew: the enemy attacked our Motherland, and the war began! - this is how the People's Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov described the sequence of events in the book "On the Eve". - Sevastopol met the fall prepared. The command of the fleet had to decide on its own to open fire. It is worth recalling once again that only a week before we were all assured that no war was foreseen, talk about it was a provocation, in order to understand how dramatic the situation was that night and what kind of internal inhibition, hesitation, uncertainty had to be overcome people in themselves before firmly and courageously giving such an order.

Subsequently, I was told that on that Saturday, as on previous days, the ships were dispersed in the Sevastopol Bay, with weapons ready for action. They were

darkened, and from the shore it was impossible to distinguish their silhouettes on the black water. But the city on the evening of June 21 was still sparkling with lights. The boulevards and gardens were filled with festively dressed-up people. "It seemed that nothing foreshadowed tragic events," N. T. Rybalko, who at that time was the operational duty officer at the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, wrote about this evening.

At about 11 p.m., Rear Admiral I. D. Eliseev, Chief of the Fleet Staff, looked into the duty officer's room.

"I'm going home for a few minutes," he said.

N. T. Rybalko again saw Rear Admiral less than two hours later, when he quickly entered the room on duty, holding a telegram in his hands.

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"I remember it verbatim," writes N. T. Rybalko, "but I can't vouch for the order in which the fleets were listed." Here is the telegram: "SF, KBF, Black Sea Fleet, PVF, DVF. Operational readiness No. 1 immediately. Kuznetsov.

Immediately the main base was given the signal "Big gathering". And the city resounded with the roar of sirens, signal shots from batteries. The mouthpieces of the city's radio broadcasting network began to speak, signaling alarms. Ki sailors appeared on the streets, they ran to their ships ...".

Note: the order of operational readiness No. 1 was given just a few hours before the start of the war! Is this not evidence of strategic foresight, based on an analysis of the military-political situation, and, of course, the military talent of this outstanding admiral, who was N. G. Kuznetsov ...

Here he writes further: "3 hours 07 minutes. German planes approached Sevastopol stealthily, at a low altitude. All of a sudden searchlights flared up, bright rays began to fumble across the sky. The anti-aircraft guns of coastal batteries and ships began to speak. Several planes caught fire and began to fall. Others hurried to drop their load. They had the task of blocking the ships in the bays of Sevastopol, preventing them from going to sea. The enemy did not succeed. Mines fell not on the fairway, but on the shore. Some hit the city and exploded there, destroying houses, causing fires and killing people.

Mines were parachuted down, and many residents thought that it was an airborne assault. In the dark, it was no wonder to mistake mines for soldiers. ... the raid was repulsed, and on June 22 Sevastopol met the dawn fully armed, bristling with guns that looked into the sky and into the sea.

In Moscow, dawn came a little earlier. At 3 o'clock everything was already visible. I lay down on the sofa, trying to imagine what was going on in the fleets.
Silent phone call

lifted me to my feet.

- Reports the commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

According to the unusually excited voice of Vice Admiral F.S. I already understand Oktyabrsky - something out of the ordinary has happened.

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- An air raid was carried out on Sevastopol. Anti-aircraft artillery reflects the attack of aircraft. Several bombs fell on the city...

I look at the clock. 3 hours 15 minutes. That's when it started ... I have no doubts - the war! .. "

And as a touch on the actions of other military leaders, whose shortsightedness only aggravated the situation, I will give an example of rare sanity: Colonel General G. M. Stern, having assumed the post of head of the Air Defense Directorate of the Red Army, said that the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of January 20, 1941 "On the organization of air defense" and the order of the People's Commissar No. 0015 of February 14 of the same year "On the division of the territory of the USSR into zones, regions and air defense points" considers ... almost wrecking and therefore is not going to fulfill them (!) . He was supported by the head of the Air Force Directorate, Rychagov. Stern believed that such orders and decrees on air defense make the entire territory of the USSR virtually defenseless against air raids by any alleged enemy. And, therefore, Sevastopol was not covered, the air defense of the country was not provided. But the command of the Black Sea Fleet did not take care of this ...

The time has come when a small flag with black and yellow squares, denoting an air raid signal in the maritime language, began to fly on the masts of the Black Sea ships several times a day.

The People's Commissar called Stalin's office, but Poskrebyshchev said that there was no such thing and there was no way to connect Kuznetsov with the leader. Nikolai Gerasimovich called Marshal S.K. Timoshenko and gave him word for word the report of Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky. A few minutes later, he calls Stalin again, but the Kremlin's communication center reports that his request to say that Sevastopol is being bombed will not be reported to Stalin, but ... to whom it should; and reported to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs that the People's Commissar of the Navy was talking in panic, that Sevastopol was supposedly destroyed. Literally a few minutes later, the buzzer of the HF apparatus rang out, and Kuznetsov heard an irritated voice:

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Do you understand what you are reporting? - it was a voice

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, who oversaw the power and administrative bodies of the country, Georgy Maksimilianovich Malenkov.

- I understand and report with all personal responsibility: the war has begun.

"Well, as you know..." Malenkov hung up.

Kuznetsov realized that the secretary of the Central Committee did not believe him; however, his information was immediately rechecked by signalmen or

gangs of the NKVD.

Undoubtedly, Kuznetsov lived through the first hours and days of the war with a heavy heart, and he certainly weighed the chances of a varied course of events more than once; thought and compared the capabilities of people in charge of the fleet on the ground and in many respects responsible for how those events will develop wa...

Of course, the people's commissar not only analyzed each of the commanders of the fleets; he compared the state of affairs and the power of the Soviet Navy with the German Kriegsmarine (navy), with the British, Italian and American fleets and understood that in terms of quality this comparison was not in favor of the Soviet fleet. And if we take the adversary - the German fleet, then it is powerful and has highly professional officers and good sailors. And it will certainly wage war on international communications against the fleets of the United States and Great Britain. This is evidenced by the death of the battleship "Hood" in the battle with the battleship "Bismarck".

Kuznetsov was aware that in the outbreak of war, the greatest burden would fall on the shoulders of the youngest commander of the Northern Fleet, Vice Admiral Arseniy Grigoryevich Golovko, who came from a dashing Cossack family in the Kuban. He was only 35, and he was only two years younger than the people's commissar...

So, - the people's commissar reasoned, - it means that there will be no war as such either in the Baltic or on the Black Sea - in these two closed Sea areas ... And, as army comrades say, "battles of local importance" will be fought there, not re

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decisive outcomes of strategic battles of World War II. This means that the role of these two fleets will be purely auxiliary, transport, and also with the forces of their weapons, supporting their artillery fire, these two fleets should help army formations and formations conducting an armed struggle against the invading enemy.

According to information available to Kuznetsov, the Germans "locked

li "on the Tallinn roadstead, all the main forces of the Baltic Fleet. Which in the very near future was waiting for a terrible tragedy, generated by the careless attitude of the command of the Baltic Fleet and personally Admiral V.F. Tributs, his assistants Admirals Yu.A. Panteleev, Yu.F. Rall, N.K. D. Verbitsky.

As for the Black Sea Fleet, Kuznetsov understood, there were no naval forces of the German fleet in that region, and there was only one obsolete Romanian submarine that did not pose any danger to the forces of the Soviet fleet. This means that it is only necessary to have highly professional personnel and tactically competent use of the available battleships, cruisers, leaders, destroyers for artillery support of the Red Army.

The command and command staff of the Black Sea Fleet:

Azarov I.I. - member of the Armed Forces, brigade commissar (later admiral; creature of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and GUGB - Main Directorate of State Security);

Kulakov Nikolai Mikhailovich - divisional commissar (later vice admiral), member of the Armed Forces of the Black Sea Fleet, head of the political department (a creature of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the GUGB). (I will immediately point out that I deliberately brought these two political workers above the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, as it was in reality, while formally they were subordinate to the commander of the fleet.)

Fleet commanders:

Oktyabrsky (Ivanov) Philip Sergeevich, Admiral - 06/22/1941 - 04/23/1943 and 03/28/1944 - 05/09/1945;

Vladimirsky Lev Anatolyevich, Vice Admiral - 04/23/1943 - 03/10/1944;

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Basisty Nikolai Efremovich, Vice Admiral - 10. - 03/28/1944.

Fleet Chiefs of Staff:

Eliseev Ivan Amitrievich, Rear Admiral - 06/22/1941 - 01/30/1944;

Golubev-Monatkin Ivan Fedorovich, rear admiral - 05.02. - 12/12/1944;

Basisty N. E., Vice Admiral - 12/12/1944 - 05/09/1945.

Heads of the Operations Department:

Zhukovsky Oskar Solomonovich, captain of the 1st rank -

06/22/1941 - 03/1943 and 04/1944-05/09/1945;

Melnikov Panteleimon Alexandrovich, captain of the 1st rank - 03.1943 - 04.1944.

Head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet:

Namgaladze D. B., colonel.

Head of Communications of the Black Sea Fleet:

Gromov G. G., captain of the 1st rank.

Head of counterintelligence of the NKVD (SMERSH):

The name of the leader is not mentioned in any open sources. But, according to the information of the former military personnel of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet in 1941-1942, the leaders of this structure, after being accused of inaction and incompetence, were shot by representatives of the NKVD of the USSR at the Black Sea Fleet who were in the counterintelligence of the fleet, who later themselves were captured. There is only official information that from 07/10/1943 to 04/04/1945, the head of the SMERSH ROC

was Lieutenant General of the Coastal Service N. Ermolaev. (Regarding closed sources of information and archives, it will be said at the end of the book.)

Chiefs of the rear of the Black Sea Fleet:

Rear Admiral N.F. Hare, and since 1943 - lieutenant general of the coastal service M.F. Kumanin.

Penal battalions of the Black Sea Fleet:

In one penal battalion - 1500 people (constantly changing composition). For the period 1941-1942. in the entire active army of the USSR, the largest number of penal battalions were in the Separate Primorsky Army, the Black Sea Fleet, in the 44th, 47th and 51st armies of the Crimean Front - if

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The number ranged from 50 to 60 penal battalions. (And you will not find this information in the open press either.)

Penalties:

Separately, there were penal companies in divisions; in the armies of the Crimean Front and in the Black Sea Fleet there were 16-20 companies (in direct proportion to the number of divisions that arrived in the Crimea; sometimes their number reached 35), each with 500 people of constantly changing composition. The penal units were structurally subordinate to the head of counterintelligence of the NKVD (SMERSH).

Commander of the Odessa defensive region:

Zhukov Gavriil Vasilyevich, Rear Admiral - 10.08. —

10/16/1941

Commanders of the Sevastopol defensive region:

Petrov Ivan Efimovich, Major General - 04. - 11.1941

Oktyabrsky Philip Sergeevich, Vice Admiral - 11/10/1941 - 07/01/1942.

Novikov Petr Georgievich, Major General - 01. - 07/04/1942

Commanders of the Novorossiysk defensive region:

Kotov Grigory Petrovich, Major General - 18.08. - 09/08/1942

Grechko Andrey Antonovich, Major General - 08.09. - 10/17/1942

Komkov Fedor Vasilyevich, lieutenant general - 10.23. - 12/17/1942

Gorshkov Sergey Georgievich, Rear Admiral - 12/17/1942 - 04/12/1943

Commander of the Tuaisin defensive area:

Zhukov G. V., Rear Admiral - 07/22/1942 - 01/26/1943

Commanders of the Odessa Naval Base:

Zhukov G.V. , rear admiral - 22.06 - 22.08.41

Kulishov Ilya Danilovich, rear admiral - 22.08. - 10/15/1941

Belousov Sergey Filippovich, rear admiral - 27.01. - 07/20/1944

Derevianko Konstantin Illarionovich, captain of the 1st rank - 07/20/1944 - 01/18/1945

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Zhukov G. V., Vice Admiral - 18.01. - 02/07/1945

Commanders of the Ochakovskaya Naval Base:

Vdovichenko Dmitry Danilovich, Rear Admiral - 11/05/1943 - 03/28/1944

Derevyanko K. I., captain of the 1st rank - 01.04. - 06/14/1944

Commanders of the Nikolaev Naval Base:

Kulishov I. D., rear admiral - 22.06. - 28.08.1941

Derevyanko K. I., captain of the 1st rank - 14.06. - 07/21/1944

Commanders of the Poti Naval Base:

Kumanin Mikhail Fedorovich, lieutenant general of the coast service - 10/10/1942 - 09/11/1943

Fadeev Vladimir Georgievich, Vice Admiral - 09/11/1943 - 10/07/1944

Filippov Andrey Mikhailovich, Rear Admiral - 10/11/1944. — 28.02.45

Commanders of the Sevastopol Naval Base:

Filippov A. M., captain of the 1st rank - 04/12 - 10/11/1944.

Fadeev V. G., Vice Admiral - 10/11/1944 - 02/07/1945

Commanders of the Kerch Naval Base:

Vasyunin Petr Nikiforovich, rear admiral - 09.09. - 06.11.1941

Frolov Alexander Sergeevich, Rear Admiral - 11/06/1941 - 06/26/1942

Traynin Pavel Alekseevich, Rear Admiral - 06.26. - 17.09.1942 and 04.03. - 04/25/1943

Rutkovsky Vladimir Ivanovich, captain of the 1st rank - 04/25/1943 - 07/21/1944

Commanders of the Novorossiysk Naval Base:

Alexandrov Alexander Petrovich, captain of the 1st rank - 22.06. - 07/24/1941

Frolov A.S., captain of the 1st rank - 24.07. - 09/10/1941 Georgy Nikitich — Bachelors, Rear Admiral - 09/10/1941 - 12/1944

Zubkov Alexander Illarionovich, captain of the 1st rank - 12.1944 - 05/09/1945

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Commanders of the Tuapse Naval Base:

Kulishov I.D., Rear Admiral - 10/19/1941 - 03/26/1942

'Trainin P. A., Rear Admiral - 26.03. - 04/08/1942

Zhukov G.V., Rear Admiral - 04/08/1942 - 03/22/1943

Golubev-Monatkin I.F., captain of the 1st rank - 03/22/1943 - 01/29/1944

Vasiliev Andrei Grigorievich, captain of the 1st rank - 01/29 - 08/10/1944.

Commander Konstanika Naval Base:

Novikov Tikhon Andreevich, Rear Admiral - 09/01/1944 - 05/09/1945

Squadron commanders:

Vladimirsky L. A., Vice Admiral - 06/22/1941 - 05/05/1943

Basisty N. E., Vice Admiral - 05/05/1943 - 09/29/1944

Gorshkov S. G., Vice Admiral - 09/29/1944 - 05/09/1945

Cruiser and battleship brigade commanders:

Gorshkov S. G., Rear Admiral 22.06. - 10/12/1941

Bassist N. E. Rear Admiral - 07/25/1942 - 03/29/1943

Commanders of the Light Forces Detachment:

Novikov Tikhon Andreevich, rear admiral - 22.06. - 06.11.1941

Bass N. E. Rear Admiral - 11/06/1941 - 07/25/1942

Commander of the 1st Submarine Brigade (PL);

Boltunov Pavel Ivanovich, Rear Admiral - 06/22/1941 - 08/12/1942

Commander of the 2nd Submarine Brigade:

Solovyov Mikhail Georgievich, captain of the 1st rank - 06/22/1941 - 08/28/1942

Submarine brigade commanders:

Boltunov P. I., Rear Admiral - 08/28/1942 - 03/16/1943

Krestovsky Andrei Vasilievich, captain of the 1st rank - 03/16/1943 - 01/17/1944

Solovyov M. G., captain of the 1st rank - 05.01. - 09.03.1944

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Chursin Serafim Evgenievich, captain of the 1st rank - 05/27 - 06/09/1944

Commander of the 1st submarine brigade:

Chursin S. E., Rear Admiral - 06/23/1944 - 05/09/1945

Commander of the 2nd Submarine Brigade:

Solovyov M. G., Rear Admiral - 06/23/1944 - 05/09/1945.

Commanders of the 1st brigade of toroid boats (TK):

Filippov A. M., captain of the 1st rank - 06/22/1941 - 04/10/1944

Dyachenkov Georgy Danilovich, captain of the 2nd rank - 04/10/1944 - 03/12/1945

Narykov Vasily Maksimovich, captain of the 2nd rank - 04/22/1943 - 05/09/1945

Commanders of the 2nd brigade of the TC:

Melnikov Alexander Alexandrovich, captain of the 2nd rank - 22.06. - 12/24/1941

Savin Sergey Stepanovich, captain of the 2nd rank - 12/24/1941 - 04/22/1943

Protsenko Viktor Trofimovich, captain of the 2nd rank - 04/22/1943 - 05/09/1945

Commanders of the 1st Trawling Brigade (BT);

Fadeev V. G., Rear Admiral - 07/21/1942 - 09/10/1943

Novikov T.A., Rear Admiral - 09/10/1943 - 09/03/1944.

Dubrovsky Vladimir Georgievich, captain of the 2nd rank - 09/03/1944. - 01/15/1945

Popov Mikhail Nikolaevich, captain of the 1st rank - 15.01. - 05/09/1945

Commanders of the 2nd BT:

Studenichnikov Alexander Fedorovich, captain of the 1st rank - 05.1944 - 07.21.1944

Katuntsevsky Grigory Vasilievich, captain of the 2nd rank - 07/21/1944 - 05/09/1945

Commanders of the 3rd BT:

Ivanov Alexey Petrovich, captain of the 2nd rank - 06/19/1944 - 03/16/1945

Ratner Adolf Maksimovich, captain of the 2nd rank - 16.03. - 05/09/1945

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Chief of Coastal Defense - Member of the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet:

Morgunov Petr Alekseevich, lieutenant general of the coast service - 01/05/1943 - 05/09/1945

Commanders of the 255th Separate Marine Rifle Brigade:

Gordeev D.V., Colonel - 08/28/1942 - 01/14/1943

Potapov A.S., Colonel - 01/14/1943 - 09/1943

Grigoriev S. T., major - 09.1943

Kharichev P.V., Colonel - 09/26/1943 - 01/1944

Vlasov N.I., Colonel - 01/09/1944 - 05/03/1945

Tatarchevskiy I.V., Colonel 03.-03.09.1945

Commanders of the 83rd Separate Marine Brigade:

Kravchenko M.P., lieutenant colonel - 30.08. - 12/20/1942

Krasnikov D. V., lieutenant colonel - 12/20/1942 - 05/1943

Abramov A. M., Colonel - 06/04/1943 - 07/1943

Kozlov, lieutenant colonel - 07.43 - 09.1943

Ovchinnikov, lieutenant colonel - 09/19/1943 - 11/1943

Murashov P. A., Colonel - 11/16/1943 - 12.1943

Smirnov, Colonel - 07/27/1944 - 01/1945

Seleznev, Colonel - 01.1945 - 05.09.1945

Commander of the 7th Marine Brigade:

Zhidilov Evgeny Ivanovich, Major General - 08/17/1941 - 07/03/1942

Commanders of the 8th Marine Brigade:

Vilshansky Vladimir Lvovich, Colonel -

09/13/1941 -01/10/1942

Gorpischenko Pavel Filippovich, colonel - 29.01. - 07/17/1942

Commander of the 9th Marine Brigade:

Blagoveshchensky Nikolai Vasilievich, Lieutenant Colonel - 09/09/1941
25 - 07/03/1942

Commanders of the 83rd Marine Rifle Brigade:

Leontiev Ivan Pavlovich, colonel - 10.1941 - 06.1942

Vrutsky Valentin Apollinariyevich, colonel - 06.1942 - 09.12.1942

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Commanders of the 1st Black Sea Marine Regiment:

Morozov I. A., major - 05. - 08.15.1941

Osipov Ya. I., Colonel - 15.08. - 02.11.1941

Commanders of the 2nd Black Sea Marine Regiment:

Osipov Ya. I., quartermaster of the 1st rank - 08. - 08.15.1941

Morozov I. A., major - 15.08. - 10/15/1941

Taran N. N., lieutenant colonel - 10.1941 - 01.1942

Commanders of the 3rd Black Sea Marine Regiment:

Root K. M., captain - 09.1941 - 04.1942

Zatylnkin V.N., lieutenant colonel - 10.1941 - 07.1942

Gusarov S. R., Colonel - 07.1942

Commanders of the 16th Separate Marine Battalion (OBMP): |

Krasnikov D.V., major - 08.1942 - 11.1942

Rogalsky I. A., senior lieutenant - 11.1942 - 05.1943

Commander of the 142nd OBMP:

Kuzmin O. I., captain-lieutenant - 06.1942. - 10.1942

Commanders of the 143rd OBMP:

Artamonov M.P., captain of the 3rd rank - 06.1942 -

09/30/1943

Levchenko 3. I., major - 10.1943 - 03.1944

Makarov V. I., captain - 11/03/1944

Levitsky I. K., lieutenant colonel - 11.1944 - 04.1945

Commander of the 144th OBMP:

Vostrikov A. I., captain-lieutenant - 06. - 09.1942

Commanders of the 305th OBMP:

Popov V. M., captain - 06. - 07.21.1942

Parosyuk I. G., major - 21.07. - 08.1942.

Zheludko P. I., senior lieutenant - 08.1942

Kunikov Ts. L., major - 27.08. - 09/05/1942

Bogoslovsky V. S., captain - 05. - 09/20/1942

Sherman A. M., lieutenant commander - 10/10/1942 - 02/10/1943

Martynov D. D., major - 11.1943 - 03.1945

Commanders of the 386th OBMP:

Bondarenko A. A., captain - 04. - 09.1943

Belyakov N. A., lieutenant colonel - 09.1943 - 05.05.1945

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Commanders of the 393rd OBMP:

Botylev V.A., captain-lieutenant - 08/21/1943 - 06/1944.

Starshinov N. V., major - 06. - 09.1944

Bondarenko A. A., major - 09.1944 - 05/09/1945

Chiefs of Air Defense of the Black Sea Fleet:

Zhilin Ivan Sergeevich, Major General of Artillery - 06/22/1941 - 09/1943

Dushin Alexey Zakharovich, Major General of Aviation - 10.1943 - 09.1944

Pimenov Alexey Fedorovich, Major General of Artillery - 09.1944 - 05.09.1945 __
Commanders of the
Black Sea Fleet Air Force:

Rusakov Viktor Antonovich, Major General of Aviation - 22.06. - 04.11.1941

Ostryakov Nikolai Alekseevich, Major General of Aviation - 11/04/1941 - 04/24/1942

Ermachenkov Vasily Vasilyevich, Colonel General of Aviation - 04/25/1942 - 05/09/1945

Chapter 13

HOW DOES ALLY TURN INTO ENEMY?

In connection with the invasion of the German Wehrmacht into the territory of the USSR, the People's Commissar of the Navy resolved a huge number of issues related to maintaining the high combat readiness of all naval associations already in the first hours of the war.

Calling the head of the personnel department, he carefully analyzed almost every top commander of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets, as well as flotillas. Some of the commanders could not satisfy him as people's commissar, but he could not, for reasons beyond his control, replace them with others, as he believed, more prepared

lazy.

A considerable number of admirals remained in the Main Naval Headquarters and in its structural divisions, and in the administration

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commissars, who - taken together - were the sword of Damocles over his head, who knew all the rules of the political game in the people's commissariat and played in fulfillment of the will of one person - the leader ... The NKVD, headed at first by Yezhov, and after Beria. It was during the defeat of the high command in 1937-1938. to "strengthen" the top leadership of the fleet here - to the fleet! - Former Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, in charge of concentration camps and internal troops, commander of the 1st rank Frinovsky, was appointed. Who soon fell into the Moloch of repressions himself ...

All these events swept by as if without regard to Kuznetsov. And it seems that not so long ago, Nikolai Gerasimovich himself arrived from the Pacific Fleet from the post of commander, acted as first deputy people's commissar, and, finally, Stalin appointed him people's commissar of the USSR Navy. How much has he done during this time? Yes! But, of course, not all ... And then - the war.

Did he know how the relationship developed between

USSR and Germany in the field of building up military power and the exchange of military technologies? "Certainly I knew...

But he still could not understand how the German country turned from an ally into an enemy...

He could not, because although he knew many secrets, he did not know the most hidden and most important nuances of what was happening.

Stalin believed that the USSR needed to expand at the expense of new countries in Europe; and in fulfillment of these bloody plans, the leader saw Germany as his main ally.

It was also important for Germany to have its partners abroad. Especially after Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933. And who, in accordance with secret agreements with Moscow, as well as with the bankers of the West, began to revise the Versailles agreements.

The first Soviet contacts with Germany were made in the period from May 27 to June 19, 1922, when a German captain of the 1st rank (captain zur see) arrived in the USSR

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V. Lohmann, who held a series of consultations with the leaders of the USSR Namorsi (heads of the naval forces) M. V. Viktorov, V. I. Zof, L. M. Galler. Moscow then promised to transfer to Germany the ships confiscated during the First World War. There was also an exchange of views on the construction of submarines in the USSR, but no agreements were reached on this issue. What V. Lohmann informed the commander of the German fleet Benke.

Even in 1923, the Reichsmarine continued to be in contact with the Soviets, including through military-diplomatic channels. After a change of command in 1924, the German fleet was headed by Admiral Zenker. However, relations with the Soviet naval command did not receive much development at that time.

On March 25, 1926, a Soviet delegation visited Berlin, which proposed a detailed and comprehensive plan for military-technical cooperation, one of the components of which was the naval part. The result of the negotiations was a protocol in which the following points were written:

- 1) the participation of the Germans in the construction of modern submarines in the USSR;
- 2) joint construction of patrol vessels;
- 3) joint construction of high-speed torpedo boats;

4) German technical assistance to the development of the Soviet Navy;

5) the participation of Soviet naval specialists in the practical work of the German fleet.

It was decided that in exchange for Germany transferring submarine construction technologies for closed technology, in return the USSR provides the German fleet with the opportunity to engage in the further development of German types of submarines in the Soviet Union, as well as the training of appropriate personnel and naval aviation specialists.

The German side rejected part of the Soviet proposals, stating that it did not have enough money, and at the same time referring to prohibiting military articles

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Treaty of Versailles. But... it was just a phrase for international public opinion, they say, Germany and its new ally honestly adhere to the articles of the Treaty of Versailles.

Later, the financial aspects of the relationship were discussed and sealed by a secret agreement at the level of the naval departments. The Nikolaevsky shipbuilding plant, its capital, technological equipment, design and scientific forces, as well as shipbuilding specialists were involved in the work on the construction of the German fleet. The total amount of orders expressed in Soviet rubles of that time was about 50 million rubles.

The financial plan was drawn up for three years; the bulk of the money was provided for the construction of submarines.

In April 1926, the project of a 600-ton submarine, developed by the IVVS firm, was transferred to the USSR. The shipbuilding enterprises of Moscow, Leningrad, and Kronstadt took part in the construction of these boats.

Namorski of the USSR V.I. Zof probed the possibility of sending Soviet specialists to Germany, and was also interested in the German experience in building battleships.

In the summer of the same year, it was decided to transfer to the USSR projects of boats (-105, Ts-114, Ch-122, Ts-126 with all the drawings and documentation. But, according to Soviet specialists, these boats were outdated! And with them did not work...

Yes, how much People's Commissar Kuznetsov did not know, how much the highest military and party officials of the USSR did not know.

Hitler's coming to power in Germany was ensured, on the one hand, by the US financial magnates, eager for peace.

domination and united in a secret organization (called by some analysts the Order, or B'nai B'rith, also: the Golden Billion, the World Government, etc.), and on the other hand, the Stalinist leadership. Namely, these two most powerful forces on Earth, ignoring the public opinion of Europe, the United States and other states of the planet, provided the possibility of restoring the military

4 Stalin could strike first 9 G

and naval power of Germany. Similarly, at the end of the twentieth century, the Order financed the anti-Russian forces led by Trotsky, who then created the Red Army; so now the Order, together with its "subsidiary" — the Bolshevik Moscow — began to finance the creation of a powerful armed forces of the Third Reich.

... The German financier Friedrich Thyssen, who had close business ties not only with the owners of the Order, but also with Adolf Hitler, was directly involved in creating the power of the army and navy of the Third Reich. Moreover, Thyssen and his "Bank für Handel und Schiff", formerly called the "Von Heit Bank", was Hitler's main source of funds. The other banks of the Order that participated with the above were Guaranty Trust (owned by Harriman), Von Heit (owned by Carter); as well as other banks in Europe operating through nominees. With such financial support and the revolutionary and state experience of Germany's friend, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Stalin, behind him, Hitler himself could be calm about the future of his Third Reich and he was armed

nyh forces.

Back in the early 1930s, unanimity was established between the powers that be on the revival of Germany and its armed forces.

In 1932 alone, Thyssen spent 3 million marks on Hitler's election campaign - a rather impressive amount of money at that time. The capital of a number of corporations from New York City, behind which stood living bankers Roland Harriman, Cornelius Livense, J. L. Gwinter, H. J. Kouwenhoven, Knight Woolley (the latter participated in the financing of Trotsky and Ulyanov- Lenin to overthrow the Romanov dynasty and bring the so-called Bolsheviks to power in Russia).

Why financed? "Because it is only as a result of wars and revolutions that enormous possibilities for super-enrichment appear!

The conflict between countries is used for profit by corporations, and the above-mentioned financial

structures and businessmen were under the strict influence and control of the Order.

Two diabolical forces, opposing each other on both ends of the Earth, actually worked in unison, because they were moving towards the same main goal: world domination. Trying in the future to avoid oversaturation of the text with quotations, I will nevertheless give here the information voiced by the same I. Bunich, adding the necessary comments and clarifications from myself.

“Recently, Beria and Merkulov received an order to deploy a whole network of new concentration camps, and everyone on the Lubyanka internally shrank under the premonition of a new wave of mass terror ... This Stalin has repeatedly tested in practice, each time convinced of the genius of the great teacher (there is in view of V. I. Lenin and his Decree on the establishment of concentration camps of December 31, 1918. - Auth.). But this time he was thinking about a problem that in 1940 no one had yet thought about, but he did not even imagine that such questions could be posed even in the form of a problematic. And the question was very complicated: what to do with the population of Germany, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, France, Italy, Spain, various Romania, Hungary, and what else is there in Europe? Approximately a third were supposed to be liquidated, a third - to be reeducated on the spot, and a third - to be reeducated in the USSR. Re-educate by labor in Siberia, the Arctic and Northern Kazakhstan. The task was so global that only Poskrebyshev knew about it so far (Lieutenant General Poskrebyshev is the head of Comrade Stalin's Secretariat, or, more simply, the head of party intelligence. - Avii.). The rest will find out in due course. ... There were questions that for the time being were not trusted even by the “Special Folder” of the Politburo. “Special punk” is the highest degree of secrecy that existed in the Soviet Union, and it was to this folder that Stalin moved, having done away with petty matters. (The “Special Folder” still contains documents that, even under our new regime, are afraid to make public. Suffice it to recall that it was in the “Special Folder”, when needed, that the “Secret Protocols” of the Hammer Pact were found.

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va - Ribbentrop and the order of the Politburo (with all signatures) on the execution of the Poles in Katyn. And in a "folder" there are 100,000 units of storage.)

"Special folder" dated November 10, 1940

Secret resolution of the Politburo.

“On the transfer of clichés and technologies for the production of British pounds sterling banknotes in order to help the German side ...”

Top-secret laboratories for the production of counterfeit money and documents appeared in the Cheka (and in the Special Department of G. I. Boki, the developments of which, after his arrest in 1937, became the property of Comrade Stalin's Secretariat. - Auth.) As early as 1918, on the personal instructions of Lenin. The leader of the world proletariat, who knew something about economics, tried to hasten the collapse of the capitalist system with the help of inflation, flooded the "bourgeois world" with counterfeit banknotes. However, the love of Lenin and his entourage for real banknotes did not allow them to launch the planned operation on a global scale ... Therefore, the main task of the laboratory was to produce fake documents: from passports of almost all countries to passes to military facilities, strategic roads, to closed areas, etc. .P. (By the way, much of this was well known to von Manstein and von Runstedt, who fought in the Crimea in the 40s of the 20th century, who were amazed by such wildness of "tricks." - Auth.) Money was also made, but in a moderate amount and for specific goals. After 1938, all this production was withdrawn from the NKVD and transferred to the International Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - i.e. personally to Stalin (to the Secretariat of Comrade Stalin. Whereas the Secretariat of Comrade Stalin, the Department of International Information of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the International Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the International Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (6) - under these various signs, until the start of World War II, Stalin's party intelligence was hiding. - Avi.) .

From the very beginning of the war, the Germans were captured by the idea of setting up the production of counterfeit pounds. But even German pedantry and accuracy did not help. There was no experience. Behind

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The SD (TU Administration of the RSHA of Walter Schellenberg) was taken from the Germans by this difficult task, which, through the "NKVD-SS Friendship Society" created in January 1940, turned to the USSR for "technical assistance". Stalin hesitated for some time, and then decided to allow it. Let them indulge. Either way, we will win. The Germans will succeed - let them make sure once again that we do not hide anything from them and help in any way we can. Moreover, to undermine the British economy is also not bad at all. Anyway, we'll take it all back soon. And if, at the same time, the British are also told, in secret, what bad things the Germans are doing, then in general there will be combinations that are simply a sin not to use. (Stalin imposed a resolution: "Comrade Malenkov. Take control." - I. Bunich. Operation "Thunderstorm". Stalin's mistake. S. 44-46.)

And the Germans wanted to annoy Great Britain once again. Revenge also for the fact that in the early 20-30s of the twentieth century. provided open support to the Zionists, "who, in order to consolidate their positions in Palestine, undertook to promote the creation of a "Jewish national hearth" there (which was already done as the main result of the Second World War; see Soviet Historical Encyclopedia, M. 1969, vol. 12, section 905).

N. G. Kuznetsov did not know about such intricacies of the Soviet "mutual assistance" to the Wehrmacht, and could not know. No one in the top political and military leadership of the Soviet country could have known about this. Almost all the information was owned by only one person - Stalin.

If Kuznetsov did not know about this, then neither did his closest associates, including the head of the GM, Admiral Isakov. But the latter, like many GMSH operators who worked for a long time in the central office, knew the nuances and details of what was happening much more than Nikolai Gerasimovich himself. That is why the events that took place in the fleets, and in particular on the Black Sea, were seen differently by the people's commissar and the head of the Main Staff. After all, in fact, each performed his own task, different from the task of the other ...

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Chapter 14

HE WANTED TO "DRIVE" THE FLEET FROM CHILDHOOD

In fulfillment of our promise to take a closer look at the biographies of individuals, and also in order to somehow explain the discrepancy between the tasks of the first two leaders of the fleet, we should first dwell on the biography of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Soviet Union Ivan Stepanovich Isakov.

The boy Hovhannes was born in the Armenian village of Ajikent on August 22, 1894, 10 years before the birth of N. G. Kuznetsov. According to official sources, undoubtedly corrected by the NKVD authorities together with Ivan Stepanovich himself, his father's name was Stepan Yegorovich Isakyan, and he was a road technician. The father of the future hero came from a Jewish-Armenian family. With the filing of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, their surname was Russified and began to sound like Isakov.

Three children grew up in the family, and since the father died early, trying to get rich in the fields in Baku, the mother, Ida Antonovna Lauer, a native of Derpt, was engaged in raising the children. She had a brother, P. A. Lauer, who lived in Tiflis and was educated as a process engineer. This brother dreamed of serving in the navy, but, in accordance with the then existing law in the Russian Empire, men of Jewish nationality were not accepted into the navy. Over time, Ida Lauer-Isahakyan moved to her brother in Tiflis, where her son Hovhannes entered a real school, and his uncle gradually instilled in him knowledge of maritime affairs, offering books from his extensive library. He managed to convey his dream to his nephew, who wished to connect his life with the fleet. With the help of his uncle, he even bought a sailor's cap with a Nakhimov visor, and the boys from the yard called him "Swiss Tsar", and sometimes derisively and derogatoryly "zh ... vsky

admiral", which caused a strong offense in the boy. And he began to seek admission to the Naval Cadet Corps,

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why in the summer of 1913 he came to St. Petersburg. But not a nobleman, and even a foreigner, was not accepted.

With the correction of the same NKVD, it is recorded in the biography that in those years the future admiral went to earn money repairing cars in the garage at the Technological Institute ... in fact, Isakov, with the help of a certain Weizmann, an acquaintance of his uncle, got a job as a laboratory assistant in one of the departments of this institute. But the desire to become a sailor arose again when the First World War began. In order to replenish the officer cadres of the fleet, Separate cadet classes were organized, where Isakov, not without the help of influential fellow tribesmen, was all. or enlisted. And he became a "black" midshipman, because the edging on the shoulder straps in these classes were black, and not white, as in the Naval Corps.

At the end of the classes in March 1917, midshipman Isakov was assigned to the destroyer "Izyaslav", but an amazing thing - the future admiral began his service not in the naval specialty, but became an auditor (!), A person who is in charge of all types of allowances on ship. What corresponds to the modern position on destroyers is the assistant commander of the ship for logistics. The biographers of this man say: the revolution has become "Izyaslav" under repair in Helsingfors; all the officers of the ship allegedly fled, and the crew loved Isakov so much that they elected him a senior officer! And, of course, "at the call of his heart" he became a participant in the Civil War, participated in the defeat of General Yudenich, after which he was appointed to serve as commander of the destroyer "Active" in the Caspian Sea. And such trust had to be proved not so much by one's own knowledge and skills in front of the sailors, but by one's devotion and loyalty to the Cheka. But the service on the ship and frequent trips to the sea, even for the commander, is not an easy thing, and soon the Krasnoenmor Isakov achieved a transfer. Isakov's further service was on the Black Sea in the Observation and Communications Service (SNIIS); then he became the senior naval commander of the Batumi base.

For the first time, V.P. Bo, head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Black Sea naval forces, drew attention to Isakov

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Golepov, who offered him the position of his deputy at the fleet headquarters in Sevastopol. And there the chief highly appreciated the new employee and offered to appoint him chief of staff of the squadron. But the future admiral boasted of his desire to serve on real ships; and he was assigned to the destroyer Petrovsky, which is being completed on

shipyards of Nikolaev. After putting it into operation, Isakov brought the ship to Sevastopol. At the same time, in letters to his wife, he was childishly delighted: "I am the captain, Olka!"

Soon he was appointed chairman of the EPRON commission (special purpose underwater expedition) to raise the destroyer Kaliakra. But Ivan Stepanovich tried, wanting to get brilliant attestations, in order to get into the number of commanders, from whom the crews were formed for the campaign of Soviet ships to Italy (it's a very profitable event to go abroad), but before leaving, he fell ill in the hospital ... After recovery, he was sent to the post of assistant chief of staff of the Black Sea coastal defense. That's how he strove to serve on ships, that he got to serve on the shore, and even to staff work! And six months later he was transferred to the headquarters of the Black Sea Naval Forces. Initially, Isakov was an assistant, then the head of the Operations Department of the fleet headquarters. After that, he no longer left the headquarters offices, considering them "the main cabins of warships" ...

In 1927-1928. I. S. Isakov is a student of the advanced training courses for senior command personnel at the Naval Academy of the Red Army named after K. E. Voroshilov. After graduation, he became Deputy Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet for operational work. At the beginning of the first five-year plan, a commission of the former tsarist rear admiral, and now the flag of man 1st rank Nemitz, and specialists arrived from Moscow to determine the combat capabilities of the Azov and Black Seas. It so happened that Isakov was temporarily included in the headquarters of this commission, which examined the shores of two seas. Upon his return to Sevastopol, Isakov began to generalize the survey; his written work, not without the help of senior officials in the administration of the navy of the republic, received recognition ... Only against such recognition there was a sharp increase

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sorry Nemitz. But the opinion of the tsarist admiral was regarded as counter-revolutionary; and even after more than 20 years, Isakov, showing revenge, will not forget this, who has already become vice admiral of the Soviet fleet Nemits.

After a conversation with a prominent staff leader and scientist Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, Isakov was sent to the Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, which was led by the famous staff work theorist Vladimir Kiriakovich Triandafilov (now Triandafillo). Working in the maritime sector, Ivan Stepanovich was repeatedly on business trips as part of commissions headed by Army Commander 1st Rank Yankel Gamarnik.

From 1932 to 1933, Isakov worked as a senior lecturer in the Department of Strategy and Operational Art of the Military Medical Academy, where he prepared a course of lectures "Landing Operation", according to which the landing operations of marines near Kerch, in South Ozereyka and Stanichka and others, which will be discussed below ...

The course has been approved as a textbook! Then he developed a course of lectures "Operations of submarines", developed jointly with A.P. Aleksandrov (Anatoly Petrovich Aleksandrov, nuclear physicist, future president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, academician, laureate of the Lenin, Stalin and State Prizes, three times Hero Socialist Labor) and V. A. Belli (Soviet scientist of the Naval Academy (VMA)) in the first volume of capital work. Thanks to this "fundamental work", the Black Sea submariners heroically suffered ... numerous losses of submarines along with their crews in the fight against a single (!) Submarine of the Romanian fleet in 1941-1944. And this will also be discussed.

The "scientist" Isakov developed the work "The Japanese Operation against Qingdao", conceived, as he admitted, while still on a business trip to the Pacific Ocean in 1933. He also published Val in the "Sea Collection" the work "White Sea-Baltic Waterway", in which showed the importance of the waterway for the country, fulfilling the order of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, as a very active accomplice of this organization. And, to

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Of course, all this contributed to his appointment in May 1933 as chief of staff of the special-purpose expedition EON-1, created to transfer warships from the Baltic Fleet to the Barents Sea to create the Northern Flotilla. Then he headed EON-2; and in 1934 Isakov's valiant work was awarded the Order of the Red Star. After which he was appointed to head the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet. But in 1935, when he was really confronted with the affairs and problems of the fleet, the theoretical foundations of which he laid with his "scientific activity" within the walls of the Soviet Naval Academy, he suddenly showed monstrous incompetence and carelessness as chief of staff. Since childhood, I wanted to "rule" the fleet so much that I ignored any naval traditions and laws of common sense.

Being on the bridge of the battleship, Ivan Stepanovich, contrary to the articles of the Ship Charter, which forbids anyone to interfere in the actions of the ship's commander (first remove the commander, then appoint someone or yourself, and bear responsibility for the ship and crew), demanded that the commander make a maneuver, and the commander showed weakness in front of his higher authorities, and as a result ... his own submarine "B-3" died under the propellers of a giant ship. True, a rumor was spread that this criminal stupidity was committed by some big boss from Moscow, but Isakov ... nobly accepted the blame. True, this did not help - Isakov was removed from his post. Ivan Stepanovich was returned to teaching as a commander who did not justify the high trust of the party in his second position in the navy.

In the late 1930s, he prepared an essay on the German Naval General Staff. In 1936 he published the book "Operation

walkie-talkie of the Japanese against Qingdao in 1914"; the materials of this book formed the basis of a dissertation for the degree of candidate of naval sciences ... Then this work was published twice more, with additions that spoke about "how small forces are capable of holding back much larger ones with a well-organized coastal defense fortresses." Only competently he did it only on paper.

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But in practice, Admiral Isakov, when he was Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Direction for the Maritime Department, managed to organize the transition of the ships of the Baltic Fleet from Tallinn to Kronstadt, and he, along with Vice-Admiral Tributs ... destroyed almost all of them!

And then, in the position of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western direction for the maritime unit, organizing the defense of Sevastopol in 1941-1942, instead of showing military wisdom, he quickly retreated under the palm trees and cypresses of peaceful Tuapse. True, it was hardly possible to consider the almost 350,000-strong grouping of sailors and soldiers driven near Sevastopol, and almost 600,000-strong grouping of three armies near Kerch as "small forces"! However, in the light of this, it will become obvious what is the "outstanding scientific role of the luminary of naval science in the fight against large enemy forces" - the 11th Army of General von Manstein, which numbered in its ranks a little more than 75 thousand (!) personnel, yes and while the army reached Perekop and Sevastopol, it suffered significant losses, which were compensated by the soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht who left the hospitals, but its number was always in the range of 70-80 thousand people.

How do you like this balance of power?!

As is known, Isakov drew up the Combat Charter of the Naval Forces (BUMS-37), "which, according to Soviet historians to this day, served the fleet until the end of the war, as well as the manual prepared by Isakov's group on the conduct of naval operations." This "instruction" was used in the battles of the Black Sea Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky throughout the entire military campaign in the Black Sea; Isn't that why the seas of ki failed?!

... 1937 was extremely difficult for the Soviet fleet due to arrests. But Isakov, already in the next year, 1938, was not shot for his faithful service to Stalin and the party, but was awarded the Order of Lenin. True, in the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee it was said that he was awarded "in connection with the 20th anniversary of the Red Army and the Red Army, for the shown valor and selflessness

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performance in battles with the enemies of Soviet power, for outstanding successes and achievements in the combat, political and technical training of ships, units of the Navy. Only now Isakov did not participate in the battles and did not organize them, but fought against the enemies of the Soviet power in close cooperation with the NKVD, handing over his colleagues in the service to the cellars of the Lubyanka. In this, you see, his valor and selflessness were expressed. In that year, 1938, he was awarded the rank of flagship of the 1st rank (which corresponds to the naval rank of vice admiral). And they were awarded the medal "XX. years of the Red Army. And the Higher Attestation Commission of the All-Union Committee for Higher Education under the Council of People's Commissars approved him as an associate professor, that is, awarded the academic title of associate professor.

In 1938, Isakov became a member of the Main Military Council of the Navy and Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy. He oversaw armaments and shipbuilding, while at the same time directing the Naval Academy.

In February 1939, Isakov was sent to the United States to study American shipbuilding (but this is just the official version ... after all, the USSR never created such ships as the Americans). Participated in negotiations in Estonia and Latvia on the organization of a naval base in the Baltic. During the war with Finland, he was the chief naval commander in the Baltic Fleet and, being on the battleship Marat, coordinated the actions of the fleet forces with the ground forces. (This is an important coordination experience; but he will clearly show his "talent of coordinator" at the Black Sea Fleet!) Isakov's activities during that period were evaluated by another order - the Order of the Red Banner "... for the exemplary fulfillment of the combat tasks of the command and the valor shown at the same time and courage.

Almost before the war, in 1940, the VAK - the Higher Attestation Committee under the Council of People's Commissars (under the government) of the USSR, approved Ivan Stepanovich Isakov as a candidate of naval sciences; and where is the preparation, development in the postgraduate course or in absentia of the topic of a candidate's dissertation, and finally, the defense for the scientific degree of a candidate?! He was re-certified in

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the Indian rank of vice admiral with the assignment of the next rank - admiral. And with the outbreak of hostilities, he was appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief and a member of the Military Council of the North-West Direction, that is, he became Deputy Marshal of the Soviet Union K.V. Voroshilov.

But consider the duties and business qualities of Ivan Stepanovich when he is transferred to the same position in the Main Command, located in the city of Krasnodar, where Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny was the commander in chief of the South-Western direction.

This person was of particular concern to Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, even when, by Stalin's decision, I.S. Isakov was approved as First Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy - Chief of the Main Naval Staff. And this anxiety increased significantly in the first hours, days and months of the WAR ...

Chapter 15

DUE TO THE COMPLETE INABILITY TO DEFEND

As already mentioned, at 01:15 on June 22, 1941, by order of the Commissar of the Navy, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, operational readiness No. 1 was declared in the Black Sea Fleet.

After the report of the head of the garrison, the commander of the fleet, in pursuance of the order of the people's commissar, demanded that the city be darkened, patrols and security of objects should be strengthened; about what uve Aomily, the commandant of the city, A.P. Starushkin. Member of the Military Council of the Fleet, Divisional Commissar N. M. Kulakov, Secretary of the City Committee B. A. Borisov, Commander of the Squadron Rear Admiral L. A. Vladimirsky, Commander of the Air Force of the Fleet, Major General V. A. Rusakov, Commandant of the Coastal Defense, Major General P. A. Morgunov.

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Previously, all the top leaders with whom Vice-Admiral Oktyabrsky, who commanded the Black Sea Fleet, entered the war, were listed. The Black Sea admirals and naval commanders accounted for:

- battleship "Paris Commune",
- 6 cruisers (5 modern and 1 obsolete),
- 16 leaders and squadron destroyers,
- 44 submarines,
- more than 150 ships of other classes,
- 625 aircraft,
- about 200 coastal and anti-aircraft artillery guns.

The fleet had a unique Sevastopol bay, but not a well-developed basing system of 5 naval bases, including the main naval base - Sevastopol; as well as 61 land and 15 sea airfields, as well as an extremely weak air defense.

In the book "Ships are returning to service" (Simferopol, '1972, p. 24), its author M. Surguchev indicates, referring to Soviet sources, that the Black Sea Fleet had 47 submarines, 2 patrol ships, 84 torpedo boats, as well as gunboats and necessary auxiliary vessels for various purposes; and, of course, the aforementioned battleship Paris Commune, overhauled and modernized, and cruisers.

Another source, the journal Morskoy Sbornik (No. 5, 2005, p. 57), provides a table "The Combat Composition of the Air Forces of the Fleets at the Beginning of the War," which says that by June 1941 the Black Sea Fleet had: fighter aircraft - 346; bomber - 73; mine-torpedo - 61; reconnaissance - 150; total - 632 aircraft.

At about 3 o'clock in the morning, the posts of the observation and communication service (SNisS) and the posts of air observation, warning and communication (VNOS), located in the areas of Evpatoria and Cape Sarych, reported that they clearly heard the roar of the enemy's engines heading for Sevastopol.

The fighting in the fleet began before dawn on June 22, 1941 with a raid by a small group of German luffs

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twaffe to Sevastopol. Having received readiness No. 1 in advance, the main base met the planes with dense fire. Fire was immediately opened by the anti-aircraft artillery of the anti-aircraft defense (AD) under the general command of the chief of the air defense of the fleet, Colonel I. S. Zhilin; ships opened fire, as well as several universal batteries of the Coastal Defense; at the same time, batteries and ships fired tracer bullets from DShK machine guns (machine guns of the system of designers Degtyarev, Shpitalny) and counting loyal machine guns.

This prevented the pilots and navigators of the German aviation from quickly blocking the city with magnetic mines, for the fight against which the specialists of the mine and torpedo department of the Black Sea Fleet turned out to be completely unprepared.

The enemy continued laying mines at the Main Naval Base (GVMB), thereby creating a nervous situation at the command of the Black Sea Fleet. In the first days of the war, these mines blew up the SP-12 sea tug and a 25-ton floating crane (June 22, with a difference of several hours), the Bystry squadron destroyer (July 1), and the Dnepr steam scow. Only in July-August a group of physicists arrived in the city, among whom were I. V. Kurchatov (later Academician, three times Hero of Socialist Labor, head of the nuclear program of the USSR, member of the Central Committee of the , President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, three times Hero of Socialist Labor, member of the Central Committee of the CPSU); V

assistance to which naval specialists were given: captain-lieutenant G. N. Okhrimenko, engineer-captain of the 3rd rank M. I. Ivanov, captain-lieutenant A. I. Malov and others; together they created a ship degaussing station in Sevastopol. They had to solve the problem of neutralizing non-contact mines; a method, which consisted in demagnetizing the ship's hull, was found. At the same time, some of the naval specialists died during mine clearance, solving the task at the cost of their lives ...

The new German mine was used at shallow depths and was an effective weapon. Her body is ready

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It was made of non-magnetic material, and a ballast was located in the lower part, providing it with the correct orientation under water. In 20-30 minutes after setting, the fuse was dissolved, and the mine went into a combat state. When a ship passed over it, under the action of a magnetic field, an electric circuit was closed, as a result of which an explosion occurred.

The Kriegsmarine developed methods for laying these mines not only from ships, but also from aircraft. Three options were used: 1) a seaplane for setting mines was lowered into the water; 2) dropped a mine from a height of no more than 15 m like a conventional bomb (it did not have time to gain the required speed in order to detonate or collapse when it hit the sea surface); 3) mines were dropped with a parachute from a great height, but in this case the installation accuracy suffered. In Sevastopol, the third option was used.

At the same time, it is important to take into account that in the Black Sea theater of military operations, Germany ironically did not have its own naval forces, which is the originality of this theater of operations.

The German General Staff of the Ground Forces planned to capture the Soviet naval base from land.

And in order to prevent the Black Sea Fleet ships and vessels from breaking into the Black or Mediterranean Seas, the German command planned to deploy blockade forces from the Romanian (weak) and Italian (rather strong) fleets, blocking the approaches to the Black Sea straits near the Bosphorus from the south with mines; while in the north the Bosphorus was blocked by us from the Black Sea.

"The Germans, not having their own ships here, counted on a small Romanian fleet. It had four destroyers, three destroyers, one submarine, three torpedo boats, three gunboats, two minelayers, ten minesweeping boats and small auxiliary vessels based at Constanta and Sulina. The Romanian fleet, in terms of its numbers and equipment, could in no way pro-

resist the ships of the Black Sea Navy

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ta" (M. Surguchev, *ibid.*, p. 25). "Data on the composition of forces in the Black Sea theater show that the Black Sea Fleet had an overwhelming superiority over the enemy" ("The Black Sea Fleet of Russia", Simferopol, 2002, p. 212).

As for the strong Italian fleet, there really were excellent battleships "Roma", "Litorio", "Vittorio Veneto", "Giulio Cesare" (or "Gaius Julius Caesar", subsequently transferred to the USSR under the division of the Italian fleet and named the battleship "Novorossiysk, died in October 1955 in the Sevastopol Bay), Cavour, confirming the high level of Italian shipbuilders. But when, on the day Italy declared war, the Mediterranean squadron of the British entered the Adriatic, challenging the Italians to battle, they were in no hurry to leave their bases. And only after the angry orders of the calls of the Duce himself did the Italian ships put to sea several times; but, seeing the British, the Italian naval officers and admirals, avoiding battles, turned back. However, they managed to lose a light cruiser and several destroyers in the process. And although the Duce personally assured Hitler that his fleet would "sweep the British out of the Mediterranean," this did not happen.

Captain 1st rank Vorontsov also informed the naval attaché of the Soviet embassy in Berlin about the Italian fleet after his meeting in August 1939 with the corvette captain (captain of the 2nd rank) Baron Norbert von Baumbach - military naval attaché of Germany in the USSR. Later, with the start of the war, Vorontsov, who had already become Rear Admiral, informed the people's commissar about the morale of the Italian Navy, expressing the idea that the fleet was not in a position to oppose the Black Sea Fleet, fearing for the Bosphorus Strait being mined.

The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, F. S. Oktyabrsky, in all seriousness expressed the opinion that the main threat came from German submarines, which, in his opinion, "probably more than a dozen were dragged into the Black Sea"; well, fear's eyes are so big that the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, believing in this, began to intimidate the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov. Behind

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believing the latter that, allegedly according to the intelligence of the Black Sea Fleet, all the forces of the Italian fleet are about to appear in the Black Sea. This is how he reported to the people's commissar: "... it is now precisely established that at least 10-12 German submarines are operating at the Black Sea theater near our naval bases."

Undoubtedly, such information caused a deep

annoyance at Nikolai Gerasimovich. But what could he do and say? Almost all the time next to him was the patron of Oktyabrsky - the head of the Main Naval Staff Isakov.

Kuznetsov himself was in control of the situation and competently operated on the intelligence presented to him as People's Commissar of the Navy. He knew that the command of the Kriegsmarine, headed by Grand Admiral Raeder, in agreement with the Führer, kept the main part of his almost perfect and powerful fleet on the Atlantic and northern communications against His Majesty's Royal Navy and the American Navy (Navy); This was also indicated by the tragedy that happened to one of the best ships in the world - the battleship Bismarck. Therefore, the falsely cowardly information that came from Oktyabrsky caused bitterness in the people's commissar. Because, according to all available information, in the Black Sea against the forces of the Black Sea Fleet there was only one and only weak Romanian submarine "Delfinul". Which in mid-July will make its first combat campaign, and quite successful, connected with reconnaissance of the forces of the Black Sea Fleet.

However, the Oktyabrsky and its Military Council, represented by Ilya Ilyich Azarov, Nikolai Mikhailovich Kulakov, the chief of staff of Rear Admiral Ivan Dmitrievich Eliseev, and the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, Oscar Solomonovich Zhukovsky, to the detriment of other tasks, organized anti-submarine defense, allocating large forces and means for this, consuming a huge amount of fuel, exhausting the motor resources of aviation and ships, and thereby creating an extremely nervous situation in its operating area. For the overused motor resource and fuel, the only victim will be the Hero of the Soviet Union, 29-year-old Commander of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet, Major General of Aviation Nikolai

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Alekseevich Ostryakov. Who will be shot in the back by a special officer of the Black Sea Fleet in 1942; and the naval newspaper will report that he was killed at the airfield during an enemy raid.

In the first month of the war, in accordance with the plans for the first operations, the Black Sea Fleet unnecessarily deployed in the area of Sevastopol, Odessa, Tuapse, Batumi, Novorossiysk, near Lake Oustrichnoye, in Kerch, the Kerch Strait, near the most important ports of the Caucasian coast in defensive minefields of almost 9000 (!) Mines and mine defenders. The mines were set by the mine layer "N. Ostrovsky", as well as destroyers and cruisers. From June 23 to July 21, 1941, 7300 mines and 1378 mine defenders were exposed.

Inconceivable stupidity - and this despite the fact that there was no non-German fleet either at the beginning of the war or later in the Black Sea ... and was not expected ...

Then the question arises: against whom are these minefields?

The answer suggests itself: the mines threatened first of all their own forces.

The destroyers "Smyshlyy", "Dzerzhinsky", 2 patrol boats, a torpedo boat, a hydrographic vessel, 3 transports, a tanker, a tugboat, 2 seiners, 2 steam schooners and a barge were killed by their own mines. In addition, the destroyer "Perfect" and 2 transports received heavy damage.

But the enemy, represented by the only Romanian submarine and several schooners that appeared off the Crimean coast for reconnaissance purposes, did not lose a single unit. Because they did not show such carelessness as the chief commander of the Soviet fleet, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, but carried out operations prudently, prudently and wisely.

The tragedies and the death of their ships and their crews took advantage of ... Oktyabrsky and his headquarters! In these mined areas, at the beginning of the war, shipping began to be practiced under wartime conditions. Why was the management of the civil fleet in the basins of the two seas reorganized.

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Due to ignorance of the theory and laws of military and naval art and misunderstanding of his appointment as commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral F.S. repelling amphibious landings in the Crimea and the Caucasus. In this regard, large forces were allocated to conduct reconnaissance and not conduct sentinel service; a large number of aircraft were kept in the air, and at sea - surface ships and submarines.

Judging by the actions of the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, he had absolutely no idea of the tactics and strategy of the German Kriegsmarine, the Wehrmacht, the goals and objectives of the military-political leadership of the Third Reich. On the other hand, to please the NKVD organs and the party leadership of the fleet, he blindly led the Black Sea Fleet to an unimaginable catastrophe. He failed to unravel and understand why the Germans did not have their own fleet on the Black Sea, but did they plan to take the Crimea and the naval bases of the Black Sea Fleet from land ...

And when the struggle began in the steppes of the Crimea, Philip Sergeyevich began to literally "bombard" the people's commissar of the fleet with requests to strengthen the main base. To which Nikolai Gerasimovich more often answered with an irritated refusal: "Yes, much more so!"

And in fact - the fleet is completely covered by a huge number of Soviet troops in the north of Crimea, the 9th Special

rifle corps under the command of Lieutenant General P. I. Batov, and Sevastopol itself - by the forces of the Separate Primorsky Army (commander Major General I. E. Petrov, member of the Armed Forces Brigadier Commissar M. G. Kuzneiov); and the Kerch Peninsula will soon have three (!) army formations consisting of: 44th Army (Hero of the Soviet Union, commander Lieutenant General G. M. Chernyak), 47th Army (commander Major General K.S. Kolganov), 51st Army (commanded by Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov, who in 1942 near Kerch will suffer the fate of General Ostryakov).

However, a thoughtful reader should remember that the corps commander P.I. Batov was arrested immediately after the end of the May exercises of the Black Sea Fleet and the 9th USC. And for a while he was

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in the hell of the Sukhanovskaya prison, enduring, like the general of the army Meretskov mentioned above, inhuman tortures. But in September 1941, Stalin ordered the release of Meretskov, Batov and several other people from Sukhanov prison, including Boris Lvovich Vannikov (from 1939 People's Commissar, and in June 1941 - Deputy People's Commissar of Armaments of the USSR, from 1942 to 1946 - People's Commissar of Ammunition, Colonel General of the Engineering and Artillery Service, three times Hero of Socialist Labor). After that, Lieutenant General Batov was again returned to the post of commander of the 9th USC.

In the first days of the war, the command and the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet were supposed to establish cooperation with the ground forces that were defending on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front.

But due agreement was not reached on this, which subsequently was reflected in the tragedy of the corps group of troops (9th USC) of the Red Army, Black Sea Fleet, suffered huge and unjustified losses that arose due to the complete inability to conduct an organized defense. And given the significant number of troops, not only to counter-attack the enemy, but also to smash him along the entire southern flank.

But this did not happen: the command of the Crimean Front - three armies on the Kerch bridgehead: the 44th Army, the 47th Army, the 51st Army, as well as the Separate Primorsky Army, Corps Forces (9th OSK) and the Black Sea Fleet failed to competently organize victorious battles over a smaller number of the enemy army, which was brought to the Crimea by the German general E. von Manstein. Not the least factor was the fact that the huge masses of the 9th USC did not want to fight and surrendered in whole battalions and units.

Everything went awry: the worthless senior leadership of the Black Sea Fleet cowardly took refuge on the warm Caucasian coast (in Poti and Tuapse); and the army high command found itself in miserable confusion and fear for its own skin, showing obvious

mediocrity, for which many hundreds of thousands of Red Army and Red Navy soldiers paid with their lives, and all the military equipment was also imitated.

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On the other hand, incredible efforts were made by the political bodies (commissars) of the army and navy and by the Chekists in the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet; due to the fact that the soldiers and sailors did not want to fight for the existing Soviet power and immediately surrendered to the Germans, they had to resort to punitive actions. The political agencies, together with the bodies of special departments, created penal battalions (if only they fought! Even if they show everyone how heroically a Soviet soldier dies for the "best and fairest power in the world!"), which threw towards the Wehrmacht: enemies in front, their own behind with machine guns, but in fact they are also enemies...

Decades after the end of the war, both Oktyabrsky and Batov, in their memoirs and memoirs, will assert that Manstein's strength was many times greater than his strength. and the capabilities of the Soviet fleet and army. And it was the same vile lie as the information of the October People's Commissar of the Navy that the Black Sea is teeming with enemy submarines ... just like Batov's lie that the Red Army never had the two most powerful corps in the world - 9- th Special Rifle and 34th Rifle Corps (which on the eve of the war was commanded by Voroshilov's personal adjutant, Lieutenant General R. Khmel'nitsky) corps ... but Manstein, according to Batov and Oktyabrsky, had "an incalculable number of tanks and aircraft" ...

Chapter 16

NOBODY COMPLETED THEIR OBJECTIVES IN THESE RAIDS

According to the Thunderstorm plan, as has been repeatedly pointed out, the task of the Black Sea Fleet was to transfer the forces of the 9th Special Rifle Corps of Lieutenant General P. I. Batov to the Ploiesti oil fields, as well as oil pipelines and bridges across the Danube. But the invasion of the Wehrmacht thwarted these capture

nic plans.

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Then the Main Headquarters of the Navy demanded from Oktyabrsky on the night of June 23 to launch the first strike by the forces of the fleet on Constantia and Sulina in order to disrupt the enemy's communications, destroy the Ploiesti oil fields and oil pipelines, as well as port terminals and facilities on the Danube. The first attempt was extremely unsuccessful, the operation

dragged on for several days and nights.

Only on the morning of June 25, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, approved the plan for the raid operation of the ships of the Light Forces Detachment to Constanta, which was reported to Kuznetsov, People's Commissar of the Navy. Comrade Stalin, who was monitoring the situation, demanded that everything be prepared in the most thorough (1!) manner for this operation.

On the eve of the raids, they planned to carry out reconnaissance of the Konstanz naval base, but on June 22, as historians say, the weather was bad, which, however, did not prevent German pilots from conducting air strikes on the Sevastopol Bay. During the second raid, scheduled for June 25, 2 DB-3 aircraft that flew out for additional reconnaissance did not return from the combat mission.

The blows, of course, were dealt; but, despite the efforts made, it was not possible to destroy the oil-bearing region of Romania due to the extreme disorganization and lack of professionalism among the participants in this strike. However, there was another reason why this - and subsequent ones! operation failed...

During the first month of the war, new strikes were carried out only against Constanta, for example, from the air - in the amount of 25 raids involving 191 aircraft. But the oil fields were still not destroyed, and the aviators suffered unjustified losses.

During the first three days of the war, 3 raids were made on Constanza and 2 on Sulina. And on the night of June 26, Constanta was shelled by a detachment of Black Sea Fleet ships. The raid on Constanta was carried out by the Light Forces Detachment under the command of Rear Admiral T.A.

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captain of the 3rd rank A. B. Tukhov) with the support of the cruiser Voroshilov and the destroyers Smart and Smart. The commander of the 3rd division, captain of the 2nd rank, M.F. Romanov, held his bred pennant on the leader "Kharkov". The commander of the Light Forces Detachment, Rear Admiral T. A. Novikov, held his flag on the cruiser Voroshilov.

Hastily concocted and thoughtless - under the leadership of the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, captain of the 1st rank O.S. Zhukovsky - the plan was to strike Constanta with aircraft, and then, at dawn, bombard the port and the railway station with the artillery of the leaders. This plan was not even coordinated with the aviation command of the Black Sea Fleet; the order had just been given. He did not agree with the commanders of Soviet submarines located off the coast of Romania.

The following important nuance was not taken into account.

Even before the war, Romania announced that they had laid mines off Constanta, 170 cables from the coast. But at the headquarters of the fleet, relying on chance, they decided that it was possible to get closer to the shore, by 120-110 cables. There was also evidence of a coastal battery and a strong anti-aircraft defense of the base. But criminal carelessness is perhaps the main reason for the tragedy that befell the Black Sea Fleet during World War II.

Of course, the lack of a proper elaboration of the plan, as well as ignorance of the very essence of the war and lack of experience (which in no way justifies the command of the Black Sea Fleet and aviation) had an effect: aviation was unable to fly out to carry out a combat mission! Ships from a distance of 100-140 cables fired 350 shells of 130-mm caliber into a space where ... there were no fisheries or other objects.

But the Soviet ships themselves were under fierce fire from the enemy's 280-mm coastal battery ...

Everything went topsy-turvy from the first minutes of the operation. The shock group consisting of the leaders "Kharkov" and "Moskva" went to sea at 2010 hours. June 22, 1941 The covering detachment went to sea at 2241 hours. At the same time, the destroyer "Smyslyy" on the Inkerman alignment caught on the anchor with a paravan-trawl

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the chain of the mooring barrel, which indicates the unprofessionalism of the commander. While he was being liberated, the Molotov cruiser went ahead with the Soobrazitelny destroyer, which, for unknown reasons, soon fell far behind the cruiser; lagged behind either because of ignorance of the situation, or because of the cowardice of the same ship commander. The destroyers entered the protection of the cruiser only in the morning.

At 4 o'clock 42 min. began to look through the coast, which was 140 cables. And after 8 minutes, problems began again: the right paravan-trawl broke off on the leader of the "Kharkov", and after some time, when turning, the left one also. But at 5:02 a.m. opened fire from the leader. Invisible targets began to "hit" and the second leader "Moskva". During this and subsequent similar operations, shooting at random only improved ... The morning pinkish-gray haze covering the horizon trembled uneasily from the bursts of shells.

At 5 o'clock 06 min. the Tirpitz coastal battery opened fire on the ships. Her 280-mm guns had the clear outlines of Soviet ships in front of them.

4 minutes after the start of hostilities, at 0510 hours, the commander of the Soviet detachment of warships transmits a signal about the start of withdrawal with the simultaneous setting of a smoke screen. Commanders (artillerymen) of "Moscow" and "Kharkov" have already managed to fire about 154 high-explosive shells, as

the ships had to urgently, on a zigzag course, leave their positions. And then the Romanian destroyers "Regina Maria" and "Mereshti" moved forward, opening fire. Expecting that, by increasing the speed, it will be possible to escape from the shelling, the leader "Moskva" at the same time loses his ... two pairs of van-trawls.

The ridiculous operation continues, ending in complete failure.

By the way, the leader "Moskva" was covered by the very first volleys of the coastal battery, which made it almost lose its course, the main and universal artillery calibers were disabled, but the ship remained stable when sailing away from the Romanian destroyers. The rest of the ships also moved away from the coast at full speed, which was not expedient,

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but a cowardly flight. At 05:20, the Moskva leader, in confusion and throwing across the sea, crashes into a Soviet mine, as a result of a powerful explosion in the central part, it splits into three parts. It was later suggested that the ship was torpedoed by her own submarine. The fact that they clearly saw the traces of two torpedoes was told by the sailors who fled from the Romanian captivity from the leader of the "Moskva"; and the ship hit a mine and blew up in the course of maneuvering.

After 4-5 minutes, it goes to the bottom ... the ship died, many crew members died, many were captured, the commander of the ship, Captain 3rd Rank A. B. Tukhov, was also captured. He later managed to escape; fought in a partisan detachment; On May 5, 1944, he died in battle near Golovanovsk (near Odessa). They began to write about his fate and the capture of part of the crew much, much later after the end of those events ...

And the leader "Kharkov", having received injuries and having on board the dead and wounded, with difficulty made his way to the main base. The cruiser "Voro Shilov" and both destroyers were not in the best position, shamefully fleeing from the shelling of only one enemy coastal battery.

In the organization (or rather, in its complete disregard) of this raid, there were no questions of interaction between the diverse forces of the fleet, including interaction with aviation. After the ships suffered heavy losses and cowardly fled to Sevastopol, 7 out of 13 bombers finally appeared, but ... without fighter cover ...

Air cover was requested by the commander of the Light Forces Detachment at 06:17. But the fleet headquarters ordered: to retreat to the main base at full speed. True, some time later I supplemented the answer: the ships will be covered by aircraft, but only ... 100-70 miles from Sevastopol. And the ships went, abandoned, in fact, to the mercy of the merciless military fate. They walked, fired from the air by the enemy and

torpedoed from the depths by the enemy, but this time not by the tasky Soviet submarine Shch-206.

In this operation, no one fulfilled their tasks, including aviation. The first group of 2 DB-3 aircraft, which

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The second aircraft was supposed to strike at about 4 o'clock in the morning, returned to the airfield due to a malfunction of the materiel. The second group, consisting of 2 SB planes, was supposed to fly up to Constanta at 0430 hours. But on one, the material part also turned out to be faulty, and the second died. The third group already had 7 SB aircraft. They flew up to the battlefield at 0640; enemy fighters scurried around, heavy artillery fire was fired from the shore. Having dropped 42 FAB-100 bombs north of Constanta from a height of 6100 m, the pilots were forced to join the battle: 2 "Messer Schmitt" were shot down, their own lost - 3.

Submarines Shch-205, Shch-206 and Shch-209, which were assigned to destroy enemy ships, also did not fulfill their purpose. But the boat commanders were not informed about the impending raid!!!

Unique mediocrity, and hence the irresponsibility of the command and operators of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet!

But if we turn to the fundamental work in six volumes "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945", then there we will find a brief description of the events we are considering: . The strike was undertaken in order to destroy the reserves of liquid fuel located there and to reconnoiter the base's defense system from the sea in battle. Having shown courage, heroism and endurance, the Black Sea people successfully completed the task assigned to them.

The aviation of the Black Sea Fleet operated in close cooperation with the surface forces. She repeatedly struck at the Romanian oil fields, oil refineries, and railway trains transporting oil, causing great damage to the enemy. (See "History ...", Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, M, 1961, vol. 2, p. 45)

Yes, it was not in vain that the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU worked on this capital work! - everything is strict, smooth, instructive, without a shadow of a doubt...

Ricks, writers and publicists in their books about the Great Patriotic War or the Second World War relies precisely on the interpretation of such grandiose works, and other evidence can already be found. Often cautious, with a question mark and a touch of naive assumption. But there is! "Aviation was unable to complete the task. Its forces were greatly dispersed instead of concentrating the strike on the most important targets - the airfield and a large-caliber battery in the Constanta area. Since June 26, a convoy system has been introduced in the theater of operations. However ... more than half of the transport followed on their own" (Coll. "The Black Sea Fleet of Russia". P. 213.); there are other printed examples which I will not give now.

I do not call for rewriting the history of the war, but to express various assumptions and versions in order to figure out how, what and why it happened - this is our duty and the duty of our descendants...

... So, as already mentioned, the operational duty officer at the fleet headquarters did not notify the submarines in the area, including Shch-206 (commander Lieutenant Commander S. A. Karakay), about the raid on Constanta. Having the task of attacking all enemy ships in the sea, he did not know about the presence of Soviet ships in these waters. And since the commander of the Shch-206 boat did not receive this notice, he did not carefully examine the ships going through the periscope (although he is obliged to know his Soviet combat projects by outlines! - otherwise what was he taught at the naval institution?!); as a result, he twice went on the attack on his ships (!). But they somehow managed to evade the attacks, and then, in turn, counterattacked the Soviet submarine!

When the leader of the "Kharkov", languidly moving towards his native shores at a speed of 6 knots, discovered the trail of a torpedo heading for the ship, it was 6 hours and 43 minutes. The ship evaded and even opened fire on the alleged location of the submarine with diving shells. At 7:30 a.m. the leader caught up with the destroyer Soobrazitelny. He was also attacked by an unknown

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submarines. With a forced move, the destroyer approached the torpedo launch site and dropped several depth charges. Soon, as expected, a large oil slick appeared, after which the stern of the submarine poked out of the water for a brief moment. The enemy was finished. Only this "enemy" was not listed in the camp of enemies. So ingloriously ended the service of the Soviet "pike". Shch-206 did not return from the combat campaign, because it was successfully sunk by its own ships ...

And who else, by and large, was there to fight?!

It remains to answer the question: is it possible to compare the loss of the leader "Moskva" and the submarine Shch-206 with the harm

caused by 350 shells fired on bare Romanian soil?! But, according to the opinion of specialists from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Chernomorians fought (!) in reconnaissance of the defense system of the base from the sea, and, having successfully completed the task assigned to them, caused great damage to the enemy ...

But if reconnaissance in combat - at the cost of hundreds and thousands of lives - then what is the intelligence department of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters for?!

"Successfully completed the task," according to Soviet and post-Soviet historians, and the submarine forces of the fleet.

As early as June 22, submarines Shch-205, Shch-206, Shch-209 came to the coast of Romania, later M-33, M-34 were added to them. For 1.5 months of the war, the submarines failed to sink a single enemy ship! (But they fought heroically with their own.)

The first suc on patrol. She managed to sink the transport going from Burgas to Constanta, as well as the Superga tanker. Soon the Shch-205 (commander captain-lieutenant P.D. Sukhomlinov) also had a phantom luck - the submarine sank the schooner with artillery fire: on August 20, M-33 (commander senior lieutenant D.I. Surov) attacked the enemy submarine with a torpedo (?). .. but what about

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went further and whether it was in fact the Del Finul boat, which safely avoided being hit, or its own, Soviet, history is silent ... And was it not this attack that inspired the former officer of the headquarters of the squadron of the Black Sea Fleet, captain of the 1st rank, in the future Soviet writer V. Dubrovsky - to tell the citizens of a vast country that defeated the "plague of the 20th century" about how courageously boat sailors sank the nameless "enemy submarine", where "Hitler's pirates" settled (!). His book "On the fairways of Sevastopol", published by Krymizdat in 1955, was popular with the children of the post-war period, nourishing them - for many, many years! - a smoldering fire of ardent hatred for all Germans. Only with an unbridled imagination, Dubrovsky could write: "This is not the first time that enemy submarines have senselessly attacked unarmed passenger ships with thousands of women and children (This is a blatant lie of an agitpropist, and not an "eyewitness"! - Aviy.). But how did they get into the Black Sea? "Neutral" Türkiye is not at war with us, and the straits are considered closed. But the fact was obvious ... It turned out that the submarine had chosen a position for itself in the area of the Chersonese lighthouse. The position was advantageous for her in that the fairway passed there, and the Nazi pirates could see those ships that were coming from the sea to Sevastopol, and those that were leaving from there ... How did the underwater

may boat to the lighthouse of Chersonesos, when there are minefields all around, and our ships navigate through hidden fairways? .. Very simple! The submarine followed some slow-moving transport going along the fairway from the sea to Sevastopol, and passed on its tail! .. Be that as it may, the enemy submarine cruised at the main base. This was confirmed by the coastal post. The signalman sometimes heard the distinct sound of diesel engines, although our ships were not there at that time. Probably, the submarine surfaced at night and charged the batteries... Having collected all this data at the headquarters, we got the approximate position of the fascist submarine... The underwater pirate had to be destroyed" (pp. 27-28).

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About how the author "participated" in the operation to destroy the "fascist submarine", which in fact was not there, how it was heroically sunk and what happened to the rest (2!) submarines, the curious can find out by reading this book, which, as the annotation says, has "great persuasiveness and educational power." Such "persuasiveness" is also characteristic of those "eyewitnesses" who, in German tankettes fighting on the Crimean peninsula, saw formidable German tanks. But more on that later.

However, why be surprised if Vice-Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky, referring to the data of his intelligence (and what kind of mediocrity they worked ?! and for whom they worked ?!), more than once in a panic reported to the People's Commissar of the Naval fleet to N. G. Kuznetsov: "It has now been established for sure that at least 10-12 German submarines are operating at the Black Sea theater near our naval bases!"

But back to the Romanian coast.

Raids on Romanian targets, in particular on Ploiesti, were carried out systematically until 18 August. On August 10 and 13, there were raids on the Chernovodsk railway bridge, along which the oil pipeline passed. In this operation, fighters were used for dive bombing. They were delivered to a given area by DB-3 bombers, each of which took 2 fighters. The latter in the target area separated at an altitude of 4000 meters and, having made an attack, independently returned to the airfield. This method was supposed to ensure that 5 bombs hit the target at once. Fighter pilots of the 2nd Squadron of the 32nd Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet under the command of Captain A.V. Shubikov took part in the raids.

As a result, the enemy lost about 20 tanks and wagons; 2 oil refineries received minor damage; the railway bridge was damaged; during the month of bombs falling, spontaneous fires broke out.

Comments, as they say, are unnecessary.

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Although no. Some sources indicate that as a result of active operations by aircraft and ships, the enemy lost about 15% of its oil reserves. And if such a quantity of oil and oil products had been lost (or something), then absolutely NOTHING would have remained from the Crimea in 1941! - except perhaps the Crimean "oil sea", black, thick, spilled ...

In order to talk about the loss of this or that amount of oil, the authors should at least know how much oil was produced per year by Romania on the eve of the war. "The total oil production capacity in Romania is over 18 million tons. Of these, about 5 million tons were exported, and with the outbreak of World War II, more than 65% were exported," testifies TSB, vol. 22, p. 374. Romania reached the same figures in the post-war decades. If you believe from the thinking of Soviet historians, it turns out that Romania lost (spilled, burned) about 2.7 million per ton!!! - and this is only for the raids carried out in the summer of 1941 ... These reports were born at that time. But the commander of the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet, Major General of Aviation V. A. Rusakov, refused to sign such fake information and was soon replaced by the youngest Major General of Aviation, Ostryakov. Which also turned out to be extremely intractable, for which he paid with his life in 1942.

Both the irresponsible organization of the operation in the summer of 1941 and the raids on Romanian targets themselves are seen to be based on the use of the Charter of Naval Forces (BUMS-37) developed by Admiral Isakov, which served the fleet until the end of the war as a "manual on the conduct of naval operations", and also lie the basic knowledge gained by Soviet sailors through his course of lectures "Oieraiii of submarines", which later became the first volume of the capital work of this "scientist".

And Admiral Isakov himself, who at that time was in Aeningrad as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western direction of Marshal of the Soviet Union K.V.

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with instructions and instructions, he prepared the commander of the Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral V.F. Tributs, for the redeployment of the fleet squadron from Tallinn to Kronstadt. To be more precise, from Tallinn through mined fairways to oblivion... together with ships and crews. Everything is in accordance with their scientific research.

... Well, if they were so trained, why then blame the illiterate ship commanders for an unsuccessful run along with Rear Admiral Novikov and the operational duty officer of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters? The accusations should have been forwarded to the chief organizer of this operation, Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky, the Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral I. D. Eliseev, and his head of the Operations Department, the direct developer of this raid, Captain 1st Rank O. S. Zhukovsky, Admiral Isakov's personal henchman. They are the main culprits of the tragedy of mediocre raid. For they did not prepare neither the commanders of warships nor the sailors to carry out the assigned combat missions in the war. This is the main, the very other reason why operations fail successfully ...

The political bodies of the Black Sea Fleet, headed by divisional commissar Ilya Ilyich Azarov, Nikolai Ivanovich Kulakov and others, who sent sailors and commanders to their deaths, knowing in advance that unprepared crews acting at random, would perish in the the order of the sea...

Chapter 17

THE FATE OF THE FLEET WILL BE DECIDED ON... LAND!

In connection with the death of the 8 million Red Army, the situation on the Soviet-German front became catastrophic, which is why already in August 1941 the Black Sea Fleet was involved in the defense in the northwestern part of the Black Sea.

5 Stalin could strike first 1 29

As is known, by September the Black Sea Fleet had lost its system of navigation in the northwestern region, and at the end of October the main base of the fleet, Sevastopol, also lost its purpose.

From now on, the fate of the fleet and part of the southern flank of the Soviet German front was decided on land.

Not only did the functions of the Black Sea Fleet become secondary, but also the command, together with the Military Council, began to control the activities of subordinate forces from ... the Caucasian coast, drawing numbers and arrows on military maps in the shade of large-leaved magnolias and palm trees, and in between "tense" Thinking floundering in the gentle waves.

In early August 1941, the Wehrmacht advanced along the entire coast of the Black Sea. The last month of summer in the south turned out to be extremely hot, at times the thermometer reached 43 or even 45 degrees, and in the shade. Already in the middle

not a month, the enemy with the forces of the 4th Romanian army and part of the forces of the Wehrmacht cut off Odessa from the water area, leaving the city without water. The same fate befell the Primorsky Army, which found itself cut off from the troops of the Southern Front, whose formations and formations, throwing down their weapons, fled to the rear or surrendered. And the Wehrmacht, together with the Romanian formations, effortlessly occupied the cities of Ochakov, Nikolaev, Kherson, Skadovsk, previously smashing and capturing Soviet soldiers and commanders; thereby destroying the shock formations of the invasion army of the First Strata

logical echelon.

In front of the right flank of Army Group South, under the command of a talented commander, Field Marshal Gerd Karl Rudolf von Rundstedt, was Odessa.

Gerd von Rundstedt, having led the Army Group "South" to the territory of the USSR, found himself in a very difficult position, because he was opposed by the largest grouping of troops of the Red Army of the South-Western direction, led by Soviet Marshal Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny.

Army Group "South" included in sequence from north to south: the 1st Panzer Group under the command of General Ewald von Kleist, the 6th Army of Colonel General

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ka Walter von Reichenau, the 17th Army of General Heinrich von Stülpnagel, the 3rd Romanian Army of General Dumitrescu, the 11th Army of General Ritter von Schobert (later General von Manstein), the 4th Romanian Army (for the period of fighting in several commanders have changed). In total, 26 infantry, 5 tank, 3 motorized, 6 mountain grenadier divisions, 3 divisions of the security forces and 14 Romanian divisions.

In total - 43 German and 14 Romanian divisions.

The general-field marshal was opposed by the forces of the Soviet marshal in the amount of 51 infantry, 21 cavalry and 5 tank divisions.

In total - 76 divisions and 28 mechanized brigades, engineering and special units, sapper and air armies and a reserve (30 divisions), troops of the Transcaucasian Front (former district). As well as the Air Force (a special army, which later became the backbone of long-range aviation - ADD) of this district under the command of twice Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant General of Aviation S.P. Denisov. In addition, the forces of the Wehrmacht were opposed by the Primorsky Army, retreating to Odessa, as well as the 9th OSK in Tavria, and later on the Perekop Isthmus; moreover, 76 penal battalions of 1,500 men each, and about 70 penal companies of 500 men, of constantly changing composition. In connection with the bitter experience of the first two months of the war, when most of the Red

part of the army was defeated, part surrendered, fled through the forests - in accordance with the order of Steel, all formations and associations of the South-Western direction, as well as other areas of the Soviet-German front, were almost literally driven into military combat - after the verdicts of the tribunals and the creation of penal battalions. In the rear of the troops of Marshal Budyonny, by the end of 1941, the NKVD army was fully formed in accordance with the combat staffing table. By May 1942, exactly the same two armies of the NKVD will be formed in the Caucasus.

An incomparable advantage in favor of the Red Army!

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Despite this, the German Field Marshal still managed to quite effectively carry out his raid into the depths of the south of the USSR. Only in the territory of Moldova and southern Ukraine, his troops defeated the troops of the former Odessa Special Military District and the 9th Special Super shock (the most powerful in the Soviet Armed Forces) Army, which became the left flank of the Southwestern direction, and captured 1 million people. 200 thousand people (according to the British historian Samuel Mitcham; according to German sources, see, for example, the works of the historian Erich Padel - more than 2 million 300 thousand), about 8000 tanks, 9300 guns, along the entire perimeter of the Soviet-Romanian border .

Then von Rundstedt managed to surround and destroy the 6th and 12th armies, as well as part of the forces of the 18th army (20 divisions). And again more than 800,000 soldiers of the Red Army were taken prisoner, 1,400 tanks and 1,800 guns were captured.

In the second month of the war, Army Group South, acting with the support of the right flank of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Fyodor von Bock, surrounded the main forces of the Red Army south of Kiev. More than 1 million soldiers, commanders and generals of the Red Army were captured. The Wehrmacht also obtained nearly 1,000 tanks and 3,178 guns. Let me remind the reader that even earlier, on June 23-27, 1941, the most grandiose tank battle took place in the region of Dubno, Lutsk and Rovno. The German troops of the Army Group "Center" under the command of the same von Bock defeated the 4th mechanized corps, which had 892 tanks, half of which were the latest T-34s and KVs; the 8th mechanized corps, which had 858 tanks; 15th mechanized corps - 733 tanks; 22nd - 647 tanks. And together with von Rundstedt's Army Group South, von Bock destroyed 16,054 tanks in the first weeks of the war!

And this was not the weakness of the Red Army of the Soviet Union, but the weakness of the morale of the Red Army men and commanders who did not want to fight for the imposed regime.

Think again. How could such a number of citizens of the happiest Soviet country in the whole wide world

should we surrender to the "damned fascists"? Yes, it could! And

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these hundreds of thousands and even millions at the first stage of the war surrendered of their own free will! What was the reason why the Soviet people threw down their weapons and raised their hands? You know, the reason is very, very weighty, if the most devoted to the Soviet regime agitpropists and historians did not even write about how Soviet troops flee from a smaller number of enemies and how many people surrender at the first stage of the war.

Here is how, for example, I. Bunich, who is mentioned here more than once, thought: "The crushed, exhausted people were deaf to the slogans of world domination. Ten years of uninterrupted and unprecedented in their bitterness wars not only changed the soul of the people, but also its anthropological type.

The old humane and naive Russian intelligentsia has almost completely disappeared, and one of its candles, which miraculously survived, proclaimed to the whole quivering world: "If the enemy does not surrender, he is destroyed!" The famous Russian industrial proletariat was completely exterminated and disappeared from the face of the earth, and collectivization, which hit the countryside, forced the peasants expelled from the land to go to the factories and construction sites of the first five-year plan, giving the authorities material for any kind of processing. The campaign against the kulaks, which killed 15 million people, as Stalin had foreseen, consolidated society, if what existed in the country can be called society. ("Operation Thunderstorm. Bloody games of dictators", p. 18.)

Or: "On the other hand, the Red Army. The massacre perpetrated by Stalin practically reduced the largest army in the world to a huge herd of sheep, cowardly waiting for the next one to fall on the butcher's axe. There is no initiative. Ivyanstvo and theft flourish in the army, denunciations are pouring in a stream, no one trusts each other. ... The work of the headquarters is almost completely paralyzed. The doctrine put forward by Stalin of conducting an offensive war "on foreign territory" has not yet found any reflection in operational documents. There are also no plans for defense. A huge army is deployed along the border, like a herd in a paddock. Recent events at Khalkhin Gol, where against

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two Japanese divisions, two Soviet armies and all the Armed Forces of the so-called Mongolian People's Republic were involved, showed the low combat training of the Red Army at all levels, the disgusting work of headquarters, the most primitive communications, the almost complete absence of vehicles ... "(ibid. , p. 44).

By the way, Soviet sources state that there

there were not 2 divisions, but the 6th Japanese army. The defeat of the Japanese forces is not the merit of Zhukov, but of his chief of staff, brigade commander Potapov. About whom the "outstanding commander" recalls only in passing, although this is the second person in the grouping of Soviet troops.

Do you need any more explanation?

... Seeing this development of events, von Rundstedt ordered General von Kleist to strike at the rear of the Soviet troops in the Dnepropetrovsk region. During the ensuing fighting, formations of the Red Army in the region of Mariupol and along the coast of the Sea of Azov were surrounded by the enemy. And the 1st Panzer Group of General von Kleist, together with the 11th Army of General von Manstein (who had already replaced the deceased General von Schobert), captured in the south of Ukraine and defeated the forces of the 9th Special Rifle Corps under the command of General Lieutenant 11. I. Batov in the amount of about 280,000 people. In addition, more than 100,000 prisoners were taken prisoner, more than 270 Soviet tanks were destroyed, and more than 200 were captured, more than 250 guns were destroyed, and 670 were captured.

After that, the successful 1st Panzer Group von Kleist turned towards the Donbass and Rostov-on-Don. And the formations of General von Manstein began a swift offensive after the brilliant defeat and destruction of the 9th Special Rifle Corps of General Batov (planned, as has been emphasized more than once, in accordance with the strategic operation of the invasion of Europe "Groza", to land on ships Black Sea Fleet on the coast of Constanta, Burgas and Ploiesti in order to destroy oil fields).

General Batov, together with the remnants of his headquarters, fled to the Kerch Peninsula. And his positions in the Pereko area

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Pa, Armyansk, Ishuni were occupied by the forces of the 51st Army (eastern part) and the Separate Primorsky Army (western part), which were soon defeated, and the remaining units were thrown back to Simferopol.

But let's interrupt the story of the victorious march of Army Group South, led by the German Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt and his valiant generals, officers and soldiers. And let's get back to Odessa, which, after a competent offensive by the Wehrmacht in August 1941, was cut off, along with formations of the Primorsky Army, from the main forces of the southern direction of the Red Army.

The army, the naval garrison and individual army units and subunits stationed in Odessa and adjacent areas, practically ended up in a German bag.

Neither the naval nor the army command had any clarity and no clear plans for waging a further war against the Wehrmacht. There was fear among the top leadership of both branches of the armed forces, as well as significant shortcomings in the study of the theory and practice of military art, the foundations of which were laid by "outstanding" Soviet theoreticians: Tukhachevsky in the army and Isakov in the navy. The theory of military art, developed and put into the basis of the book "The Brain of the Army" by Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov, was not suitable for a defensive war and was useless under the given conditions, because Shaposhnikov developed the theory of the aggressive offensive military policy of the Red Army.

Finding themselves in a critical situation, Odessa and its garrisons lost their significance as a naval base, and the high command prudently spoke about the possibility of leaving the city. But it was not there! The fear and despair that seized the naval and army commanders were decisively suppressed by Stalin. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in a telegram gave the order to the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western direction, Marshal Budyonny and the commander of the Southern Front and the Black Sea Fleet: "Don't give up Odessa and defend it to the last opportunity, involving

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case of the Black Sea Fleet. To put it bluntly, the Supreme Commander of the Black Sea Fleet did not let him sit out under the palm trees in the hope: maybe he will carry over from both his own and from strangers, and then, lo and behold, the war will end ...

In order to protect Odessa from the sea direction, on August 6, a detachment of the northwestern region was formed, which included the Comintern minelayer, the destroyers Nezamozhnik and Shaumyan, a brigade of torpedo boats, a division of minesweepers, a division of gunboats, a detachment and a link of patrol boats - under the overall command of Rear Admiral D. D. Vdovichenko: - no

And how can one not remember at the same time the main theoretician of Soviet naval science, Admiral Isakov, who "did a lot to strengthen the forces of the fleet", but for some reason forgot to form conceptual views on the defense of the naval base in the prewar years. Understandably: -there was a concept of a strategic offensive, but defense was by no means foreseen.

"The importance the German-fascist command attached to the capture of Odessa is evidenced by the fact that the entire 4th Romanian army was allocated to achieve this goal. As early as the beginning of August, the Rumanian command threw significant forces near Odessa and then, as the struggle unfolded, they continuously increased them. On August 15, eight enemy divisions (of which one was tank) and two cavalry brigades were already at the approaches to Odessa. In addition to the pogo, two more infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade advanced to Odessa. The composition of the troops intended

to capture Odessa, also included parts of the 72nd Nemeian and Hot Division. The actions of all these troops were supported by more than 100 aircraft. This is the alignment according to the previously mentioned source - the capital work "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945" (p. 113). However, all this is not true, being a falsification of Soviet historians.

Back in February 1941, in addition to the Thunderstorm plan, there was an instruction from the People's Commissar of Defense to introduce the post of another deputy district commander, including

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including Odessa. The new deputy was entrusted with the performance of duties in the absence of a commander in a particular garrison. So General N. E. Chibisov appeared in the Odessa Military District; and just a few days before the joint exercise of the Black Sea Fleet and the 9th USC in the Odessa Military District, there was a separation of structures. From the headquarters of the district, it was not the headquarters of the front that stood out, but the headquarters of the most powerful of all the armies of the people's commissariat of defense, the 9th Special Army. Most of the commanders (officers) of the headquarters of the OdOVO, headed by the chief of staff, Major General (later Marshal of the Soviet Union, professor, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, twice Hero of the Soviet Union) M. V. Zakharov were secretly transferred to the headquarters of the 9th Oso army fight. And on June 20, the headquarters of this army was raised on combat alert and again secretly withdrawn from Odessa to the field command post. And the commander of the OdOVO troops, Colonel General Ya. T. Cherevichenko, was no longer in Odessa, but in the Crimea, where he secretly and secretly carried out the acceptance of the 9th OSK, who had arrived from the Caucasus. After that, he, bypassing Odessa, goes to the command post of the 9th Special Army.

On the day of the invasion - June 22, 1941 - General Cherevichenko was on the train. The 9th Special Army was supposed to leave the Soviet territory and from the land part attack and cut off the Romanian oil fields from Germany. At the same time, the ships of the Black Sea Fleet were supposed to transfer the troops of the 9th USC to the coast of Ploiesti and Constanta and seize the fisheries from the sea. The invasion of the German Wehrmacht confused all the plans of the Soviet military leaders ...

In Odessa itself, General Chibisov remained the senior military commander; the Separate Primorsky Army was then stationed there under the command of Lieutenant General G.P. Safronov. "The retreat of the troops of the Southern Front and the Separate Primorsky Army, created from the left-flank divisions of the 9th Army," we read in another Soviet source, "took place in difficult conditions ..." the command allocated the 4th Romanian army "and no more additional forces (!). (see the book "The Second World War. 1939-1945", published in the "Officer's Library" series, in

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Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, Moscow, 1958, p. 217.)

And since Odessa was of no particular value to the German General Staff (!), the task of capturing it was entrusted to the unreliable 4th Romanian Army. The local population perceived this army as a warlike gypsy camp, which, however, did not bring tangible harm.

The Wehrmacht crushed the battle formations of the 9th Special Army, which with its left flank retreated to Odessa and took up defense there. The number of formations in the 9th Special Army was 7 times greater than the number of troops and weapons of the entire Romanian army. Naturally, the soldiers and commanders of the 9th Special Army did not want to fight for the interests of the Soviet regime, internally rejected by each person, and massively surrendered. Moreover, the 9th Special Army surrendered to the right flank of the units and formations of the 11th Wehrmacht Army, and not to the Romanians.

And here it is curious: on Soviet maps, the powerful 9th Special Army appears and disappears.

For example, in the album of maps for the 4th and 6th volumes (maps No. 2 and No. 4, respectively) of the titled "History of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945", the 9th Special Army is available. But on the cards issued in the special series "Officer's Library" "The Second World War. 1939-1945. Album of schemes", the 9th Special Army is on scheme No. 6, but on the important scheme No. 7 "Odessa defensive operation", this army simply does not exist!

By the way, the fake about the superior forces of the enemy becomes so obvious if you carefully look at the numerous maps-schemes given as an appendix to some Soviet historical works. There clearly (even with the concealment of many, many facts) one can see the multiple superiority of the forces of the Red Army over the forces of the Wehrmacht, which invaded the USSR on June 22, 1941 !!

When organizing the defense of Odessa, there was a lot of confusion and confusion. And, as always, due to the lack of a unified command and lack of interaction, the ground units began unauthorized evacuation to the rear of the country.

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What became known in Moscow from the competent authorities, who were still unable to prevent not only a planned retreat, but a real stampede of the Soviet troops.

A tough order came from Moscow to the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, F. S. Oktyabrsky, and the commander of the Odessa Naval Base, Rear Admiral

Ral G. V. Zhukov, who said that if the flight of troops from Odessa did not stop, then both naval commanders would be shot. The order worked. Employees of the SMERSH bodies - by decision of the command, adopted at a closed meeting of the OOR - began a mass shooting of commanders, sailors and soldiers, in whom at least a drop of cowardice and unwillingness to remain in positions was manifested.

On August 19, 1941, the Supreme Command Headquarters created the Odessa Defense Region (OOR), headed by Rear Admiral G. V. Zhukov, subordinating to him all naval, land and air forces, as well as all civilian organizations.

The new organization of military development provided for the strictest centralization of command and control of all armed forces and the civilian population in a particular region. Prior to that, the commander of the Separate Primorsky Army, Lieutenant General G.P. Safronov, formally headed the defense, but he was soon replaced by Major General I.E. Petrov. Which at the same time became: the first deputy head of the OOR, Rear Admiral G. V. Zhukov. Rear Admiral I. D. Kulishov was appointed commander of the Odessa Naval Base.

What does the creation of a new formation in the system of the Primorsky garrison indicate? The fact that theoretical studies, and not only by Admiral Isakov, to put it mildly, do not stand up to criticism in the event of war. And if you continue to be guided by them, then this will ensure vain sacrifices and in the future will show the inability to fight with a strong and intelligent enemy. This is also confirmed by the fact that until the Headquarters gave a strict order to create a new structure, a whole crowd of admirals of the Black Sea Fleet and generals of the spacecraft, who graduated from academies or academic courses, could not think of anything but to drape from the front and take refuge in the Black Sea health resorts of the Caucasus ...

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On the outskirts of Odessa, in a hurry, and therefore not qualitatively, four defensive lines were created by the forces of the Primorsky Army, the Odessa Naval Base, residents of the city and nearby villages.

The land front was divided into three sectors: eastern, western and southern. The advanced line was 20-30 km from the city. The commanders of the naval base were responsible for everything that happened from the sea, and from the land, the commanders of the Primorsky Army, which, in the course of a chaotic retreat, was badly battered and lost a lot of tanks and artillery. The army had about 500 guns, but mostly of small caliber. Therefore, its firepower was reinforced by 44 coastal defense guns and naval artillery. Aviation counted 41 aircraft, and the naval sector had a fairly powerful mine and artillery position - more than 2.5 thousand mines and mine defenders and the same 44 coastal artillery guns of the fleet.

On August 8, 1941, a state of siege was introduced.

After that, local battles began with a different advantage of one or the other side. Gradually, Odessa found itself further and further behind the lines and represented an unfortunate misunderstanding for the German command, which took off a lot of strength and required special attention.

It was not easy for the defenders of the city either. The troops suffered significant losses, and the shortage of command personnel in rifle units reached 45 percent.

When the situation in Odessa became critical, a telegram signed by I. V. Stalin came: "Convey the request of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to the soldiers and commanders defending Odessa to hold out for 6-7 days, during which they will receive help in the form of aviation and armed reinforcements ". I draw the reader's attention to how incompetent in the Soviet army and navy were many commanders of formations who could not even take a step without Stalin's order. Occupying high positions, having high ranks, huge apartments, personal cars, special rations, special services for themselves, their relatives, wives and mistresses, they are not in harmony with this amount of all kinds of heavenly blessings.

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while standing, it was thought that "narrow problems" in a peaceful and combat situation should be "embroidered" not by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, but by himself. That is, to create the necessary reserves, to seek opportunities to resolve certain emerging problems. And they, the Soviet commanders of the Crimean Front and the Black Sea Fleet, played the role of ... postmen, distributing directives, orders and instructions from the People's Commissariat of Defense and Headquarters for lower commanders, and placed all responsibility for incompetent battles on ordinary soldiers, sailors, who, on duty, became penalty boxes.

A completely different picture was among the generals and admirals of the Third Reich. Field Marshal von Rundstedt practically did not need the advice of the Fuhrer or Keitel, and only occasionally consulted with a talented operator, Colonel General Alfred Jodl. To match the General Field Marshal were his generals, especially the talent of the most recent commander of the Second World War, General von Manstein.

Chapter 18

**BOLD AND BOLD?
STUNNING AND ILLITERATORY!**

From 16 to 20 September on the training ship "Dnepr", trans-

157th Rifle Division was transferred from Novorossiysk to Odessa . The escort ships were escorted by the cruiser Chervona Ukraine, the minesag Komintern, the destroyers Merciless, Bodry, Capable, Boiky, Frunze, minesweepers T-403, T-412, T-406, T- 409, T-483 and a dozen more boats. This enormous, exorbitant power protected from ... an attack by the Romanian submarine "Delfinul" and a possible raid by boats of the Romanian fleet equipped with machine guns. Yeah...

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But there was a really serious danger - this is the backlash of the twaffe of the 8th Air Corps of General von Richthoffen. But not because of the number of German aircraft, but because of the skillful tactical calculation of the headquarters of the German air corps, the high professionalism and physical training of the pilots, especially on the Yu-87. For example, when this attack aircraft was taken out of the peak, the load on the crew increased many times over.

At the same time, 36 penal companies were transported to Odessa, referred to in some memoirs as "marching companies".

Some authors of memoirs and participants in those events explain such a powerful cover for the delivery of one compound by the fact that "enemy aircraft dominated" in the sky. Come on, gentlemen-comrades admirals and generals! Yes, indeed, the Luftwaffe aviation gave heat to the troops from the Soviet army and navy ... But in order to exclude this, it was necessary for the chief of intelligence of the fleet, Colonel Namgaladze, as well as the head of the unit of the same name in the Odessa defensive region, to have undercover intelligence at the headquarters of the formations and associations of Army Group Center, including the Luftwaffe. Then the command of the Black Sea Fleet and the OOR would have had complete information about the sorties of the German Luftwaffe on this sector of the front or when the ships were moving from the Caucasus to Odessa. And knowing that such a sortie is carried out by the Germans, raise their aircraft into the air and impose a battle. Thus, to divert the pilots from the main goal of bombarding the convoy. After all, the Luftwaffe is not in the air all day and not all night. And the crowd of intelligence services of the fleet and the Navy, as well as state security and counterintelligence agencies, were paid big money not for torture in basements, and a carefree life in mansions ... Stalin's hearty bread also needs to be worked off.

And it turned out that on one side there was a minimum of possible troubles from one enemy submarine, on the other - a whole fleet, where more than half of the combat (!) Ships burn a huge amount of fuel and consume motor resources! What kind of "brilliant" heads do you need to have in order to fight like that ...

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And here in the sky "enemy aviation dominates"! And since we will have to mention the 8th Air Corps of the Luftwaffe more than once, I will add a few characteristic touches. In the preface to the book of General P. A. Morgunov "Heroic Sevastopol", written (or signed) by the Hero of the Soviet Union, Vice Admiral N. M. Kulakov, Vice Admiral I. I. Azarov, Hero of the Soviet Union, General Colonel-Engineer A.F. Khrenov, there are the following lines: "In October 1941, the Nazi command mobilized the 11th German Army and the Romanian mountain corps, which were supported by the German 4th Air Fleet, to capture the Crimea." Ah yes military leaders, ah yes professionals! They cannot distinguish the 4th Fleet, commanded by General Lehr as part of Army Group South, from the 8th Luftwaffe Air Corps under the command of General Wolfram von Richthoff, which was part of the 4th Fleet. But thanks to such fabrications, the reader, like these military leaders, is playing out the imagination that Odessa and Sevastopol were bombed by the whole 4th German air fleet, and not one of its corps. At the same time, they do not bother to explain to us the technical condition and losses of the 8th Air Corps, which carried out combat operations from the Mediterranean Sea to the territory of the Soviet Union.

A wonderful German trait - punctuality - would make life easier for future Soviet historians in many ways if they used German data in their historical works. The composition, deployment, transfer, engineering and technical condition of the German Air Force are painted literally according to ANYA.

From the combat log of the 8th Air Corps of the Luftwaffe under the command of General Wolfram von Richthoffe, it does not become clear that this air corps supported the offensive of the 3rd Panzer Group and the 9th Wehrmacht Army from the air, in the strip from Vilnius to Grodno, on the left flank Army Group Center. I note that this was one of the most productive and experienced formations of the Luftwaffe. Air groups from the 8th AK fought from the first hours of the beginning of World War II, passing through the Polish and French

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pania, through the "Battle of Britain", participated in air battles for the island of Crete. They were transferred to the Eastern Front from the combat zone over the Mediterranean Sea almost a few days before the start of the invasion. At the same time, I want to emphasize that many months of continuous hostilities led to a deterioration in the technical condition of aircraft, losses of ma

tires and flight personnel.

The bomber aviation of the 8th Air Corps consisted of three air groups of "horizontal" bombers (/K@2, Sh/K@2, PI K@Z). With a regular strength of the Luftwaffe air group of 40 aircraft, by June 24, 1941 in these

three groups in good condition each had 21, 23 and 18 aircraft. Yes, plus four command vehicles. On the same day, June 24, the 8th AK could lift 66 bombers into the air; and even then, mostly Dornier - Ro-17 /, - obsolete and already discontinued aircraft.

The main striking force of the 8th AK consisted of four groups of "dive" a-87s (P/5{@a1, Sh/{1, l\$@a2, Sh/{E2}). The formation of dive bombers, which were part of the Luftwaffe air corps, was the largest on the entire Soviet-German front! On the morning of June 22, there were 103 serviceable Junkers in service. But by June 24, four groups of dive bombers had 28, 24, 19 and 20 combat-ready aircraft, respectively. In total, including staff vehicles, - 96 aircraft. But every day there are less and less...

These figures can already be found in books of recent years, published in Russia. I personally came across similar figures in the archival materials of the Luftwaffe in Germany and in the archives of the apparatus of the International Communist and Labor Movement (in the former Secretariat of Comrade Stalin).

Here you have the numerical "superiority" of the enemy in aviation, here you have "superiority" in the air! But what really happened was everyday reconnaissance, when, for example, at the same fixed time, a German "frame", "Focke-Wulf-189", flew up to Sevastopol and photographed the situation. The coastal batteries were silent, firstly, because it is very difficult to knock down the "frame", and secondly, because the flash of the battery would have been detected by its sensitive equipment.

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After fighting in the area of Vilnius and Grodno, the 8th Air Corps of the Luftwaffe was for a short time, as having suffered heavy losses, withdrawn to the rear in order to rest the pilots, replenish crews and aircraft. They rested, by the way, in Romania, in Transylvania; after spending a week looking for Count Dracula (this joke was made by veterans of the 8th Air Corps). Before the start of the fighting in Odessa, the 8th Air Corps was 78 percent complete.

When transferred to the Crimea, its staffing did not exceed 49 percent. Replenishment up to 90 percent came only towards the end of the defeat of the Kerch grouping of Soviet troops.

Subsequently, in connection with the appointment of Field Marshal von Bock as Commander-in-Chief of Army Group South on January 18, 1942 (the appointment was also associated with the death of the previous Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal, 57-year-old Walther von Reichenau), Hitler had a decision was made to create a special Crimean Luf Twaffe zone, commanded by Ritter Robert von Grime (later Field Marshal of the Luftwaffe). But the existence of this zone was short-lived, but allowed

to General von Richthoffen to replenish his corps almost to the regular strength.

However, let us return to Odessa in 1941.

After the delivery of the 157th Infantry Division (SD) to Odessa, the "wise decision" of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was again needed, which recommended a joint strike from the sea and from land by the forces of the Black Sea Fleet and the Separate Primorskaya Army in the eastern sector.

The operation began on the night of September 21-22. The 157th SD under the command of Colonel D. I. Tomilov and the 421st SD under the command of Colonel G. M. Kochenov were to advance from the city. At the same time, the fleet was supposed to land the 3rd Black Sea Marine Regiment under the command of Captain K. M. Koren in the Grigoryevka area; the regiment was supposed to be landed from warships. For this purpose, you shared the cruisers "Red Crimea" and "Red Caucasus", es

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mines "Flawless", "Courageous" and "Frunze". According to the plan, the landing force was supposed to hit the rear of the enemy and thereby help the advance of two divisions between the Kuyalnitsky and Bolshoi Adzhalyk estuaries. Simultaneously with the sea landing in the Buldichka area, an airborne landing was planned. If the combined attack had been successful, then the Soviet troops could have cleared the northern coast of the Gulf of Odessa from enemy troops and removed the threat of shelling the port of Odessa from this direction.

The ships were supposed to deliver the paratroopers from Seva Stopol to the landing area, where, with the help of the landing craft brought from Odessa, the marines would get to the coastal strip. A detachment of ships was formed for the landing. Rear Admiral Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov, commander of the cruiser brigade, was appointed commander of the landing (later Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. However, as he fought, he received high government awards in the war and post-war period, having made us all hostages of nuclear ambitions, is a separate story. It should be borne in mind, first of all, the removal and disarmament of nuclear reactors withdrawn from the first combat line of nuclear submarines and SSBNs).

The landing forces included the cruisers Krasny Kavkaz (commander 2nd-Class Captain A. M. Gushchin); "Red Crimea" (commander captain of the 2nd rank A. I. Zubkov); a squadron of cadre destroyers under the command of Captain 2nd Rank B. A. Permsky. From the forces of the OOR, a detachment of landing craft was created - the gunboat "Red Georgia", the tugboat "Alupka", 22 boats and 10 longboats.

The air cover of the landing was assigned to the 63rd Aviation Brigade of the Fleet and the Aviation Regiment of the Odessa Defense Region.

The overall leadership of the forces was entrusted to the commander of the squadron, Rear Admiral L.A. Vladimirsky. This plan was drawn up at the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet.

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On September 21, at 6 o'clock, Rear Admiral L. A. Vladimirsky, with the Deputy Chief of Staff of the OOR, Captain 1st Rank S. I. Ivanov, left Sevastopol on the destroyer Frunze to deliver the amphibious landing plan to Odessa and agree with the detachment commander landing craft on issues of interaction with the main forces. This detachment consisted of 10 longboats, 12 boats, 10 small hunters, the gunboat "Red Georgia" and the tugboat "Alupka".

On the sea crossing on the beam of the Tendra Spit, the destroyer Frunze saw the sinking gunboat Krasnaya Armenia and tried to help her. But they themselves were attacked by German aircraft. What should be attributed to the big puncture of the intelligence of the Black Sea Fleet, headed by Colonel Namgaladze, and intelligence of the OOR,

From the hit of several bombs, the destroyer "Frunze" exploded and sank in a matter of minutes. Together with the crew, the captain of the 1st rank S.I. Ivanov died, and with him went to the bottom of the sea and documents with a plan for the landing of amphibious assault.

While Rear Admiral Vladimirsky, who was slightly wounded, flew overboard. Fortunately for him (or perhaps unfortunately), he was picked up by a torpedo boat and taken to Odessa. A few hours later, the admiral arrived at the Krasny Kavkaz cruiser and notified the commander of the amphibious landing that ... he was left without documents. And therefore, not knowing the content of the plan, he could not tell the commander of the de Santa the place and time of his landing, except perhaps only the conditional time for the start of the landing.

At 01:14 on September 22, the ships arrived in the proposed landing area and, without waiting for the landing craft detachment, after a short artillery preparation, with the help of boats, longboats and improvised means, they began the amphibious landing ...

The gunboat was late for the start of the landing, and the launches went ashore on their own, but ... lost their way and landed troops 5 cables east of the intended point. I had to wait for the boats, which only at dawn transferred this group of paratroopers to the place.

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After 40 minutes, a detachment of landing craft was finally delivered to the area. Yves 5 hours 10 minutes landing was completed.

The gunboat "Red Georgia" and the boats arrived from Odessa an hour after the start of the landing.

This "bold and daring operation", and in fact - not an operation at random in the conditions of war, is another performance of the connoisseur and tactician of the operational art of Admiral Isakov, in particular, his scientific work "Airborne Operation", which in 1934 published as a textbook by the People's Commissariat of Defense. At first, I.S. Isakov theoretically illiterately substantiated the landing operation, then, as the chief of the Main Naval Staff, he irresponsibly supervised the training through the chiefs of staffs of the fleets, the heads of the operational departments of these headquarters, how to land the sailors and their commanders.

At 1:30 a.m., near the village of Shitsli, a small detachment of paratroopers consisting of 23 people was thrown from a TB-3 aircraft, which, as the "historians" write, caused "some panic" among the enemy. But by the forces of the divisions of the Main Branch (Gestapo) of one of the divisions of the Wehrmacht, it was soon destroyed.

By dawn, the cruisers "Krasny Krym" and "Krasny Kavkaz" left for Sevastopol, proudly displaying their "barrels of the main and universal caliber", which "overheated" from ... failed firing at the enemy. Is the delivery of landing forces the main task of cruisers ?! Their task, in the event that there is no worthy surface enemy, is to organize artillery support for army units and landing troops, covering enemy positions with fire. However, what is smart? Both the headquarters of the OOR and the commanders of the cruisers simply fled from Odessa.

And the destroyers "Merciless", "Flawless" and "Fight cue" ... remained for fire support of the landing. You do not need to have much knowledge to understand that the artillery power of even three destroyers cannot be compared with artillery

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the Lerian power of departed cruisers. And the effect of firing from universal calibers and small anti-aircraft artillery (MSA), of course, did not bring the desired result to the marines.

One should, however, pay tribute to the naval paratroopers - in the eastern sector they inflicted significant damage on two infantry formations of the Romanian army. As a result of the landing on this sector of the front, the enemy was forced to retreat up to 10 km in depth, which to some extent deprived the enemy of the freedom of tactical maneuver.

But at what cost was this whole operation carried out!

The German Luftwaffe tracked the tactical operation of the landing quite clearly and delivered a powerful air strike. And since there was no fighter cover from the air in the operation, the destroyers became easy prey for German pilots. They inflicted heavy damage on the destroyer Bezuprechny, as a result of an accurate hit, the 1st and 2nd steam plants (stokers) and the engine room were out of order. The destroyer was left without a move, and only because the Yu-87 "pieces" used up their ammunition and flew away, the tugboats managed to tow the destroyer to Odessa.

By evening, the German dive-bombers again struck at the destroyer Merciless (commander - lieutenant commander G.P. Negoda), but he managed to evade direct hits. "In the next battle with air pirates, and now there were at least twenty of them, "Merciless" was also unlucky," shares with readers an almost "eyewitness", who was then an employee of the Morzavod, the author of the book "Ships are returning to service" M. Surguchev (p. 52). The blast wave ripped off the stem up to the 44th frame, flooded three cubes and the central post. No, it's not funny, it's a shame - the ship in reverse barely dragged itself to Odessa. But they failed to cope with the heroic ship and ... 20 enemy planes! Later, when moving to Sevastopol for repairs, the bow of the Merciless hull, which was submerged in water, broke off and sank into the sea. The destroyer Boikiy was also damaged in the battle.

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Who left three destroyers without air cover? It should not be repeated, all the same military leaders ...

On the other hand, the intricate inventions spread in the 1940s and subsequent years are popularized even today by the followers of the "truth" once and for all assimilated about the impeccable skill of Soviet soldiers. Here is a quote from the book "The Black Sea Fleet of Russia", published in 2002: "The aviation of the Black Sea Fleet provided great assistance to the landing force. During the landing, the pilots struck at the enemy reserves in the area of Sverdlovo, Kubanka, Aleksandrovka, and the Ilyichevka state farm. In the same period, OOR aviation launched assault strikes on enemy airfields in the area of Basen and Salza. The enemy lost 20 planes" (p. 225); if 20 aircraft were destroyed in one operation, then only five or six such sorties were enough to once and for all deal with the "superior enemy forces" (meaning the number of aircraft of the 8th Luftwaffe Air Corps, where during the Odessa operation, on average, there were 95-100 aircraft) in aviation and stop their "air supremacy"!

"Leaving the ships without fighter cover was the height of recklessness ...
- speaking of that landing, the authors indicate, whose opinion can be trusted in many respects. - Aviation of the Odessa defensive region, due to its small

strength could not fully ensure the fulfillment of the tasks that were dictated by the prevailing situation. By the beginning of the defense of Odessa, only 30 aircraft remained in the composition of the Primorsky Army, and the air forces of the Black Sea Fleet could provide only 41 aircraft. Since August, naval aviation and aviation of the Primorsky Army have been united into one grouping "(V. Dotsenko and G. Getmanets. "The Fleet in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945", St. Petersburg, M., 2005, p. 222-223) . But... stop, stop, stop! We read further: "In total, from August 24 to the evacuation of the garrison from Odessa, the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet carried out 15,000 sorties ... Over Odessa, Soviet pilots shot down 167 enemy aircraft and destroyed a lot of military equipment and manpower."

Where do such numbers come from? Yes, everything is from there, from reports that N. A. Ostryakov, the youngest Russian

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General (not counting Vasily Iosifovich Stalin). And he didn't sign because his intelligence chief reported: the intelligence officers found that the 8th Air Corps of the Luftwaffe had suffered such losses, due to which it did not carry out "massive" raids on Odessa. And if earlier General von Richthoffen, as a rule, sent a group of aircraft to carry out a combat mission in three waves of 10 aircraft, which Nikolai Alekseevich Ostryakov personally made sure during air reconnaissance while flying a fighter, then at the climax of the fighting in Odessa, the German general already sent "groups" in three waves, but already 4 combat vehicles each. And even then, provided that the intelligence of the Luftwaffe knew for sure that in a particular area of the sea or land there is an accumulation of transports or troops of the Red Army. In the literal sense, the mechanics and technicians of the 8th Air Corps (just like the Soviet aircraft mechanics) prepared each combat vehicle for a combat sortie throughout the night, assembling it piece by piece, piece by piece.

That is why General Ostryakov does not want to deal with postscripts, does not want to enter significant zeros that turn 1 into 10, and 10 into 100, and so on. He, a general with blue stripes, understands that his combat colleague, a general with white stripes, von Richthoffen, has almost no one to lift into the air, so each of his operations is verified and calculated to the smallest detail after carrying out the appropriate reconnaissance! Just as bravely and competently, using the data of his scouts, General Ostryakov himself wants and must fight. But ... After refusing to sign the exaggerated "bullshit", General Nikolai Alekseevich Ostryakov allegedly poisoned himself with stale food, fell ill and was sent to the medical unit, and his commissar put his signature in military reports to Moscow instead. Then why not the first deputy, not the deputy for flight training? Hence, from the fakes embedded in military history, that "120 (130, 157, armadas, countless hordes) of damned German vultures attacked the landing force" and similar lies. For what? The answer lies on the surface: in order to obtain permission from the Headquarters for additional weapons, equipment, and personnel. Beg for more strength, so that for-

to crush the enemy, if not by skill, then by quantity,

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lay corpses, suffocate under the mountains of equipment and bodies! Stalin was well aware of the established practice, he knew that most of the appointed commanders were simply liars, and therefore, as a rule, he reduced the requests of military leaders by half ...

However, there will be many times more enemy planes, given the assurances expressed by some Soviet "historians" that "massed strikes became more frequent after the relocation of the 10th air corps of the German Luftwaffe near Odessa", which in fact was not there. So where could this information come from? At that time, the 10th Air Corps, transferred from Greece and flying to Izyum, further to the bend of the Don near Kharkov, made an intermediate landing in the Crimea. To refuel and rest at airfields; at the same time, the wounded pilots were sent for treatment to a sanatorium, or were treated in the medical unit of their own. So some of the pilots, after recovery, ended up in the 8th Air Corps. When the downed German pilot was taken prisoner, during interrogation the Chekists found out that he had served in the 10th Air Corps, but after being wounded he was sent to the 8th ... Then, after years, Soviet historians took the reports of the Chekists, discovered there is the number "10", and the fake went to fit in-correspond. This is how History was falsified. This is how "countless hordes", "terrible armadas", "overwhelming forces" and "considerable superiority" arose ... - false concepts that cover up the anti-humanism of the Soviet system and the cowardice of its military leaders.

As an example, I will cite a story told to me by the former Oberst Lieutenant (Lieutenant Colonel) of the 8th Air Corps of the Luftwaffe Heinium-Wilhelm von Bulow. We met with him when, at the beginning of 1972, I arrived in Irschenhausen (Germany, Bavaria) to see Field Marshal Erich von Manstein.

During the fighting on the territory of the Soviet Union, the corps of General von Richthoffen suffered heavy losses during fierce air battles south of Vilnius. Horrified by the death of the flight personnel, the general, being in a state close to passion, took a kind of oath to himself. He called a soldier-artist to him and ordered to bring the most

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broad poster pen and red ink. After that, he demanded that on his white stripes of the general's trousers draw one red stripe across the stripes for each dead pilot or navigator. When his stripes turned completely red, General von Richthoffen decided, he, having not survived the death of so many young pilots, would be shot

pours itself.

Like any decent person and a truly talented military leader (whether German or Soviet), von Richt Hoffen was very worried about the death of each of his subordinates. At the height of the bombing of Sevastopol, the number of casualties became horrendous. The soldier-artist, so that the general would not carry out his plan, literally did not finish the red stripes on his stripes ... And this showed not toadying and servility, but sincere respect for his general, for the word of an officer, which does not just rush to the wind.

Chapter 19

"DUE TO THE THREATS OF LOSSING CRIMEA..."

For 2.5 months, while the defense of Odessa lasted, surface ships of the Black Sea Fleet made 165 exits to Odessa. As they write from the headquarters, "to carry out fire missions." During this time, they used up 11,000 shells, but then again - the ships all the time fell under well-calculated blows of the luff twaffe. On one of these exits at the end of August 1941, the German "Junkers" inflicted significant damage on the leader of "Tashkent" under the command of Captain 3rd Rank Vasily Nikolaevich Eroshenko. I will say that this unique ship was built in the mid-1930s, among those ordered by Comrade Stalin; in 1936, having passed tests in the Mediterranean Sea, near the Italian city of Livorno, he, under the command of Captain 2nd Rank L.A. Vladimirsky (later admiral, commander of the Black Sea Fleet during the war), came to Odessa, and then arrived in Sevastopol, where became in

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doc. By the way, with the beginning of the war in the German press, articles appeared from time to time, where it was written that secret ships of Italian construction, equipped with the latest technology, were sailing on the Black Sea under Soviet flags.

During the defense of Odessa, the coastal artillery of the fleet worked closely, which, supporting the counterattacking infantry, fired 18,000 shells. But the lack of prepared observation and correction posts significantly reduced the effectiveness of artillery. The issues of organizing adjustments and the necessary documentation were worked out already during the battles ... The interaction between the artillery of the fleet and aviation was not worked out, which is why the aviation of the fleet often "poured out" its ammunition on the positions of artillerymen. And they could shoot another time ... but not at the enemy, but at their mother infantry.

The OOR aviation was also very inefficient and, of course, was not in a position to fulfill the tasks imposed on it by the Luftwaffe aviation. There were only 30 aircraft in Odessa, while the Black Sea Fleet Air Force was able to allocate 41 aircraft; after which two

groups were combined into a common grouping.

Aviation losses were very significant. By the end of the battles for the city, the number of aircraft in the grouping had decreased by two thirds! And the rest were already half incompetent. Only once did aviation successfully strike at the positions of the 1st Romanian Cavalry Division - after reconnaissance on August 18 discovered the concentration of enemy troops in the Kagarlyk area.

Sea communications between Odessa, the ports of the Crimea and the Caucasus increasingly became the site of hostilities on both sides, because the stability of the defense of Odessa would depend on sea transportation - which both the enemy and the Soviet command understood.

But still, the Luftwaffe carried out its bombing and torpedo strikes more often than the bold "Soviet Stalinist falcons." Often, German pilots carried out up to 10 bombing and torpedo attacks on Black Sea transports per day. By the end of the defense of the city, as a result of the actions of the Luftwaffe, more than half died (and not a quarter, as ut

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historians say) of the tonnage available in the Black Sea basin of the Azov Sea by June 22, 1941.

Of the 46 lost transport ships, only 12 were sunk by enemy aircraft; several were killed by coastal artillery fire; the rest died from ... their mines and for other ridiculous reasons.

And claims here should be addressed to the command of the Black Sea Fleet, as it failed (or did not want to be able) to ensure maximum security of communications from the ports of the Crimea and the Caucasus to Odessa.

At the same time, the transport fleet made about 1000 voyages of owls; 696 - as part of convoys. Replenishment of ammunition was delivered, and the return flights took out, first of all, not children and the wounded, not women and the elderly (as Soviet agitpropists and their followers wrote), but ... party workers of the regional committee, city committee and district committees of the Communist Party of Ukraine and members of their families, then - employees of the Main Directorate of State Security for the city of Odessa and the region, the regional and city NKVD, the prosecutor's office, the court, special communications; the remaining seats after loading the "precious" passengers could go to the wounded, who could still be returned to combat formation. There was another category of people who were allowed to leave the city - local Jews; for the Jews knew well what awaited them if the city was occupied by parts of the Wehrmacht, and the Gestapo would come with them ... The townspeople, Ukrainians or Russians by nationality, were not included in the list of those saved, as, indeed, were the simplest, poorest Jews ...

During the defense of Odessa, not

50,000 soldiers, according to Soviet historians, and more than 160,000 Red Army soldiers, most of whom died defending the beautiful Ukrainian city. Almost half a million tons of military cargo and more than 150,000 tons of other cargo needed for the needs of the city were transported.

In September 1941, the OOR and the command of the Black Sea Fleet realized that Odessa could not be held; after which the secret evacuation of the party and punitive bodies, state security and the NKVD began.

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On September 30, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued an order: "In connection with the threat of losing the Crimean peninsula, which is the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, and in view of the fact that at present it is not in a position to simultaneously defend the Crimean peninsula and the Odessa defensive region, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided evacuate the Odessa region and, at the expense of its troops, strengthen the defense of the Crimean peninsula. People's Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov sent a directive to the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet, in which he demanded that the experience of evacuating troops from Tallinn, the main base of the Baltic Fleet, be taken into account in order to avoid a repetition of the tragedy.

At the same time, on September 30, vice-admiral Gordey Ivanovich Levchenko flew to Odessa by plane for the Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy, delivering the directive of the Headquarters on the evacuation of troops. He instructed the Military Council of the Fleet to begin evacuation the next day, October 1, with the dispatch of the 157th Rifle Division, which had the best combat capability.

On the same day, the first units of the formation were sent to Sevastopol on transport "Ukraine". But ... an incident occurred: many cabins and part of the cabins were occupied by senior officials of the regional committee, city committee, law enforcement agencies and members of their families. But Gordey Ivanovich showed firmness and inflexibility, and not without the help of the division commander and the guard platoon of the division headquarters, he expelled all the "patriots" of the Motherland. Communist comrades will still remember this to Admiral Levchenko ...

It should be noted that the People's Commissar of the Navy Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, knowing the capabilities of one of his deputies - G.I. Levchenko, was against his appointment as commander of the Crimean Front. At the same time, not without reason, believing that the naval chief, especially without experience in commanding army formations, will not be able to effectively fulfill the tasks assigned to him in leading army formations and fleet forces in the amount of more than 600,000 people in the Kerch bridgehead and about 300,000 in Sevastopol and on its outskirts, who will be under his control.

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However, Stalin ordered the people's commissar to leave this candidate round, as planned by the Headquarters. That, they say, the Black Sea Fleet is the main force in the Crimean theater of operations, and the territory of Crimea, as stated in the directive, is the main operational base of the fleet, then Levchenko is needed as a coordinator of relations between the command of the Black Sea Fleet and the command of the armies stationed in Crimea. In favor of this appointment, Stalin said, and the fact that the chief commander of the Odessa defensive region was a sailor, Rear Admiral Zhukov.

Nikolai Gerasimovich, after listening to the leader on the phone, firmly stated that, unfortunately, the OOR experience cannot be classified as positive. This infuriated Stalin, because the decision to create the OOR was the brainchild and an innovation in the decision of the Headquarters. The leader hung up. The people's commissar did not know that Levchenko, the head of the Main Staff, Isakov, had proposed the candidate for the tour. Who did not favor his boss and believed that Kuznetsov would be punished for the failure that befell the fleet in Odessa. However, this did not happen, and therefore Ivan Stepanovich decided that the catastrophe that had occurred was not enough to remove the people's commissar of the Navy. And, as they would say now, he "set up" his chief, putting forward Vice-Admiral Levchenko, unprepared for such activities. At the same time, having enlisted the support of his longtime protégé, a member of the Orgburo and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a member of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, People's Commissar of the State Control of the USSR, head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda, army commissar 1st rank Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis, who created in the Military Council In the southern direction, a special group of political workers, which included I. I. Azarov, N. I. Kulakov, L. I. Brezhnev and a number of other well-known figures of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

By the way, the future General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, although he was included in this group, during his work as deputy head of the political department of the Southern Front in the political rank of brigade commissar, and later head of the political department of the 18th Airborne Army in the rank colonel, did not show himself as a punisher, which for the most part were political workers.

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On the contrary - and it really is! - Leonid Ilyich possessed a special gift of penetrating persuasion, he was respected by officers and privates subordinate to him. He was believed, trusted; and what is important, he had the strength and courage to suppress in himself a certain weakness of character that could manifest itself during battles; Simply put, he was not a coward. This was also confirmed by retired Lieutenant Colonel Shtakhanovsky, who served in the 18th Army under the direct supervision of L.I. Brezhnev as a senior instructor of political affairs. He spoke positively about him more than once both in the postwar years and after the death of Leonid Ilyich.

The plan for the evacuation of the OOR garrison was corrected by the People's Commissariat of the Navy and approved on 4 October. A very narrow circle of military leaders was involved in its development.

At the same time, disinformation was launched that the first echelon was being withdrawn from the battles under the pretext of regrouping troops, and the population - "under the guise of unloading the besieged city on the eve of winter." The command of the enemy must be misled by this.

The city created the illusion of preparations for the winter defense. In fact, the withdrawal from the front of forces consisting of almost 37,000 military personnel (the rest of the soldiers and sailors died in battle or were captured) was of great difficulty. This number of people had to be put on ships during the night of October 16. For this purpose, 17 transports were concentrated in the port, the cruisers Krasny Kavkaz and Chervona Ukraina, 4 destroyers: Smart, Vigorous, Nezamozhnik, Shaumyan, 2 patrol ships: Petrash and Ku baths", 4 minesweepers, 20 patrol boats, other types of small vessels: schooners, barges, tugboats. The retreat was covered by coastal and naval artillery.

But the enemy still became aware of this night operation, and his aircraft launched a series of massive attacks on ships leaving the port of Odessa. As a result of the raid, warships were damaged, and several small ships, together with the defenders of Odessa, sank.

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With the beginning of the next night, the withdrawal of troops from the front line began. The enemy intercepted the retreat; rearguard action ensued. By 3 o'clock the landing of the main forces, as historians say, was completed. But it was not the landing that was completed, but ... the battles, since the remaining units and rearguard battalions were simply destroyed.

For the Wehrmacht and its command, the evacuation of troops from Odessa was not a surprise, but it was known that the batteries were blown up by the Soviets, and the port itself was mined ...

While crossing on 16 October, more than 30 Luftwaffe FE aircraft attacked the convoy. As a result, the Bolshevik transport and several small ships were sunk.

True, a report went to Moscow that it was not 30 enemy planes that attacked, but about 50. In intelligence, they corrected it again and wrote exactly 50 planes, adding that the enemy lost 17 planes. They didn't report on their losses ...

The report also stated that 86,000 military personnel and 15,000 civilians had been evacuated from 1 to 16 October. This is something from Odessa, in which the inhabitants

at that time there were hundreds of thousands. These 15,000 civilians are the party leadership, state security, the NKVD, the prosecutor's office, the court, the heads of punitive structures, special departments of SMERSH, as well as the "voluntary asset of the party and bodies" - otherwise how could it be without all these servants of the system listed above to keep in obedience to such an emotional city as Odessa ... And how could the authorities be left without such valuable personnel if they were given to the occupiers to be torn to pieces? They can be useful both in Sevastopol and in the Caucasus; yes you never know where else!

Soviet historians consider the evacuation of OOR troops to be brilliant, and even unsurpassed! - both in terms of results and art, moreover, "for the entire period of the Great Patriotic War." These historians could not think of a greater blasphemy, mocking those thousands and thousands of dead Ukrainians and Russians in this beautiful city in the south of Ukraine.

..The Romanian army entered Odessa on October 17, 1941.

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Chapter 20

THE MYSTERY OF THE MISSION OF THE BLACK SEA FLEET

After leaving Odessa, the Crimean Front was created.

And before talking about the tragedy of this front-line association, one should name the authors of its creation, indicate the goals and objectives, and most importantly, the motives that guided the participants in the events.

Soviet historians and their successors, like the former commanders of Soviet formations (armies) and higher formations (fronts) during the war years, have an amazing manner - to deliberately exaggerate the forces and capabilities of the Wehrmacht and reduce the presence of troops and weapons. It would seem that something simpler: maps and diagrams are given in printed sources, write on the one hand - such and such an army, so many formations, units, subunits, so many weapons, such and such a commander and such and such corps commanders and divisions. And on the other hand - the same thing, but about the forces of the enemy. And then it will become clear to everyone who is a smart military leader, and who is a fool, who has trained officers, and who has drunkards and lechers, who has soldiers come to fight, and who has to drape from the battlefield ...

But back to the Crimean Front.

Commander - since October 23, 1941 - Vice Admiral G. I. Levchenko.
At the end of December of the same year, he would be removed from his post and appointed in his place by Lieutenant General

and D. T. Kozlova. The chief of staff was Major General F. I. Tolbukhin (later Marshal of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Soviet Union, holder of the Order of Victory, commander of the troops of the 3rd Ukrfront), who, after the removal of Levchenko, would be replaced in January 1942 by Major General P. P. Eternal. Members of the Military Council were corps commissar A. S. Nikolaev, divisional commissar F. A. Shamanin. The representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were: Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR for armaments, Hero of the Soviet Union, Mar

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Grigory Ivanovich Kulik, the head of the Soviet Union, who, as it should be understood, provided (or was supposed to provide) the operations of the artillery of the front. And also a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (and we understand that this is the main person in Crimea), a member of the Organizing Bureau of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, People's Commissar of the State Control of the USSR, Head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army, Army Commissar 1st Rank Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis .

Organizationally, the Crimean Front is part of the Southwestern direction, headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny, whose headquarters is in Krasnodar. And given that the Black Sea Fleet is operationally subordinate to the Crimean Front, then the First Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy, the head of the Main Military School, Admiral I.S. Isakov, is sent to Budyonny, or rather, to Tuapse.

At the head of the party was General Secretary Stalin, who created within the Politburo a practically untouchable body of unlimited power - the Organizational Bureau (Orgburo) of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). So, a member of this Orgburo was Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis, appointed by Stalin as the representative of the Headquarters in the Crimea.

Behind this lay not only special trust, but also the special significance of the task that Stalin set for Mekhlis, sending him to the Crimea.

And now we come to the very essence of the secret mission of the Black Sea Fleet, assigned to it during the Second World War.

The official biography of L. 3. Mekhlis says that after the Crimean Front he was a member of the military councils of a number of fronts. Of course, Lev Zakharovich appeared at the front, and this happened quite often, but his tasks were completely different from those that were assigned to members of the military councils. All the commanders and members of the military councils of the fronts and armies, without exception, trembled before Lev Zakharovich! Why? Let's try to lift the veil. And only one single (!) time Stalin appointed him a representative of the Stavka, but ... an amazing thing - for the most, how many

6 Stalin could strike first 161

gim seems to this day, insignificant, auxiliary

new Crimean front. So

what is the secret of this appointment? Let's take a closer look...

The Crimean Front included:

- 44th Army (Hero of the Soviet Union, lieutenant general S. I. Chernyak, combat strength 250,000, reserve of the 2nd division - 40,000, 25 penal battalions - 37,500, replenished at the expense of the main combat strength). After the complete defeat, the former 9th Special Rifle Corps was introduced into the army, or rather, its remnant in the person of commander Lieutenant General P.I. Batov and several other officers; the newly formed corps became the usual 9th rifle corps and included 3 divisions of three regiments. In connection with the formation of the headquarters of the Crimean Front, Batov was appointed one of the deputy commanders of the front (presumably, with the sole purpose of destroying and destroying now not the corps, but the front);

Here is an interesting quote from P. A. Morgunov's book "Heroic Sevastopol": "Considering the important military-political and strategic importance of the Crimea, on August 14, 1941, the Stavka decided to form the 51st Separate Army on the basis of the 9th Rifle Corps as a front with the operational subordination of the Black Sea Fleet to it in matters of the defense of the Crimea" (p. 27); and no one doubts: how and why an entire army is being created on the basis of the corps ?! - and only if we take into account that this is the largest 9th Special Corps, then the decision taken acquires logic ...

- 47th Army (Major General K. S. Kolganov, combat strength 200,000, reserve 1 division - 20,000, 10 penal battalions - 15,000, replenished at the expense of the main combat strength):

- 51st Separate Army (commanded by Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov, and then Lieutenant General V. N. Lvov, combat strength 190,000, reserve 1 division - 15,000, 15 penal battalions - 22,500, replenished at the expense of the main combat strength);

- Air Force of the front under the command of Major General Aviation S.K. Goryunov - 3 air divisions of three regiments, in the regiment - 35 aircraft. In total, there are 350 aircraft in the army.

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- during the defense of the Kerch Peninsula, aviation of the troops of the Transcaucasian Military District (front) under the command of twice Hero of the Soviet Union for Lieutenant General of Aviation S.P. Denisov was also involved. It consisted of three buildings, in which there were a little more than 1000 aircraft

comrade and a separate air brigade in the amount of 100 aircraft. According to unofficial information, the district Air Force under the command of General Denisov had about 2,000 aircraft;

- as well as the Separate Primorsky Army under the command of Major General I.E. Petrov, upon arrival near Sevastopol, completed to full strength, which dispersed to defend the main naval base of the Black Sea Fleet. There were 300,000 people in the army, 30 penal battalions - 45,000, by the summer of 1942 the number of penal battalions was increased to 50 units, which were also replenished from the main combat personnel arriving from the Caucasus and from the depths of the RSFSR, Plus the artillery of the reserve of the Supreme High Command under command of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Kulik.

The Black Sea Fleet was also operationally subordinated to the Crimean Front.

At that time, these forces were opposed by the troops of the 11th Wehrmacht Army under the command of Colonel General Friedrich Erich von Lewinsky (Manstein) of Army Group South, led by Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt. The 11th Army included three corps, fairly battered in battles and not replenished (which Soviet and post-Soviet historians, admirals and generals never wanted (and do not want) to remember). When von Manstein took over the army, there were 75,000 Wehrmacht soldiers in three corps, but after an insistent request, the Field Marshal presented him with another 25,000 personnel, who were assigned to three corps.

Von Manstein's appointment took place on September 12, 1941, after the death of the commander of the army, Colonel-General of the Cavalry, Ritter Eugen von Schobert, on the Storch communications plane. Von Manstein had at his disposal

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an association consisting of the 54th Corps (General Erich von Hansen), the 42nd Mountain Corps (General Count Hans. von der Sponeck), the 30th Corps (General Hans von Salmuth), which included 6 infantry divisions and 2 mountain divisions, the 1st SS motorized division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", as well as the 3rd Romanian army (three mountain divisions and three cavalry brigades). The only powerful, in the opinion of von Manstein himself, was the 1st SS division, which bore the name of the Fuhrer.

After listening to the formation commanders and getting acquainted with the state of affairs in the army, General von Manstein clearly understood that he simply did not have enough manpower to carry out the task of simultaneously capturing the Crimea and Rostov-on-Don.

After weighing all the pros and cons and reporting on the acceptance of cases and

General Ludwig Kübler, General Ludwig Kübler, who was put in command of the 11th Army reserve, received the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group South, von Manstein received from Field Marshal von Rundstedt the 49th mountain corps of General Ludwig Kübler. But not for long.

At the same time, von Manstein reported to von Rundstedt that the problem of defeating the Soviet troops in the Crimea, as well as the defeat of the Sevastopol and Kerch groupings of troops, was a serious military undertaking that required many months of heavy fighting. The Field Marshal General, having calmly listened to the talented general, agreed with his opinion.

So, according to the staffing table, in one German army (the regular category of the commander is a colonel general), two or more corps are provided. General von Manstein has three of them plus one reserve.

As stated, he received 75,000 people, then received an additional 25,000; thus, the strength of the three corps increased to 100,000. But the number of divisions at von Manstein remains the same - 6 plus 2 divisions of Kübler in the 49th mountain reserve corps. Yes, plus the life standard "Adolf Hitler".

Total - 9 divisions.

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And according to the state, the division includes 15,859 soldiers and 6,358 horses for guzhtransport. In reality, General von Manstein had exactly 100,000 men, together with the reserve, for the entire army - much less than the regular strength, more than 1/3 is missing; that is, each division has an average of 9,000 soldiers. It would not be correct to say that this was a huge force, because the general had no tank support: not a single tank unit, not to mention reinforcement units and formations. True, there was also the 3rd Romanian Army (three mountain divisions and three cavalry brigades).

What these forces are, we can understand only in comparison, if we count the forces gathered in the Crimea by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for the defense of the Crimea.

And since the main person from the Central Committee of the party is a member of the Organizing Bureau of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, then he - L. 3. Mekhlis - was given selected and numerous forces drawn from all over the Caucasus, Kuban and from the South-Western direction, which is led by Marshal S. M. Budyonny. Only they didn't write about this in memoirs... But the reader knows very well that during the war we had such a charismatic figure as G. K. Zhukov. And wherever he appeared, there he, as a representative of the Headquarters and Deputy Supreme Commander, gathered the most powerful and most trained formations of the Red Army. That is, almost all available power

People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff! And try someone to object to the only Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief (but he will become one later, in 1943). And in 1941, the fate of the Soviet Union was decided not near Moscow and Leningrad, but in the south. And Stalin, like no one else, understood this. And to save his country, he needed not Zhukov, but the most influential and treacherous member of the top leadership of the party, which was Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis, a member of the Orgburo of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. And in the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Direction, a "people's hero" created by the agitprop (the department of agitation and propaganda of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6b)) and who did not pose a danger to Stalin personally was needed. Such a hero was Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny.

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And who would dare to object to such a unique person (both in terms of position and sophistication of deceit) who was a member of the Organizing Bureau of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis? There were none and there could not be.

But if Stalin sends such a person to the Crimea, then something out of the ordinary is here ...
What?!

Chapter 21

"PERSON OF HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE"

Von Manstein was and is being spoken about in different ways in the former SSSR. And more often than not, the characteristics given to him do not correspond to the inner essence of this talented commander of the twentieth century. Here is what David Irving writes about him: "Hitler's respect for Manstein bordered on fear." The highest representative of the Bundeswehr, General de Maizière, called this commander a "person of historical significance" in his address on the year of von Manstein's 80th birthday, emphasizing that his "fate was in many ways the expression of the fate of his nation." And the famous World War II expert B. H. Liddell Hart wrote: "The general opinion among the generals whom I had the opportunity to interrogate in 1945 was that Field Marshal von Manstein proved himself to be the most talented military commander in the whole army, and it is he who, first of all, they would like to see in the role of their commander in chief. Gerd von der Rundstedt, the oldest of the German field marshals, who came from an ancient aristocratic family, and many other German military leaders thought so too. Even Hitler once said: "Perhaps Manstein is the best brain that our General Staff Corps has produced." It is possible that it was for this reason that the Führer

he was afraid of him.

Friedrich Erich von der Lewinsky was born on November 24, 1887 in Berlin. His father is a Prussian aristocrat

tic family, General of Artillery Edward Ewald Erich von

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der Lewinsky, was a corps commander in the Imperial Reichs Faith. The military tradition of this family dates back to the time of the Teutonic Knights. His aunt Hedwig, the younger sister of his real mother Helen, had no children and begged the boy's parents (and Erich was the tenth child in the family) to take him up. The father and mother allowed her to adopt the child, transferring the baby after baptism to a foster family. Erich's stepfather was Lieutenant General von Manstein, a division commander in the Kaiser's army. By the way, the von Mansteins were already raising the adopted daughter of the brother who died early, sisters Helen and Hedwig von Sperling, who had close ties.

So over time, Erich became known as Fritz Erich von der Lewinsky, called von Manstein; in the USSR he was known for 60 years as Erich von Manstein.

Erich was educated at military cadet schools in Strasbourg. After graduation, he was enrolled in the 3rd Prussian Infantry Guards Regiment and on July 1, 1907 he was awarded a junior lieutenant. From 1913 to 1914 he studied at the military academy; already in those years, his military talent was appreciated by the leaders of the General Staff. He received his baptism of fire in the First World War, served as an adjutant in the 2nd Guards Reserve Regiment. He personally participated in battles in Belgium, East Prussia and Poland. He served under his uncle Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg. He was seriously wounded, after being cured in the first days of June 1915, he served as an adjutant at the headquarters of the 12th Army. Then he became a representative of the General Staff in the 2nd, then in the 1st Army on the Eastern and Western fronts.

After the battle of Verdun, he was appointed chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 4th Cavalry Division. And from May 1918 he was transferred to a similar position in the 213th Infantry Division on the Western Front.

Von Manstein met the end of the First World War in the rank of Hauptmann (Captain) and Knight of the Iron Cross 1st Class, was awarded the Order of the House of Hohenzollern. Natural talent, intelligence, a broad outlook in many areas of public and state life, as well as

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gaining combat experience opened the way for him to staff work.

After working for several years as a headquarters operator, he returned to the troops; at first he commanded a company, then a battalion, in 1933 he was awarded the rank of oberst (colonel), after which he was

appointed chief of staff of the 3rd military district in Berlin. In 1935, he was transferred to the post of head of the combat operations department of the General Staff. On October 1, 1936, he was awarded the rank of Major General. Since 1937 - Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

At that time, persecution of Jews in the army began in Germany. Some generals believed that such processes would not bring anything to the generals of the Wehrmacht and would not change anything. Von Manstein believed that the German army could not be international; only Germans should serve in it, while the Jews who lived in the Reich should be released from service and they should all leave German territory.

And there's nothing to be done - what happened, happened: already after the war, a letter was provoked and falsified, allegedly written by von Manstein to the leadership of the Wehrmacht, that he condemned the policy of discrimination against Jewish military personnel.

However, he brought a lot of fakes into the life of this person.

It should be noted that von Manstein, starting from 1945 and almost until his death at the age of 85 on the night of September 9 to June 10, 1973, was subjected to repeated mental influences, when actions were attributed to him that he never did and did. could not, primarily because of his aristocratic essence and high chivalric culture (as he himself repeated more than once). It should not be forgotten that he came from an ancient Prussian family, not so much from the Teutonic Knights, but "from the lineage of the leaders of the ancient Prussians" - as Erich von Manstein claimed. In his memoirs "From the Life of a Soldier", written by him in the 50s of the twentieth century, he emphasizes: "The spirit of the family was supported by the Christian faith and awareness of the honor of the Prussian officer." No wonder Erich was a strong proponent of cleanliness.

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of his nation. And he always believed that any nation has the right to be "clean" from any impurity imposed on it from the outside. At the same time, he normally treated the fact that sincere feelings of love can arise between representatives of different nationalities. But since he was opposed to the Jewish assimilation of his people (like many in the Wehrmacht), the love of a German for a Jew or a German woman for a Jew looked like a crime against the nation. Such were the views of the German General Field Marshal. And it was good about that at the time

which is known to all.

In 1939, von Manstein became a lieutenant general, was appointed head of the operations department at the headquarters of General von Rundstedt, and, together with Colonel Blumentritt, developed a plan for the invasion of southern Poland and the capture of Warsaw. During the invasion, he acted as Chief of Staff of Army Group South. He also developed and uni-

a hard plan, as a result of which France capitulated to the German Wehrmacht.

On July 1, 1940, he was promoted to the rank of General of the Infantry. At the end of February 1941, von Manstein was appointed commander of the 56th Panzer Corps, which included the 8th Panzer, 3rd Motorized, 3rd Motorized SS (the motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht and the SS did not have any one tank, but had motorcycles (1) and in tank groups served to reinforce, like infantry divisions) and the 290th infantry division. And during the invasion of the USSR, his corps was part of the 4th tank group of General Göppner, which was part of Army Group North under the command of Field Marshal von Leeb.

Von Manstein immediately distinguished himself in that he made a brilliant breakthrough of almost 300 km and, on the fifth day of the campaign, he saddled the bridge across the Western Dvina near the city of Dvinsk (Daugavpils), and then organized the rescue of the 10th Wehrmacht Corps, which was in the Soviet cauldron, surrounded and destroyed the 3rd Soviet army near the city of Demyansk.

And after the battles at Lake Ilmen, he ended up in Tavria.

After assuming the post of commander of the army, General von Manstein received an order to carry out two operas.

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tions: the capture of the Crimea and Rostov-on-Don. And since he did not have the strength to perform two tasks at the same time, he decided first to defeat the troops of the Crimea, since they still posed a danger to the oil fields of Romania and created a significant threat to the right flank of Army Group South.

On September 24, 1941, von Manstein, with the forces of the 54th Corps of General Erich von Hansen, launched an offensive against the positions of the 9th Special Rifle Corps of Lieutenant General P.I. Batov. Keeping the 49th mountain corps of General Ludwig Kubler in reserve, ready to throw to Sevastopol.

By the way, neither Soviet historians nor General Field Marshal von Manstein in his book (only the third, last, "permitted" option is known to the general public!) "Lost Victories" does not indicate that the 9th OSK was located on the Ishun heights; but they point out that only the Separate Primorsky and 51st Separate armies conducted the defense there (even in this situation, Soviet historians DO NOT realize that two armies are always more than one! - and shamelessly lie about "superior enemy forces"!).

The book, called "Lost Victories", or rather the history of its writing, has its own secret. As well as why Erich von Manstein, convicted by the tribunal after the end of the Second World War, was released from prison ahead of time and why the Soviets did not oppose this at all. How a secret remained and that: which of the Soviet high party

chinov was involved both in the liberation and in the writing of the book. Well, I'll leave those details for another time. Let me just say that in total Erich von Manstein prepared three versions of the manuscript: the first one was for Comrade Stalin and several of his loyal guardsmen; the second - for the most elite, including the highest generals; the third is for everyone. Of course, the true history of the events that took place in the 40s of the 20th century on the Crimean Peninsula was contained in the first version of the book, which I was familiar with (and which was provided to me from the secret archives of our service by order of my immediate superior before the trip to Germany).

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And in 1972, I happened to go to the Bavarian town of Irschenhausen, where the 84-year-old General Field Marshal of the Third Reich von Manstein lived out his life. I will not expand on what served as the basis for our meeting and how it took place (in general, there were several meetings). Of course, just a curious person, even one with power, and even more so a person from the USSR, could not get into an intimate conversation with him...

Then, in a conversation with me, Erich von Manstein confirmed that the 9th Corps of Lieutenant General P.I. Batov was in the autumn of 1941 on the Ishun Heights and was destroyed by him. By the way, this was already discussed in detail at the beginning of the twentieth century! century in popular historical programs on the TV channel Ostcoyegy.

Once again, I recall the above curious quote from Lieutenant General 11. A. Morgunov: "Given the important military-political and strategic importance of the Crimea, on August 14, 1941, the Stavka decided to form the 51st Rifle Corps on the basis of the 9th Rifle Corps. A separate army on the rights of the front with the operational subordination of the Black Sea Fleet to it in matters of the defense of the Crimea. But! On the basis of the 9th OSK, it is not the "51st Separate Army" that is being created, but the 51st Separate and Separate Primorsky Armies, i.e. two armies! On the abbreviation of two armies completely defeated near Odessa, two new ones are formed from the remnants of the corps, administration and headquarters of Batov. Corps, which in terms of the number of troops and military equipment and exceeded any army of the Red Army, with the exception of the 9th Special Army !!

To protect the left flank, the German commander left only the 30th Corps of General Hans von Salmuth and 3 weak Romanian brigades.

During the three days of the offensive, General von Hansen, with the help of his corps, destroyed more than 50,000 soldiers of the 9th Special Rifle Corps of General Batov, captured more than 140 tanks and more than 100 guns. More than 250,000 Red Army men and commanders surrendered, over 70,000 fled to the east and south of the peninsula.

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But the victory did not have to be used due to the fact that the left flank, where the 30th Corps of von Salmuth stood in Tavria, was attacked by the forces of two Soviet armies at once. In addition to the surrender of the Red Army, the reason for the defeat of the 9th USC was the fact that the Soviet troops were forbidden at that time to dig into the ground during the defense, that is, to bury the tanks, which were supposed to conduct continuous fire. This was taken advantage of by the soldiers and officers of the 30th district of General von Salmuth.

However, the 30th Corps withstood this blow, although the 3 Rumanian brigades were partly defeated and partly fled. The 30th Corps also suffered significant losses, in some regiments not even half of its staff remained. Then, in order to assist the 30th Corps, von Manstein was forced to throw the 49th Corps of General Kübler into the Nogai steppe, which, according to the plan, on the shoulders of the defeated Soviet 9th Special Corps, was supposed to make a breakthrough to Sevastopol. After the 49th Corps, together with the 30th Corps, released two Soviet armies, General Field Marshal von Rundstedt ordered that the 49th Corps be left in Tavria. Isn't it Jo-Suvorovian: to destroy a larger enemy with a smaller number? Two Wehrmacht corps - two divisions each, and two Soviet armies - each of them had 3 corps, in which there were 5 divisions! At the same time, von Rundstedt ordered von Manstein to place the SS division "Adolf Hitler" at his disposal; the commander of the 11th Army gave two regiments of the SS division, and left one in reserve, convincing the field marshal that the presence of at least one SS regiment would raise the spirit of his soldiers.

And indeed it is. Von Manstein was convinced of this even when he was a corps commander, and at that time it included the best SS division "Dead Head". Recalling her and the SS division Life Standard "Adolf Hitler", he told me:

"These were truly elite troops. The soldiers and officers, selected for their appearance, were all tall and flashy, brightly perceived in their black uniforms from their selves.

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ribbed trims and stripes. But all their qualities could not compensate for the lack of combat training of the commanding staff. And the SS division "Totenkopf" suffered colossal losses, since the commanders of the standards (regiments) and subdivisions of the division had to learn to fight in a combat situation, learn what the Wehrmacht regiments had long ago learned. I believed that the SS divisions should have been transferred to the complete subordination of the command of the ground forces on the Eastern Front. This would make it possible to quickly

these compounds are combat-ready. But I was not allowed to. During the course of the fighting, I was forced to provide assistance to the SS division all the time, but I could not prevent its greatly increasing losses. When the SS division "Death's Head" was under my command, after ten days of fighting, the three regiments of the division had to be reduced to two. I took this experience into account when I was given the SS life standard "Adolf Hitler" when I was in command of the 11th Army in the Crimea.

With their advance to the north of the Sea of Azov, the formations of the Red Army saved two military formations in the north of Crimea and three armies that were being formed on the Kerch Peninsula and Taman from further defeat.

But the right flank was exposed, into which the wedges of the 1st Panzer Army of General von Kleist crashed, who, together with von Manstein, carried out (30th Corps of General von Salmuth, 49th Corps of General Kübler and two regiments of the SS division "Adolf Hitler") On December 5-10, a large-scale operation to encircle Soviet troops. They completely destroyed the 18th Army (its commander and headquarters were killed) and completely destroyed the 9th Special Army - the most powerful military formation of the Red Army. About 1 million (!!!) Red Army soldiers were taken prisoner, all remaining tanks and guns of the 9th Special Army were destroyed. During these 5 days, the command of the Crimean Front and the Black Sea Fleet did practically nothing for the defense of the peninsula, because the entire command of both army formations and the fleet was infected with defeatist moods. Even despite the repressive measures of Mehlis and the security officers.

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After the competently conducted operations of the German troops, von Manstein came to grips with organizing the defeat of the troops of the Crimean Front, whose command did not take advantage of the respite that had arisen and did not carry out the necessary regrouping of their troops.

Chapter 22

VON MANSTEIN'S SECRET OF SUCCESS

The destruction of the elite 9th OSK, as well as the stampede of General Batov with his headquarters, political department and special department to the Kerch Peninsula, caused confusion in the minds of the red commanders. At the same time, south of Perekop, the command of the Crimean Front concentrated 15 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions - a new formation of units coming from Taman. This new formation was defined as the 51st Separate Army, headed by Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov.

And now we will make some necessary clarifications on the perturbations of the 9th USC, its disappearance and restoration in a different capacity either in the 51st Separate Army, then in the Separate Primorsky Army, or in the newly allegedly created 9th Rifle Corps.

When the Headquarters gave the order to evacuate Odessa, occupying the city, the majority of the Rumanian 3rd Army was redeployed to the rear of the 11th Army in Tavria. In Odessa, in addition to the Separate Primorsky Army (OPA), there were other units and formations that suffered heavy losses, and their remnants, by order of the Stavka, were transferred to the north of Crimea. They will serve as one of the starting points for the formation of the Crimean Front.

If you look at the map of the Crimea, then the units of the OPA will be placed on the left, and the remains of other units and formations on the right, they should merge into the 9th Special Rifle Corps. After the start of the offensive of the 11th army of the Wehrmacht

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an accurate and powerful artillery strike was delivered, then German aviation went into battle, which is why the forward units and formations of the OPA and the 9th OSK located on a narrow section of the isthmus were defeated. And part of the UPA forces rolled back to Simferopol; the other, surviving part of the 9th USC began to roll to the east of the peninsula. After that, the command of the Crimean Front decided to stop the running units, the decision to understaff the OPA and parts of the defeated 9th OSK, renaming it the 51st Separate Army.

This was so in the directive documents of the Headquarters and the Crimean Front, but the further development of events in the north of the Crimea and the subsequent catastrophic defeat of the UPA and the 51st Separate Army showed the complete failure of the Soviet troops, and primarily its command, in battles with small forces of the 11th th army of the Wehrmacht.

After the second defeat, General Batov fled to Kerch, where he was stopped by the Chekists, who reminded him of his stay in the Sukhanovskaya prison. And Pavel Ivanovich assured the Chekists that he would carry out any of their orders and defeat the enemy at any cost. And since the army and the corps were defeated, but the banner of the corps was preserved, the 9th Special Corps was "reborn" as a simple 9th Rifle Corps as part of the 44th Army. The gold embroiderers had to tinker a little, removing the significant word "Special" from the scarlet brocade.

After the end of the war, during the first 10-15 years in the circles of Soviet historians and ideologists, a fake about the results of the Great Patriotic War began to form. And, fulfilling the Stalinist testament, the agitpropists could not show their people that the gigantic 9th Special Rifle Corps, which was armed with tanks, artillery, vehicles, other weapons and ammunition, was not able to resist the insignificant power of the 11th Wehrmacht army.

And then he disappeared from the annals of history! And the Soviet military commanders, guided by the guidelines of the ideological department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, strayed from the true state of affairs, recklessly distorting the events of the war, especially its first two years. Hence the falsifications and confusion.

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So, a new formation, defined as the 51st Separate Army, headed by Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov, deployed at the line of Genichesk - Sivash - Perekop. Believing that this will close the path to Sevastopol for the advancing Wehrmacht. In total, this grouping of troops included about 300,000 Red Army men and commanders, of which 30 penal battalions of 1,500 people each were later formed (after each battle they were replenished from the main army, formed on Taman), and another each division - a penal company of 500 people (a total of 19 penal companies).

After the transfer of the 49th mountain corps of General Kubler and two regiments of the SS Life Standard "Adolf Hitler" to the Army Group "South" in the Rostov direction, General von Manstein had only 6 divisions, with 4 infantry and 2 mountain, and 1 SS regiment, which deprived him of even elementary maneuvering. And there were 3 mountain divisions of the Romanians. There were just over 70,000 Wehrmacht soldiers in 6 divisions. Perhaps, someone considers 3 formations of Romanian soldiers - forces Loi, BUT THIS "force", as von Manstein told me, "he was ready to give to anyone or leave in the rear to protect not very important objects." |

The ratio (approximate) of forces was in favor of the Soviet troops only in the east of the Crimea - 300,000: 70,000 (ground troops).

Finding himself in such a difficult situation, the commander of the 11th Army, who did not have the habit of begging for reserves from the high command, once again made an extraordinary decision. "... it was also difficult for me to recognize someone's authority only on the basis of public opinion. Therefore, even when I grew up, I could not become a silent performer," the field marshal admits in his book of memoirs "From the Life of a Soldier".

He summoned the chief of staff of one of his corps, Major General Heinz Ziegler, and assigned him the task of

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in the very next few hours, form an operational-sabotage brigade, which will include two of the three battalions of the SS regiment of the SS division "Adolf Hitler", also in the

brigades include five assault companies from the army corps and a reconnaissance battalion of the 22nd Lower Saxon infantry
hot regiment.

Addressing Ziegler, the commander said:

- General, you do as you see fit, but first of all I destroy headquarters, communication centers, command posts with aviation and artillery, after which the soldiers, having lost control, surrender en masse with weapons.

This phrase contains the key to understanding what was happening in the Crimea!

It was easy to fight the Soviet army, having learned its weak points! This was the secret of the success of the talented general von Manstein, who made extraordinary decisions in each particular battle. |

After that, von Manstein gave a cipher to Generalfeld Marshal von Rundstedt, so that in the next week it would be desirable to deliver 2-3 battalions of marine paratroopers from the Reich. The request was granted and the Luftwaffe aircraft under the command of Oberst Lieutenant (Lieutenant Colonel) Heinz Wilhelm von Bülow delivered the paratroopers.

The battle lasted 10 days.

The German divisions, as a result of the competent actions of the German general von Manstein, dealt a crushing blow and defeated the main forces of the Crimean Front. They took prisoner more than 100,000 Red Army soldiers, more than 300 guns (which were inactive due to the lack of delivery of shells from Sevastopol) and 160 tanks.

But the time had not yet come for the capture of Sevastopol by von Manstein.

On October 30, he led his troops on the offensive on the Balaklava heights, and on December 17 he launched an assault. As soon as the operation entered a critical phase, the command of the Crimean Front, on the initiative of the Headquarters, decided to strike from the side of the Kerch Peninsula.
Multiple

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the preponderance of forces, of course, was on the side of the Soviet armies. The balance of forces at this moment: 600,000 of the main structure of the three Soviet armies against 70,000 of the Wehrmacht, which had to be broken into two parts - between the Sevastopol and Kerch bridgeheads.

Erich von Manstein, having suspended the assault on Sevastopol, transferred part of the forces of the 54th Corps to the eastern direction near Kerch and took up a tough defense. The commander of the corps previously located here, General Count Hans von

der Sponeck was removed from his post and subsequently put on trial by the Third Reich for abandoning positions by parts of the entrusted corps (the corps included 1 incomplete division!) And as having allowed the enemy to break through. But he was sentenced to death not for this, but for participating in a conspiracy against Hitler.

So the 54th Corps wintered, conducting positional battles. In the new year, 1942, von Manstein was awarded the next rank of Colonel General. All this time there was an intensive development of various options for conducting battles with the Red Army and its destruction in the Crimean theater of operations.

What was being done at that time in the headquarters of the Crimean Front and the Black Sea Fleet? This will be discussed below.

And so, after a slushy winter and the wonderful months of the Crimean spring, unexpectedly, in early May, von Manstein transferred the main forces to the east, bringing down 5 infantry divisions from the six available infantry divisions on the Kerch bridgehead. But on the long winter evenings, special units of his army spread disinformation among the inhabitants of the Crimea, and with the help of agents and in the location of the Soviet troops, that after the October offensive on Sevastopol, von Manstein had no more than two divisions and three Romanian brigades. The disinformation was taken into account; red commanders breathed a sigh of relief ...

Therefore, it was a complete surprise that 5 enemy divisions and 75 German tanks from the 22nd Panzer Division appeared near Kerch, which, as Field Marshal promised, was supposed to help von Manstein in defeating the Soviet troops in April 1942. 22nd Panzer Division

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macht was formed in France in September 1941. Part of her forces in the amount of 75 tanks. operated for a day on the Kerch Peninsula, which gave Soviet historians a reason to record in their "scientific annals" the very dubious fact that the 22nd Panzer Division took part in the battles on the Kerch Peninsula and that this division "took part in the battles to capture Sevastopol". And according to the codes of the Soviet Information Bureau near Sevastopol, there were ... more than 400 tanks. Other sources report that 450 tanks stormed Sevastopol. It was from such fantasies that the 22nd Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht was born.

In the collection of I. Moshchansky and A. Savin "The struggle for the Crimea, September 1941 - July 1942" us. 79 indicates that by June 30, 1942, i.e. by the beginning of the assault on Sevastopol "... the 22nd separate (?! - ed.) tank division included: 28 T-2 tanks with a 20-mm gun; 114 tanks 38 (I) of Czechoslovak production with a 37-mm gun; 12 G-3 tanks with a 33 mm gun; 11 T-4 tanks with a 75-mm cannon with a barrel length of 24 calibers; 11 T-4 tanks with a 75-mm cannon with a barrel length of 40 calibers. A total of 176 tanks." These figures are pre-

raised several times even for a fresh tank division! Whereas part of the 22nd Panzer Division in the amount of 75 tanks, which carried out a raid on the Kerch Peninsula, was recalled the next day to the Rostov direction, where Soviet troops broke through the German defense line. The 22nd Panzer Division was brought into the 17th Wehrmacht Army, which was advancing into the bend of the Don.

A. Basov's book "Crimea in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" (edited by Academician A. M. Samsonov, author of historical works on the Second World War) on p. 169 in the table "The balance of forces and means of the parties by the beginning of June 1942" in the column "Tanks" we see that the Germans were armed with 450 tanks and the ratio of forces by tanks was 1:12 in favor of the Wehrmacht. There, on p. 319, in the table "Ground forces of the German-fascist bloc operating in the Crimea in 1941-1944. gg.", compiled on the basis of the "Collection of materials on the composition, grouping and regrouping of the ground forces of fascist Germany and the troops of its former satellites in the Soviet

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German front for 1941-1945. (M., 1955-1956, issue 1-4), the author nevertheless writes that the 22nd Panzer Division was sent from May 21 to 24 to the 17th Army.

So what kind of Wehrmacht tanks were near Sevastopol?

Field Marshal von Manstein at our meeting said that heavy tanks with thick armor were needed to storm the fortress of Sevastopol, but by May 1942 they would not be there yet, because the Tiger tanks and the Ferdi Nand self-propelled gun would appear only in 1943 .

During the assault on Sevastopol, "heavy German tanks" (as well as numerous German submarines and myriads of enemy aircraft) existed only in the reports of Admiral Oktyabrsky, the generals of the Crimean Front and their political workers, who reported to Headquarters: "30 tanks knocked out... 40 ... 100 heavy enemy tanks ... ".

However, the Field Marshal General decided to use the heavy Soviet tanks taken as trophies near Kerch; he had already ... 9 combat units corrected and ready for battle! They were indeed sent to Sevastopol, where they were to fight in the area of Sugar Loaf. But a strict order was received from the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of Army Group South, Field General Marshal Reichenau, to ban the use of Soviet weapons in the fight against the Soviets. And these tanks in the amount of 9 combat units were sent to Germany for study by tank designers of the Reich.

However, the 224th separate tank battalion was sent from France to the Crimea, equipped with "heavy" French-made B-2 tanks in the amount of 17 tanks, 12 of them were in the flamethrower version. An important nuance: the weight of the "vra-

"zhest" tank V-2 - 32 tons, while the Soviet-made T-34 tank, belonging to the class of medium tanks, weighed more than 40 tons. But these 5 tanks, following with tanks of other units across the territory of Ukraine in a separate , were derailed by Soviet saboteurs of Colonel D. Medvedev. Following in another echelon, 12 flamethrower tanks with a flamethrower firing range of up to 40 meters arrived in the Crimea, but ... never entered the battle.

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There is nothing to say about the Romanian tanks - they were destroyed near Odessa. Some Soviet historians reproach the Field Marshal in absentia for the fact that if he spoke in his memoirs, it was only about Wehrmacht tanks; and at the same time allegedly did not take into account the tanks that were in the SS division "Life Standard" Adolf Hitler ". But for a short time, out of the entire division of the SS Manstein, there was only 1 regiment, which did not have a single tank.

As an experiment, German designers in April 1942 tested radio-controlled tanks. It was a company from the 300th tank battalion, equipped with V-[U (54.K#.301) tanks, the weight of which did not exceed 5 tons, and the armor was 10 mm. But they were not tanks or even self-propelled guns, but children's toys the size of a bed. Which von Manstein refused, saying contemptuously: "These are a burden, not tanks."

- Is it possible, - said von Manstein, - to consider those assault guns of the 190th light division in the amount of 18 combat units of the 5i@ Sh Ats\$Yo S/O as a formidable weapon? Or assault guns in the composition of 22 \$a @ Sh Atsze SO of the 197th division, delivered to the Crimea on November 3, 1941? ...You yourself know what happens in the Crimea in late autumn. At the same time, during the November thaw, these assault guns got stuck far from Sevastopol, in the valley of the Kacha River.

So, on the next day of the stay of 75 tanks from the 22nd Panzer Division in the Crimea, von Manstein received an order to return all these tanks. The order was carried out. There were never any more tanks in von Manstein's army in the Crimea when he was in command of the 11th Army!

Simultaneously with his divisions, von Manstein brought the Romanian corps into battle, and from the air his troops were intensively supported by the pilots of the 8th Air Corps of General Wolfram von Richthofen, equipped mainly with Yu-87 dive bombers and Mer fighters covering them. 109.

And again, in 10 days of fighting, Colonel-General von Manstein completely destroyed two Soviet armies - the 44th

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the army of Lieutenant General Chernyak and the 47th Army of Major General Kolganov, and also defeated the main forces of the 51st Army of Lieutenant General Lvov!

About 50,000 people remained from the army of General Lvov. More than 350,000 Red Army men and commanders were taken into the Ilen, more than 2,500 guns and 400 tanks were captured.

Awesome battle lineup! This is truly a Suvorov-style war (!!!), when a smaller number but a greater number; you just have to keep your head up...

Whereas the own losses of the troops of Colonel-General von Manstein amounted to only 7,500 people - out of 50,000. In five divisions thrown on the Isthmus of Parnap, the presence of personnel did not exceed 10,000 soldiers in each (with a regular strength of 15,859 soldiers) . The Commander-in-Chief of Army Group "South" planned that after the defeat of the Kerch grouping of Soviet troops, he would replenish the 11th Army from the reserves coming from Germany. However, the reserves did not come, but this did not upset Field Marshal Shal von Rundstedt. He did not interfere at all in the actions of subordinate generals, and even more so in the actions of von Manstein, realizing that he would get out in any case.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that Soviet sources indicate different information about Soviet prisoners of war and losses of weapons and military equipment. How is it not said that as a result of the brilliant maneuver of the German commander, three Soviet armies were practically destroyed, all the Air Forces of the Red Army operating on this sector of the front, and auxiliary units and rear. Only the political workers who fled to Taman, from the regimental commissar and above, as well as most of the special officers of SMERSH and part of the detachments, survived.

The generals of the Crimean Front, as if pursued by evil fate, being in passive defense, publicly recognized the superiority of the Wehrmacht, which very, very ... upset General von Manstein. In this regard, he bitterly recalled decades later:

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- Of course, I understood why the Soviet generals were subject to such a defeatist mood. On the one hand, they were well aware that their authority among the Russian soldiers was extremely low, on the other hand, they were depressed by the fact that as soon as the German units surrounded the Soviet formation or association, the Gestapo officers quickly identified political workers and security officers by special signs, but in first line - the Jews. So the Soviet generals Batov, Chernyak, Lvov perfectly imagined what awaited them in the event of capture ... It's bad on both sides: Russian soldiers